CROOM v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

• Court: District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
• Decided: January 6, 2023
• Docket: 2:22-cv-03817
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DEREK T. CROOM, : Plaintiff, : : v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-CV-3817 : CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al., : Defendants. :

ORDER AND NOW, this 6th day of January, 2023, upon consideration of Plaintiff Derek T. Croom’s Motions to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF Nos. 6, 8, and 11), Prisoner Trust Fund Account Statements (ECF Nos. 5 and 10), Motion for Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 4), and pro se Complaint (ECF No. 1), it is ORDERED that: 1. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 2. Derek T. Croom, #617429, shall pay the full filing fee of $350 in installments, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), regardless of the outcome of this case. The Court directs the Warden of the Detention Center or other appropriate official to assess an initial filing fee of 20% of the greater of (a) the average monthly deposits to Croom’s inmate account; or (b) the average monthly balance in Croom’s inmate account for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of this case. The Warden or other appropriate official shall calculate, collect, and forward the initial payment assessed pursuant to this Order to the Court with a reference to the docket number for this case. In each succeeding month when the amount in Croom’s inmate trust fund account exceeds $10.00, the Warden or other appropriate official shall forward payments to the Clerk of Court equaling 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to Croom’s inmate account until the fees are paid. Each payment shall refer to the docket number for this case. 3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Order to the Warden of the Detention Center. 4. The Complaint is DEEMED filed. 5. Croom’s claims against the 24th and 25th Districts of the Philadelphia Police

Department are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for the reasons stated in the Court’s Memorandum. 6. Croom’s remaining claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for the reasons stated in the Court’s Memorandum. 7. Croom may file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order in the event he can allege additional facts to state a plausible claim against an appropriate defendant. Any amended complaint shall identify all defendants in the caption of the amended complaint in addition to identifying them in the body of the amended complaint, shall state the basis for Croom’s claims against each defendant, and shall bear the title “Amended Complaint”

and the case number 22-3817. If Croom files an amended complaint, his amended complaint must be a complete document that includes all of the bases for Croom’s claims. Claims that are not included in the amended complaint will not be considered part of this case. When drafting his amended complaint, Croom should be mindful of the Court’s reasons for dismissing his claims as explained in the Court’s Memorandum. Upon the filing of an amended complaint, the Clerk shall not make service until so ORDERED by the Court. 8. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Croom a blank copy of the Court’s form complaint for a prisoner filing a civil rights action bearing the above civil action number. Croom may use this form to file his amended complaint if he chooses to do so.1 9. If Croom does not wish to amend his Complaint and instead intends to stand on his

Complaint as originally pled, he may file a notice with the Court within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order stating that intent, at which time the Court will issue a final order dismissing the case. Any such notice should be titled “Notice to Stand on Complaint,” and shall include the civil action number for this case. See Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2019) (“If the plaintiff does not desire to amend, he may file an appropriate notice with the district court asserting his intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an order to dismiss the action would be appropriate.” (quoting Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976))); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 703–04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding “that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the otherwise viable claims . . . following plaintiffs’ decision not to replead those claims” when the district court “expressly warned plaintiffs that

failure to replead the remaining claims . . . would result in the dismissal of those claims”). 10. If Croom fails to file any response to this Order, the Court will conclude that Croom intends to stand on his Complaint and will issue a final order dismissing this case.2 See Weber,

1 This form is available on the Court’s website at http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/forms/frmc1983f.pdf.

2 The six-factor test announced in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff’s intention to stand on his complaint. See Weber, 939 F.3d at 241 & n.11 (treating the “stand on the complaint” doctrine as distinct from dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order, which require assessment of the Poulis factors); see also Elansari v. Altria, 799 F. App’x 107, 108 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Indeed, an analysis under Poulis is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the case or makes adjudication impossible, as would be the case when a plaintiff opts not to amend his complaint, leaving the case without an operative pleading. See Dickens v. 939 F.3d at 239-40 (explaining that a plaintiff’s intent to stand on his complaint may be inferred from inaction after issuance of an order directing him to take action to cure a defective complaint).

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Mitchell S. Goldberg MITCHELL S. GOLDBERG, J.

Danberg, 700 F. App’x 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Where a plaintiff’s conduct clearly indicates that he willfully intends to abandon the case, or where the plaintiff's behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication of the case impossible, a balancing of the Poulis factors is not necessary.”); Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six Poulis factors in cases where a party willfully abandons her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).