Crosland v. Hales

CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedApril 13, 2021
Docket2:20-cv-00612
StatusUnknown

This text of Crosland v. Hales (Crosland v. Hales) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crosland v. Hales, (D. Utah 2021).

Opinion

CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

TROY CROSLAND, et al., MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART Plaintiffs, PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL Vv. Case No. 2:20-cv-612 JNP CHRISTOPHER D. HALES; CANDACE KANAHELE, District Judge Jill N. Parrish Defendants. Chief Magistrate Judge Dustin B. Pead

Before the court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Discovery.! (ECF No. 132.) As set forth below, the court GRANTS the Motion in part and DENIES it in part. The court declines to award Plaintiffs attorney fees and costs finding them not warranted in the current circumstances.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (a)(5)(A)(iii) (“other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.”). BACKGROUND This case arises from alleged violations committed while Defendant Christopher Hales sold purported securities or investment contracts to Plaintiffs for a company called “Sindakit Software.” Compl. § 8. Mr. Hales has been charged criminally for the conduct that occurred, and was charged previously in 2010 for similar conduct.* Defendant Candace Kanahele was married to Mr. Hales in May 2019. Plaintiffs contend that Ms. Kanahele has benefited from Mr. Hales’ scheme and used ill-begotten funds to purchase various items. Plaintiffs bring claims for breach

' This matter is referred to the undersigned in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A) from Judge Jill Parrish. (ECF No. 7.) 2 The court has determined that oral argument would not be materially helpful and will decide the motion on the basis of the written memoranda. DUCivR 7-1(f). 3 See USA v. Hales, Case No. 2:10-cr-183 TS; USA v. Hales, Case No. 2:20-cr-323 TS.

of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, for violations of the securities laws, and fraudulent conveyance or transfer from Mr. Hales to Ms. Kanahele. Plaintiffs seek judgment in the amount of $1,000,000 plus attorney fees and costs. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs move the court to compel Defendant Candace Kanahele to provide complete and responsive answers to their discovery requests. Plaintiffs also seek attorney fees and costs under Rule 37. As in other discovery disputes, the base standard by which this dispute is judged against is Rule 26. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.

F.R.C.P. 26(b)(1). Considerations of both relevance and proportionality govern the scope of discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment. Relevance is “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on” any party's claim or defense. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). When the requested discovery appears relevant, the party resisting discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevancy by demonstrating that the requested discovery (1) does not come within the scope of relevancy as defined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal relevancy that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure. See Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp. v. Lear Corp., 215 F.R.D. 637, 640 (D. Kan. 2003). The consideration of proportionality is not new, as it has been part of the federal rules since 1983. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note to 2015

amendment. The court has a duty to limit the frequency or extent of discovery if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in this action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by [the rule].

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

On December 29, 2020, Plaintiffs served their First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Admission and Requests for Production of Documents. Ms. Kanahele answered on February 16, 2021, but Plaintiffs assert the responses were unsatisfactory and filed two discovery dispute letters with the court. (ECF No. 37, ECF No. 38.) Receiving no additional responses, Plaintiffs then filed the current motion on March 28, 2021. Ms. Kanahele’s response to the motion contains some additional answers to the discovery requests. Plaintiffs maintain these additional responses are still unsatisfactory. The court turns to the requests as set forth by Plaintiffs. I. Interrogatories Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory #1 states: Identify and describe every employment you have had for the past five (5) years preceding the time of answering these interrogatories. Include the employer name; location or city of location; dates or approximate dates of hire and termination; title or name of position held; a general description of job duties; and the rate or method of compensation.

(ECF No. 44 p. 3.) The court finds this Interrogatory relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims concerning fraudulent conveyance. Ms. Kanahele responded that she has made “great money as a Master Estehetician, Nutritionist, Personal Trainer, Wellness Instructor, Life Coach, Interior Decorator, Designer, Model, Producer, Marketer, Social Media Influencer, as well as many other occupation titles,

however too many to list, nor pertinent to this case.” (ECF No. 42 p. 2.) Although a good start, this response is insufficient. It fails to list dates or approximate dates of hire and termination, a description of any job duties, methods of compensation, employer names, locations or the title of any position held. As such, Defendant is ordered to provide additional responses to this Interrogatory. Interrogatory # 2 asks, “Where did you get the money to purchase the residence at 354 North 20 West Vineyard, Utah?” (ECF No. 44 p. 3.) The court finds this Interrogatory relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims. There is no direct response by Ms. Kanahele. Defendant provides she previously “rented a run down twin home in Orem” yet, Defendant also provides that she has “always been able to afford a home such as the one my children and I are living in now.” (ECF

No. 42 p. 3.) Defendant avers that Co-defendant Mr. Hales “depleted [her] personal finances] by borrowing money from her.” These answers lack the requisite specificity under the Rules. Defendant is to provide further responses.

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Related

Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders
437 U.S. 340 (Supreme Court, 1978)
General Electric Capital Corp. v. Lear Corp.
215 F.R.D. 637 (D. Kansas, 2003)

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Crosland v. Hales, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crosland-v-hales-utd-2021.