Cronier v. Cronier

540 So. 2d 1160, 1989 WL 21362
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedFebruary 28, 1989
Docket88 CA 1505
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 540 So. 2d 1160 (Cronier v. Cronier) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cronier v. Cronier, 540 So. 2d 1160, 1989 WL 21362 (La. Ct. App. 1989).

Opinion

540 So.2d 1160 (1989)

Jessie Marie Weathers CRONIER
v.
John Marshall CRONIER.

No. 88 CA 1505.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

February 28, 1989.

Leo J. Landry, Jr., Judycki & Landry, Morgan City, for plaintiff.

Nicholas F. Larocca, Jr., Lippman, Mahfouz, Martin & Larocca, Morgan City, for defendant-appellant.

Before CARTER, LANIER and LeBLANC, JJ.

CARTER, Judge.

This is an appeal from a trial court judgment granting the parties a separate from bed and board and awarding custody of three minor children to the mother, subject to the father's visitation rights. The trial court judgment restricted the father's visitation with his minor daughter.

*1161 FACTS

The trial judge, in his written reasons for judgment, correctly set forth the pertinent facts and a succinct synopsis of the testimony of each witness. A copy of the reasons for judgment, which we adopt as our own, is attached hereto as "Appendix 1."

The father appealed the trial court judgment assigning the following errors:

1. The trial court committed error in admitting the testimony of the Department of Health and Human Resources case worker and clinical psychologist in evidence contrary to the provisions of La.R.S. 46:56.
2. The trial court abused its discretion in restricting appellant's visitation with his children in the absence of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant subjected his child to sexual abuse.

ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY

The father contends that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the social worker and clinical psychologist who investigated the allegations of sexual abuse and/or evaluated the parties relative to the allegations of sexual abuse. The father reasons that LSA-R.S. 46:56 provides that such information is confidential and prohibits the release of such information for any purpose not directly connected with the administration of DHHR programs. The father contends that because the information gathered pursuant to such an investigation was admitted in contravention of LSA-R.S. 46:56, the matter should be remanded for retrial, excluding the confidential information.

LSA-R.S. 46:56 H provides as follows:

(1) Information pertaining to foster care of children, reports and investigations on abuse or neglect of children, and records of other child welfare services administered by the department, including handicapped children's services, nutrition, immunization, and other medical and public health services records pertaining to children and where such records are in the custody of parish health units or regional and central offices of the office of preventive and public health services of the Department of Health and Human Resources, shall not be subject to subpoena in any judicial proceeding for legal separation, for divorce, or for custody of children incidental to a proceeding for legal separation or divorce.
(2) In the event of the issuance of a subpoena for such information, or for any representative or employee of the Department of Health and Human Resources or any of its offices to testify concerning the contents of any such record as described in Subsections B and H of this Section, the attention of the court shall be called to the provisions of this Section. Counsel for the department may request counsel for the party against whom such evidence and testimony is intended to be used to assist in obtaining a timely stay order to quash the subpoena. If the court for good cause shown, refuses to quash the subpoena, the department and its employees shall then comply as directed by the court. (Emphasis added).

A careful reading of this statutory provision shows that the statute clearly permits representatives or employees of DHHR to testify concerning the contents of its records if the court, for good cause shown, refuses to quash the subpoena. "Good cause shown" is not specifically defined in LSA-R.S. 46:56, and there is little jurisprudence interpreting the statute. See State v. Stamm, 527 So.2d 367 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1988) and Watson v. Department of Health And Human Resources, 394 So.2d 1316 (La.App. 1st Cir.1981). However, in cases involving the medical privilege of LSA-R.S. 13:3734, the court has determined that, although suits for separation and divorce are not statutorily enumerated exceptions to the general prohibition against the disclosure of information made to a health care provider, certain circumstances warrant an implied waiver or justify abrogating the privilege.

In Arsenaux v. Arsenaux, 428 So.2d 427 (La.1983), the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:

*1162 LSA-R.S. 13:3734 provides that, in civil cases, a patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose any communication made to a health care provider which enables the provider to diagnose, treat, prescribe or act for the patient except in certain instances. The exceptions are: the contest of a will or an instrument transferring property by one deceased; death cases; workmen's compensation suits; and personal injury actions. Suits for separation and divorce are not included in the enumerated exceptions.
* * * * * *
The statute is quite clear about which civil cases constitute a "consent" or waiver of the medical privilege. See Wing v. Wing, 393 So.2d 285 (La.App. 1 Cir.1980). Since the legislature had delineated the civil suits which waive the privilege, an additional judicial exception would contravene the statute and flout the law. LSA-C.C. art. 13. Because Ms. Arsenaux's physical condition is not an essential element of her suit, no implied waiver of the privilege should be inferred. Compare Randa v. Bear, 50 Wash.2d 415, 312 P.2d 640 (1957).
Not only is the trial court's interpretation of the statute correct, but there are strong constitutional considerations weighing against admission of this evidence. The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides in Article 1, § 5, that "[e]very person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy...." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) recognized a constitutional right to privacy concerning abortion in the early stages of pregnancy. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976) held that a woman is protected from husbandly as well as governmental intrusion in deciding whether to terminate a pregnancy. This constitutional right to privacy is not absolute but can only yield to a compelling state interest. Roe v. Wade, supra. No compelling state interest requires an invasion of the right to privacy here. See The Abortion Privacy Doctrine: A Compendium and Critique of Federal Court Abortion Cases by Professor Lynn D. Wardle.
The court of appeal erred in reversing the trial court's ruling on evidence relative to the alleged abortion. The wife did not waive her statutory privilege and right to privacy by filing suit for separation and contending that she was free from fault. (footnotes omitted) [428 So. 2d at 429-430]

In Dawes v. Dawes, 454 So.2d 311 (La. App. 4th Cir.1984), writs denied,

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Bluebook (online)
540 So. 2d 1160, 1989 WL 21362, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cronier-v-cronier-lactapp-1989.