NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 23 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KELLYE CROFT, No. 24-6150 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:24-cv-00371-PA-AGR v. MEMORANDUM* JAMES DOLAN; HARVEY WEINSTEIN; AZOFF MUSIC MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC.; JD & THE STRAIGHT SHOT, LLC; DOE CORPS, 1-10,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 8, 2025 Pasadena, California
Before: M. SMITH, CHRISTEN, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Kellye Croft appeals the district court’s order granting Defendants’
motions to dismiss her claims brought pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 1595. As relevant here,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Defendants include James Dolan (together with Dolan’s rock band, JD and the
Straight Shot, the Dolan Defendants) and the Azoff Company Holdings LLC and the
Azoff Company LLC (collectively, the Azoff Defendants). Plaintiff asserted a direct
liability claim against the Dolan Defendants. Plaintiff also asserted a beneficiary
liability claim against the Azoff Defendants, arguing that they had constructive
knowledge of Dolan’s actions or, alternatively, that they had an agency relationship
with Dolan. The district court dismissed both claims. Because the parties are
familiar with the facts of this case, we do not recount them here except as necessary
to provide context for our ruling.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Doe v. Grindr Inc., 128 F.4th 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2025).
We may affirm dismissal “on any ground supported by the record, even if it differs
from the rationale of the district court.” United States v. Perez-Garcia, 96 F.4th
1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2024). We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s
direct liability claim against the Dolan Defendants because Plaintiff has not
plausibly pleaded illicit means. We also affirm dismissal of her beneficiary liability
and vicarious liability claims against the Azoff Defendants.1
1 Plaintiff does not challenge the dismissal of her state law tort claims. Accordingly, we do not reach them.
2 24-6150 1. To state a claim for direct liability under the TVPRA, a plaintiff must
plausibly plead that the defendant
knowingly . . . in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce . . . [1] recruit[ed], entice[d], harbor[ed], transport[ed], provide[d], obtain[ed], advertise[d], maintain[ed], patronize[d], or solicit[ed] by any means a person . . . [2] knowing, or . . . in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion . . . or any combination of such means will be used [3] to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act.
18 U.S.C. § 1591. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s direct liability claim solely
on the basis of her failure to plead the “commercial sex act” element because it found
that she did not sufficiently allege that “anything of value was provided to Plaintiff
in exchange for her engaging in the alleged sexual relationship with Dolan.” On
appeal, the Dolan Defendants argue that Plaintiff also failed to properly plead illicit
means and an enumerated act. We conclude that, even assuming Plaintiff has
plausibly pleaded a commercial sex act, she has failed to plead factual matter
sufficient to state the use of illicit means. We therefore affirm dismissal of Plaintiff’s
direct liability claim on that basis.
Section 1591(a) “requires Plaintiff[] to plausibly allege that [Dolan] enticed
[her] with knowledge that means of force or fraud would be used to cause a
commercial sex act to take place.” Acevedo v. eXp Realty, LLC, 713 F. Supp. 3d
740, 769 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (citing United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 333–34 (9th
3 24-6150 Cir. 2010)). She alleges only fraud and coercion, see 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a); neither
is adequately pleaded.
Plaintiff’s fraud allegations fail because her operative complaint does not
contain facts that demonstrate Dolan knowingly defrauded her in order to cause her
to engage in a commercial sex act. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a); see also United States
v. Maynes, 880 F.3d 110, 114 (4th Cir. 2018). The fraud Plaintiff alleges is, at most,
the reason for her invitation to join the Eagles tour in Los Angeles. Specifically,
Plaintiff “alleges that she was lied to about the reasons she was invited to California,
which caused her to be in close proximity to be exploited” by Dolan. But alleging
that Dolan fraudulently secured Plaintiff’s presence in Los Angeles is insufficient to
show that he intended to defraud her into engaging in a commercial sex act. This is
especially true where Plaintiff’s theory of fraud is undermined by other allegations
in her complaint that tend to show she had been invited to Los Angeles to provide
massage services.
Plaintiff similarly fails to plead coercion. The TVPRA defines “coercion” to
mean
(A) threats of serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; (B) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; or (C) the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process.
18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(2). “Serious harm,” in turn, “means any harm, . . . including
4 24-6150 psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all
the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same
background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing
commercial sexual activity in order to avoid incurring that harm.” Id. § 1591(e)(5).
Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that, under the circumstances of this case,
losing out on career opportunities constitutes “serious harm.” Id. The crux of
Plaintiff’s argument is that working on the Eagles tour was “the career break of her
lifetime,” and she “understood that rebuffing Dolan and alienating him would
jeopardize” her current and future work opportunities. To be sure, “financial
pressure, including the threat of financial harm, may constitute serious harm under
the [TVPRA].” Estavilla v. Goodman Grp., 2022 WL 539192, at *13 (D. Mont.
Feb. 23, 2022) (collecting cases). But Plaintiff does not allege either financial
pressure or threat of financial harm. Cf. Schneider v.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 23 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KELLYE CROFT, No. 24-6150 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:24-cv-00371-PA-AGR v. MEMORANDUM* JAMES DOLAN; HARVEY WEINSTEIN; AZOFF MUSIC MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC.; JD & THE STRAIGHT SHOT, LLC; DOE CORPS, 1-10,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 8, 2025 Pasadena, California
Before: M. SMITH, CHRISTEN, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Kellye Croft appeals the district court’s order granting Defendants’
motions to dismiss her claims brought pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 1595. As relevant here,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Defendants include James Dolan (together with Dolan’s rock band, JD and the
Straight Shot, the Dolan Defendants) and the Azoff Company Holdings LLC and the
Azoff Company LLC (collectively, the Azoff Defendants). Plaintiff asserted a direct
liability claim against the Dolan Defendants. Plaintiff also asserted a beneficiary
liability claim against the Azoff Defendants, arguing that they had constructive
knowledge of Dolan’s actions or, alternatively, that they had an agency relationship
with Dolan. The district court dismissed both claims. Because the parties are
familiar with the facts of this case, we do not recount them here except as necessary
to provide context for our ruling.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Doe v. Grindr Inc., 128 F.4th 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2025).
We may affirm dismissal “on any ground supported by the record, even if it differs
from the rationale of the district court.” United States v. Perez-Garcia, 96 F.4th
1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2024). We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s
direct liability claim against the Dolan Defendants because Plaintiff has not
plausibly pleaded illicit means. We also affirm dismissal of her beneficiary liability
and vicarious liability claims against the Azoff Defendants.1
1 Plaintiff does not challenge the dismissal of her state law tort claims. Accordingly, we do not reach them.
2 24-6150 1. To state a claim for direct liability under the TVPRA, a plaintiff must
plausibly plead that the defendant
knowingly . . . in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce . . . [1] recruit[ed], entice[d], harbor[ed], transport[ed], provide[d], obtain[ed], advertise[d], maintain[ed], patronize[d], or solicit[ed] by any means a person . . . [2] knowing, or . . . in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion . . . or any combination of such means will be used [3] to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act.
18 U.S.C. § 1591. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s direct liability claim solely
on the basis of her failure to plead the “commercial sex act” element because it found
that she did not sufficiently allege that “anything of value was provided to Plaintiff
in exchange for her engaging in the alleged sexual relationship with Dolan.” On
appeal, the Dolan Defendants argue that Plaintiff also failed to properly plead illicit
means and an enumerated act. We conclude that, even assuming Plaintiff has
plausibly pleaded a commercial sex act, she has failed to plead factual matter
sufficient to state the use of illicit means. We therefore affirm dismissal of Plaintiff’s
direct liability claim on that basis.
Section 1591(a) “requires Plaintiff[] to plausibly allege that [Dolan] enticed
[her] with knowledge that means of force or fraud would be used to cause a
commercial sex act to take place.” Acevedo v. eXp Realty, LLC, 713 F. Supp. 3d
740, 769 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (citing United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 333–34 (9th
3 24-6150 Cir. 2010)). She alleges only fraud and coercion, see 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a); neither
is adequately pleaded.
Plaintiff’s fraud allegations fail because her operative complaint does not
contain facts that demonstrate Dolan knowingly defrauded her in order to cause her
to engage in a commercial sex act. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a); see also United States
v. Maynes, 880 F.3d 110, 114 (4th Cir. 2018). The fraud Plaintiff alleges is, at most,
the reason for her invitation to join the Eagles tour in Los Angeles. Specifically,
Plaintiff “alleges that she was lied to about the reasons she was invited to California,
which caused her to be in close proximity to be exploited” by Dolan. But alleging
that Dolan fraudulently secured Plaintiff’s presence in Los Angeles is insufficient to
show that he intended to defraud her into engaging in a commercial sex act. This is
especially true where Plaintiff’s theory of fraud is undermined by other allegations
in her complaint that tend to show she had been invited to Los Angeles to provide
massage services.
Plaintiff similarly fails to plead coercion. The TVPRA defines “coercion” to
mean
(A) threats of serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; (B) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; or (C) the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process.
18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(2). “Serious harm,” in turn, “means any harm, . . . including
4 24-6150 psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all
the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same
background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing
commercial sexual activity in order to avoid incurring that harm.” Id. § 1591(e)(5).
Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that, under the circumstances of this case,
losing out on career opportunities constitutes “serious harm.” Id. The crux of
Plaintiff’s argument is that working on the Eagles tour was “the career break of her
lifetime,” and she “understood that rebuffing Dolan and alienating him would
jeopardize” her current and future work opportunities. To be sure, “financial
pressure, including the threat of financial harm, may constitute serious harm under
the [TVPRA].” Estavilla v. Goodman Grp., 2022 WL 539192, at *13 (D. Mont.
Feb. 23, 2022) (collecting cases). But Plaintiff does not allege either financial
pressure or threat of financial harm. Cf. Schneider v. OSG, LLC, 2024 WL 1308690,
at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2024) (finding serious financial harm where plaintiff
alleged that “defendants intended to make the plaintiff believe that he would suffer
serious harm” and where plaintiff alleged he was explicitly threatened with “public
humiliation” (emphasis added)); Richardson v. Northwestern University, 2023 WL
6197447, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2023) (finding serious financial harm from
university’s imposed “payback requirement” where plaintiff was mandated to repay
university $10,000 when she could not afford to do so). Thus, we conclude that
5 24-6150 Plaintiff has not pleaded coercion.
Because Plaintiff does not plausibly plead illicit means, her direct liability
claim against the Dolan Defendants fails, and dismissal was warranted. We
therefore do not reach the enumerated act element of her direct liability claim.
2. Plaintiff next appeals the district court’s dismissal of her liability theories
against the Azoff Defendants. Plaintiff pursues beneficiary liability under § 1595 of
the TVPRA and vicarious liability and agency principles. Because we conclude that
Plaintiff has not plausibly pleaded her direct liability claim against the Dolan
Defendants, her claim against the Azoff Defendants also fails. See Doe #1 v. Red
Roof Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th 714, 725 (11th Cir. 2021) (explaining that, to state a
beneficiary liability claim, a plaintiff “must plead sufficient facts to plausibly allege”
that a violation of § 1591(a) occurred); Doe (K.R.D.) v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings
Inc., -- F. Supp. 3d. --, 2025 WL 2539010, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2025) (holding
that a beneficiary liability claim “require[s] that the defendant have taken part in an
association in fact that assisted, supported, or facilitated a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591(a)(1).”). Additionally, beneficiary liability under § 1595 independently fails
because the operative complaint does not plausibly plead that the Azoff Defendants
had either constructive or actual knowledge that Dolan intended to sexually exploit
Plaintiff. None of the “red flags” Plaintiff relies on raise the inference that the Azoff
Defendants should have known that Dolan intended to transport her to Los Angeles
6 24-6150 to coerce or fraudulently induce her into a sexual relationship.
Likewise, Plaintiff’s reliance on vicarious liability principles fails because she
does not plausibly allege that the Azoff Defendants controlled Dolan as their agent.
On the contrary, the operative complaint alleges that Dolan held power over anyone
related to the Eagles tour; that he “controlled the purse strings” related to the Azoff
Defendants’ other projects involving The Forum venue; and that Dolan requested
Plaintiff’s presence in Los Angeles, which the Azoff Defendants arranged
accordingly. Plaintiff contends that the same allegations demonstrate that “Dolan
exercised the control and power ceded to him by the Azoff Defendants.” Without
any allegations that the Azoff Defendants controlled Dolan’s conduct, we cannot
reasonably draw that inference. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Plaintiff’s vicarious liability claim against the Azoff Defendants.
AFFIRMED.
7 24-6150