Crooks v. Ignoramis

Opinion

WILLIAM GRANT CROOKS, Case No.: 3:20-cv-0407-LAB-RBM

Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING SECOND v. AMENDED PETITION WITHOUT PREJUDICE IGNORAMIS, et al., Respondents. On March 2, 2020, Petitioner, a civil detainee proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which he appeared to be challenging his continued involuntary commitment to Patton State Hospital, after being found not guilty by reason of insanity in 1982. (See Pet., ECF No. 1.) On March 4, 2020, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice because Petitioner failed to satisfy the filing fee requirement, failed to state a cognizable claim and failed to name a proper respondent. Petitioner was instructed that to have this case reopened he had to (1) either pay the filing fee or provide adequate proof of his inability to pay and (2) file a First Amended Petition no later than May 8, 2020. (ECF No. 2.) On April 1, 2020, Petitioner paid the $5.00 filing fee and filed a First Amended Petition, pursuant to this Court’s Order. (ECF Nos. 3 & 4.) On April 8, 2020, the Court dismissed the First Amended Petition for failure to state a cognizable claim and gave Petitioner until May 16, 2020 to file a Second Amended Petition. (ECF No. 5.) On May 14, 2020, Petitioner filed a Second Amended Petition. (ECF No. 6.) The Second Amended Petition must be dismissed because Petitioner has failed to allege exhaustion of state judicial remedies. Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state court conviction or the length of their confinement in state prison, must first exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). To exhaust state judicial remedies, a California state prisoner must present the California Supreme Court with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of every issue raised in his or her federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry, 481 U.S. at 133-34. Moreover, to properly exhaust state court remedies a petitioner must allege, in state court, how one or more of his or her federal rights have been violated. The Supreme Court in Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995) reasoned: “If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution.” Id. at 365-66 (emphasis added). For example, “[i]f a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him [or her] the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he [or she] must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court.” Id. at 366 (emphasis added). Nowhere on the Petition does Petitioner allege that he raised his claims in the California Supreme Court. In fact, he specifically indicates he did not seek such review. (See Pet. at 6–8.) If Petitioner has raised his claims in the California Supreme Court he must so specify. “The burden of proving that a claim has been exhausted lies with the petitioner.” Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997); see Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1998); Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997); Oyler v. Allenbrand, 23 F.3d 292, 300 (10th Cir. 1994); Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1994). Further, the Court cautions Petitioner that under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) a one-year period of limitation shall apply to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of: (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2006). The statute of limitations does not run while a properly filed state habeas corpus petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). But see Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (holding that “an application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance [by the appropriate court officer for placement into the record] are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.”). However, absent some other basis for tolling, the statute of limitations does run while a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001). Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides for summary dismissal of a habeas petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . .” Rule 4, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. Here, it appears plain from the Petition that Petitioner is not presently entitled to federal habeas relief because he has not alleged exhaustion of state court remedies. Based on the foregoing, the Court DISMISSES the Second Amended Petition without prejudice because Petitioner has failed to allege exhaustion of state judicial remedies. IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED THAT JUDGMENT BE ENTERED DISMISSING THE PETITION AND THE ACTION. Dated: July 9, 2020 / g / 4. ‘4, W/V Larry Alan Burns Chief United States District Judge