CROOK v. GRACEVILLE CF FDOC
This text of CROOK v. GRACEVILLE CF FDOC (CROOK v. GRACEVILLE CF FDOC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA PANAMA CITY DIVISION
RONNIE HOWARD CROOK,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 5:25cv53-TKW-HTC
GRACEVILLE CF FDOC,
Respondent. _________________________/
ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Petitioner Ronnie Howard Crook, an inmate in the Florida Department of Corrections (“FDOC”) proceeding pro se, submitted a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Doc.1, and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, Doc. 5. Upon review, the motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, but the undersigned respectfully recommends the petition be dismissed under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases because Crook has failed to exhaust his available state remedies. I. BACKGROUND Crook was convicted in 1999 of arson in the Tenth Judicial Circuit Court for Highlands County Case No. 1988 CF 54 and sentenced to thirty (30) years’ imprisonment. Doc. 1 at 1. He claims the FDOC has “frozen” his tentative release date at May 21, 2029,1 even though Crook should have been granted ten (10) days of gain time per month, making his release date November 21, 2024. Id. at 5. He
requests this Court order “all my earned gain time be awarded” and he “be released immediately and FDOC pay for every day” he has been falsely incarcerated.2 Id. at 14.
II. LEGAL STANDARD Under Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, the Court must promptly examine a habeas petition, and “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must
dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” Rules Governing Habeas Cases, Rule 4. If the petition is not dismissed, “the judge must order the respondent to file an answer, motion, or other response within a fixed time, or to
take other action the judge may order.” Id. III. DISCUSSION It is a long-standing prerequisite to the filing of a federal habeas corpus petition that the petitioner must first exhaust available state remedies. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (quoting Picard v.
1 The FDOC website also states Crook’s “Current Release Date” is “05/21/2029.” See https://pubapps.fdc.myflorida.com/offenderSearch/detail.aspx?Page=Detail&DCNumber=27512 9&TypeSearch=AI. 2 Monetary damages are unavailable in this action. See Prieser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 493 (1973) (monetary damages are available in a § 1983 action but not in a habeas petition). Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (citation omitted)). Under § 2254, a petitioner “shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). Here, for Crook to have exhausted “any available procedure” he must have
completed all steps of the FDOC’s administrative grievance procedures, see Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-103.005 to 33-103.007, and he must have filed a petition for writ of mandamus or a state habeas petition with the circuit court. See Goldwire v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 4:22-CV-173-WS/MJF, 2022 WL 1693981, at *2 (N.D. Fla.
May 12, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:22CV173-WS/MJF, 2022 WL 1686876 (N.D. Fla. May 26, 2022) (“In Florida, a challenge to a prison disciplinary proceeding is properly filed as a petition for writ of mandamus in the
appropriate circuit court.”). Crook, however, has not completed either procedure. First, Crook did not complete all steps of the FDOC’s administrative grievance process. The FDOC’s grievance procedures generally require an inmate to (1) file an informal grievance with a designated prison staff member, (2) file a
formal grievance with the warden’s office, and then (3) submit an appeal to the Office of the Secretary. Id. While Crook attached his institution-level grievances to the petition, Doc. 1 at 27-28, he did not attach any attempted appeal to the
Secretary. Instead, he argues “F.D.O.C. is not doing the processing of formal appeals” and “I must start at institutional level but they have refused to process appeals.” Id. at 11. FDOC regulations are clear, however, that the failure of an
FDOC official to timely respond at any level requires the prisoner to proceed to the next step in the administrative process or, if none remain, to proceed with state judicial remedies:
[E]xpiration of a time limit at any step in the process shall entitle the complainant to proceed to the next step of the grievance process. If this occurs, the complainant must clearly indicate this fact when filing at the next step. If the inmate does not agree to an extension of time at the central office level of review, he shall be entitled to proceed with judicial remedies as he would have exhausted his administrative remedies
Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-103.011(4). Thus, even if the FDOC is failing to process his appeals, he must still proceed to the next level and eventually proceed to state court. See Pavao v. Sims, 679 F. App’x 819, 825–26 (11th Cir. 2017) (“even assuming that the prison failed to respond to that grievance, the grievance procedure provides that he could have ‘proceed[ed] to the next step of the grievance process’— administrative appeal—after the expiration of 20 days.”). Second, Crook did not file a petition for writ of mandamus or habeas corpus in the circuit court. See Williams v. Moore, 752 So.2d 574, 575 (Fla. 2000) (holding that “the [state] circuit courts are the proper place to adjudicate these issues of fact” concerning the application of gain time for prisoners.). In Pruitt v. Jones, 348 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 2003), the court held that discretionary review of a habeas petition to the Alabama Supreme Court under that state’s law, even though discretionary with the court, was required, because discretionary review must be
sought “[i]n order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c),” unless such review would be considered “extraordinary.” The Florida Supreme Court in Williams, supra, made it clear that discretionary review in the circuit courts
is not extraordinary, but is the proper place to resolve gain time issues. Because Crook did not exhaust his state remedies, this case should be dismissed. IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 1. The motion to proceed in forma pauperis, Doc. 5, is GRANTED, and Crook may proceed without paying the filing fee.
2. The clerk shall provide a copy of this Report and Recommendation to the Warden at Graceville Correctional Facility and to the Attorney General of Florida and if the Respondent wants to waive exhaustion, then he shall file a notice of waiver within fourteen (14) days of this Order.
Additionally, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that: 1. The petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Doc. 1, be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust available state remedies.
2. That the clerk be directed to close the file. At Pensacola, Florida, this 8th day of April, 2025. s/ Hope Thai Cannon
HOPE THAI CANNON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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