Crosland v. Hall

33 N.J. Eq. 111
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery
DecidedOctober 15, 1880
StatusPublished

This text of 33 N.J. Eq. 111 (Crosland v. Hall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crosland v. Hall, 33 N.J. Eq. 111 (N.J. Ct. App. 1880).

Opinion

The Chancellor.

On the 24th of December, 1877, the complainant, Sarah Cros-land, held the legal title to a tract of land of about eighteen acres, in Landis township, in the county of Cumberland, and, according to the bill of complaint, was the owner thereof. The property was improved. There was on it a dwelling-house, besides other buildings and improvements. It appears to have been worth about $5,500. She also owned certain personal property on the premises, consisting of household furniture in the house, [112]*112fanning and gardening implements, farm products &c., of the value of from $500 to $600. Prior to the day above mentioned, December 24th, 1877, she concluded to go, with her children, to Australia, to which place she was to be followed by her husband. On that day she exécuted and acknowledged, with her husband, a deed of conveyance in fee of the real property, but neither any consideration nor any grantee was mentioned in the instrument. Blanks for both were left in it, to be filled up when the husband should have found a purchaser for the property. Their object was to provide the husband in this way with the means of conveying the property in the wife’s absence. She gave him no authority in writing to fill the blanks or deliver the deed. She afterwards departed for Australia, in February, 1878, taking with her her children, leaving her husband here, and leaving the deed in his possession for the purpose before mentioned. In December, 1878, Crosland agreed with Reuben P. Hall to convey the real and personal property to him in consideration of the assignment to the former of one-half of certain letters-patent, and the royalty thereunder, for what was called a " medico-electric ” plaster. The agreement was carried out. The name of Hall’s wife was, at his request, inserted in the deed as grantee. The blank for the consideration was filled so that the deed expressed a consideration of $6,000. The personal property was, at Hall’s request, also transferred to his wife. An assignment of the interest in the letters-patent was made to Crosland. When [113]*113the bargain was made there was a mortgage of $400 on the Crosland property. At the making of the agreement for exchange, Hall agreed to lend Crosland $500 to enable him to go to Australia. To raise that money and $200 for himself, Hall » and his wife executed a mortgage for $700 to Crosland on the property, which Crosland was to negotiate. Leverett Newcomb, to accommodate Crosland and to enable the latter to get the $500 by means of the mortgage for $700, agreed with Hall and Cros-land to advance the $200 to Hall on the security of the assignment of the bond and mortgage by Crosland to him. He took the assignment accordingly, and advanced $20 on account of the $200 to Hall at the time, and agreed to pay the balance of the $200 in five or six days thereafter. A few days afterwards, he paid to Hall $24.10. Shortly thereafter, Crosland, having become suspicious that Hall had defrauded him in the exchange, borrowed $80 of Newcomb to pay his expenses to Chicago, where he went to make inquiry about the patent. A new assignment of the bond and mortgage was thereupon made by Crosland to New-comb, to secure the. sum of $280, the amount which Newcomb had agreed to pay Hall and the $80 lent by him to Crosland. Afterwards, Crosland having become satisfied that Hall had defrauded him, forbade Newcomb to pay Hall any more money, but Newcomb, notwithstanding, did, on Hall’s demand, pay him the balance of the $200. Hall and his wife, soon after the exchange was made, went into possession of the Crosland property, [114]*114and have held it ever since. The complainant knew nothing of the transaction with Hall (she went to Australia and has never returned), until after it bad been completed. She never affirmed, but, on the contrary, repudiated it. She knew nothing of the transaction with Newcomb. She brings this suit by her next friend to obtain a decree declaring the deed and the transfer of the personal property, and the mortgage to Newcomb, void, and requiring Hall’s wife to reconvey the property, real and personal, to her, and Newcomb to give up the mortgage to be canceled. Her claim to relief is based on the ground that the deed for the real property is void, because, though it was signed and acknowledged by her, yet there was then no grantee named therein, and she never gave lawful authority to her husband or any one else to insert therein the name of any person as grantee; and next that the deed was obtained under fraudulent misrepresentations made by Hall to her husband. As to the mortgage, she insists that-if the deed to Hall’s wife is void, the mortgage is void also. I do not consider it necessary to pass upon the question whether the deed is void in law or not. I am satisfied that the conveyance of the land and the transfer of the personal property ought to be set aside on the ground of fraud. In the exchange, Hall made a false representation of at least one very material fact to Crosland. The complainant, in her bill, alleges that Hall represented to Crosland that he had received for half of the royalty under the patent, $800 a year, in quarter-yearly payments. The answer not only denies that he made that statement, but alleges in substance that what he said was that he had received $200 a yeai", in quarter-yearly payments. But Crosland swears that Hall told him, when they were bargaining for the exchange, that the half of the royalty under the letters-patent had paid him and was then paying him $800 a year, and was getting better all the time, and was only in its infancy.” Major Walker, a counselor at law in "Vineland, at whose- office and by whom the blanks in the deed were filled, and the assignment of the interest in the patent-right and royalty drawn, and by whom the execution of it was witnessed, testifies that while they were in his office, at the time of the exchange of the papers, [115]*115Hall said that he had received from the royalty from $300 to $500 a quarter, and that that income would enable Crosland to live at his ease. Crosland swears to the same conversation. The defendants, Hall and wife, by their answer, not only deny that he told Crosland that Hall had received, for half of the royalty, $800 a year, but they give the impression that they mean to say that he never made any representation on the subject to Cros-land at all, but that all the representation that was made was made, not to Crosland, but to the complainant herself. They swear, in the answer, that the complainant herself, in or about October, 1877, offered to sell the property to Hall in consideration of the half interest in the letters-patent and royalty, and that he told her that the amount received was $200 a year; but it is clear that this statement is entitled to no credit whatever. It is true, they produce a witness, Ransford P.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Bishop v. Small
63 Me. 12 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1874)
Pike v. Fay
101 Mass. 134 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1869)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
33 N.J. Eq. 111, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crosland-v-hall-njch-1880.