Cromer v. Tanner

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedApril 17, 2026
Docket2:25-cv-11227
StatusUnknown

This text of Cromer v. Tanner (Cromer v. Tanner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cromer v. Tanner, (E.D. Mich. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAMES EDWARD CROMER,

Petitioner, Civil No. 2:25-CV-11227 Honorable Jonathan J.C. Grey v.

JEFFREY TANNER,

Respondent. ____________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S RULE 60(B) MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT (ECF No. 11) AND APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner James Edward Cromer’s Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. (ECF No, 11.) For the reasons stated below, the motion is DENIED. Petitioner previously filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, in which he attacked his 1990 conviction for second-degree murder, armed robbery, assault with intent to do great bodily harm, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. The Court treated the motion as a second or successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus being brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and on August 19, 2025, transferred the case to the United States Court of Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) for Petitioner to obtain authorization to file a second or successive habeas petition. (ECF No. 5.)

On December 19, 2025, the Sixth Circuit issued an order, in which it agreed that Petitioner’s habeas petition is successive and “[denied] Petitioner’s motion for authorization to file a second or successive habeas

corpus petition.” In Re Cromer, No. 25-1747 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2025) (ECF No 8).

Petitioner has now filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, in which he argues that this Court erred in (a) treating his prior motion for relief from judgment as a successive habeas petition and

(b) transferring it to the Sixth Circuit instead of addressing the merits of the issues raised in his motion. He also appears to suggest the Sixth Circuit erred in denying him permission to file a successive habeas

petition. An individual seeking to file a second or successive habeas petition must first ask the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing

the district court to consider the petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 641 (1998). When a habeas petitioner files a second or successive petition for habeas corpus relief in the district court without preauthorization from the court of appeals, the district court must transfer the document to the court of appeals. See 28

U.S.C. § 1631 (directing that “[w]henever a civil action is filed in a court ... and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action ... to any other such

court in which the action ... could have been brought at the time it was filed”); In re Sims, 111 F.3d 45, 47 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that “when a

prisoner has sought § 2244(b)(3) permission from the district court, or when a second or successive petition for habeas corpus relief or § 2255 motion is filed in the district court without § 2244(b)(3) authorization

from this court, the district court shall transfer the document to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631.”). To the extent that Petitioner seeks authorization from this Court to

file a successive habeas petition, any motion to authorize a second habeas petition is not properly before this Court. This Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a § 2244 motion. See Riggleman v. W. Va. Dep’t of Corr., 174 F.

App’x. 168, 169, n. 1 (4th Cir. 2006). To the extent that he challenges the Sixth Circuit’s prior decision to deny him permission to file a successive habeas petition, this Court lacks the power to alter the Sixth Circuit’s decision. A district court lacks the authority to reinstate a habeas petitioner’s second or successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus after

the Court of Appeals declines to grant the petitioner leave to file such a petition. See White v. Carter, 27 F. App’x 312, 313–314 (6th Cir. 2001). This is consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E), which states that the

grant or denial of an authorization to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition “shall not be appealable.” Further, it shall not be a

subject for a petition for a rehearing or for a petition for a writ of certiorari. In Re King, 190 F.3d 479, 480–481 (6th Cir. 1999). Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the

motion for relief from judgment (ECF No. 11) is DENIED. Because the Court is denying the Rule 60(b) motion, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s request to proceed in forma pauperis.

SO ORDERED. s/ Jonathan J.C. Grey Jonathan J.C. Grey Dated April 17, 2026 United States District Judge Certificate of Service

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First-Class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on April 17, 2026.

s/ S. Osorio Sandra Osorio Case Manager

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Related

Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal
523 U.S. 637 (Supreme Court, 1998)
In Re Jonathan Sims, Janice v. Terbush
111 F.3d 45 (Sixth Circuit, 1997)
In Re Terry Lynn KING, Movant
190 F.3d 479 (Sixth Circuit, 1999)
Riggleman v. West Virginia Department of Corrections
174 F. App'x 168 (Fourth Circuit, 2006)
White v. Carter
27 F. App'x 312 (Sixth Circuit, 2001)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Cromer v. Tanner, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cromer-v-tanner-mied-2026.