Croft v. Coplan

2006 DNH 067

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: June 14, 2006
• Docket: 04-CV-328-SM
• Status: Published

Opinion

Croft v . Coplan 04-CV-328-SM 06/14/06 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Sean Croft, Plaintiff

v. Civil N o . 04-cv-328-SM Opinion N o . 2006 DNH 067 Jane Coplan, Defendant

O R D E R

Plaintiff, Sean Croft, is a state inmate, currently being

housed in a correctional facility in Colorado. Pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983, he brings this action against Jane Coplan, the

former warden of the New Hampshire State Prison in Concord, New

Hampshire (“NHSP”). Croft claims Coplan orchestrated his

transfer to an out-of-state correctional facility in a deliberate

effort to hinder his ability to pursue a then-pending state court

petition to reduce his sentence. In other words, he says

defendant intentionally interfered with his constitutionally

protected right to access New Hampshire’s state courts. He seeks

a judicial order directing his transfer back to New Hampshire, as

well as $1,009,500.00 in damages, representing $100 for each day

of the three years he claims to have suffered injury. Defendant

denies and wrongdoing and moves for summary judgment. Croft

objects. For the reasons set forth below, the court concludes that

there are no genuinely disputed issues of material fact and

defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Standard of Review

When ruling on a party’s motion for summary judgment, the

court must “view the entire record in the light most hospitable

to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable

inferences in that party’s favor.” Griggs-Ryan v . Smith, 904

F.2d 1 1 2 , 115 (1st Cir. 1990). Summary judgment is appropriate

when the record reveals “no genuine issue as to any material fact

and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In this context, “a fact is

‘material’ if it potentially affects the outcome of the suit and

a dispute over it is ‘genuine’ if the parties’ positions on the

issue are supported by conflicting evidence.” Intern’l Ass’n of

Machinists & Aerospace Workers v . Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103

F.3d 196, 199-200 (1st Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

Nevertheless, if the non-moving party’s “evidence is merely

colorable, or is not significantly probative,” no genuine dispute

as to a material fact has been proved, and “summary judgment may

be granted.” Anderson v . Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 2 4 2 , 249-

2 50 (1986) (citations omitted). As the Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit has observed, “the evidence illustrating the

factual controversy cannot be conjectural or problematic; it must

have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of

the truth which a factfinder must resolve at an ensuing trial.

Conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported

speculation will not suffice.” Cadle C o . v . Hayes, 116 F.3d 9 5 7 ,

960 (1st Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). See also Coyne v . City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 4 4 0 ,

444-45 (1st Cir. 1992) (“[T]hough for pleading purposes the line

between sufficient facts and insufficient conclusions is often

blurred, we nonetheless require that it be plotted.”) (citation

and internal punctuation omitted).

The key, then, to defeating a properly supported motion for

summary judgment is the non-movant’s ability to support his or

her claims concerning disputed material facts with evidence that

conflicts with that proffered by the moving party. See generally

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). It naturally follows that while a

reviewing court must take into account all properly documented

facts, it may ignore bald assertions, unsupported conclusions,

and mere speculation. See Serapion v . Martinez, 119 F.3d 9 8 2 ,

987 (1st Cir. 1997).

3 Background

In May of 1995, Croft was sentenced to seven and one-half to

fifteen years in prison for conspiracy to commit burglary, and a

consecutive ten to twenty years for first degree assault. During

his period of incarceration in the state prison system, Croft has

accumulated an extensive disciplinary record. He acknowledges

that he has received more than 100 disciplinary citations, though

he says most were for “minor infractions, mainly tattooing.”

Plaintiff’s memorandum (document n o . 14-2) at 3 . He does,

however, admit that several involved more serious charges such as

weapons possession and drug use. Id.

In light of Croft’s disciplinary record, on June 6, 2000, he

was transferred to a correctional facility in Massachusetts under

the Interstate Compact System. In 2001, Croft requested a

transfer back to New Hampshire on grounds that his behavior had

improved and because he wished to be closer to friends and

family. That request was granted and he was transferred to the

New Hampshire correctional facility in Berlin. Shortly

thereafter, however, Croft’s behavioral problems re-emerged.

Among other things, he received major disciplinary citations for

assaulting a staff member, interfering with a cell search, and

possession of drugs. Soon after that, he tested positive for the

4 presence of opiates. He was then transferred from the Berlin

facility back to the NHSP in Concord and his status was upgraded

to C-4 (close custody). While at the NHSP, Croft’s behavioral

problems continued and he was periodically transferred back and

forth between C-4 and C-5 custody (also known as the Special

Housing Unit, the most secure unit at the NHSP).

On October 2 8 , 2002, a classification review team was again

convened to review Croft’s status. After considering the

findings and recommendations of that group, Kimberly Lacasse, the

Director of Classifications for the New Hampshire Department of

Corrections, concluded that Croft should again be transferred to

an out-of-state correctional facility. See Lacasse affidavit,

Exhibit A to defendant’s memorandum (document n o . 13-3) at para.

11. Gregory Crompton, acting as defendant’s designee, approved

that decision. Id. Accordingly, Denise Heath, the Interstate

Compact Coordinator, contacted several states to determine if

they would be willing to accept Croft. All but Colorado refused.

Seeking to prevent his impending transfer, Croft filed a petition

for habeas corpus in state court. After conducting a hearing on

the matter, the court denied Croft’s petition on December 2 0 ,

2002. Exhibit A to plaintiff’s memorandum (document n o . 1 4 - 3 ) .

5 On that same day - December 2 0 , 2002 - Croft filed a motion

in state court seeking a reduction in his sentence. The State

received notice of that motion in mid-January and objected to any

change in Croft’s sentence, citing, among other things, his

lengthy and serious disciplinary record while in prison. Exhibit

C to plaintiff’s memorandum (document n o . 1 4 - 5 ) . In March of

2003, while that motion was still pending, Croft was transferred

to a correctional facility in Colorado, where he is presently

incarcerated.

Approximately two months later, on May 7 , 2003, the state

court issued an order scheduling a 15 minute hearing for May 1 3 ,

2003, on Croft’s pending motion for sentence reduction. The

court also directed the State to arrange for his presence at that

hearing. Exhibit D to plaintiff’s memorandum (document n o . 14-

6). It appears the court was operating under the mistaken

impression that Croft was still being housed in Concord, at the

NHSP. See id. at 2 . And, perhaps due to the limited amount of

time to make travel arrangements, the State failed to produce

Croft for the hearing. Nevertheless, the State acknowledges that

it was responsible for insuring Croft’s presence at the hearing

and does not attempt to offer any excuse for its failure to meet

that obligation.

6 Defendant, however, says she was completely unaware of the

court’s order directing the State to produce Croft for the

hearing or that the State failed to comply with that order.

Moreover, she says that if she had been aware of the court’s

transportation order, she would have made arrangements to get

Croft to that hearing and/or sought additional time from the

court to comply with it’s directive. Coplan affidavit, Exhibit B

to defendant’s memorandum (document n o . 13-4) at para. 1 1 .

Given Croft’s absence, the court issued an order continuing

the hearing on his motion for sentence reduction for

approximately 60 days, unless the court ruled on the merits of

the motion prior to then. Exhibit E to plaintiff’s memorandum

(document n o . 1 4 - 7 ) . Subsequently, the Clerk of the Court

scheduled the hearing on Croft’s motion for the latter part of

July. Accordingly, on May 1 9 , 2003, M s . Heath contacted the

Colorado Department of Corrections to inquire about the

possibility of arranging a video-conference link for the July

hearing, so Croft might be heard without the need to transport

him back to New Hampshire. Those efforts were, however, soon

rendered moot.

7 On May 2 2 , 2003, the state court issued an order denying

Croft’s motion on the merits, based upon the written submissions.

Among other things, the court concluded that Croft’s record while

an inmate “includes a lengthy disciplinary record and does not

support any change in the sentence. Under these facts any

modification or reduction [in his sentence] is not appropriate.”

Exhibit F to plaintiff’s memorandum (document n o . 1 4 - 8 ) . In

light of that decision, the court cancelled the previously

scheduled hearing for July 2 3 .

Reduced to its essence, Croft’s complaint asserts that,

while the decision to transfer him to an out-of-state

correctional facility may have been made in October of 2002, by

January of 2003, defendant knew that he had filed a motion with

the state court seeking a reduction in his sentence.

Accordingly, says Croft, at that point defendant should have

recognized that transferring him to another state might interfere

with his efforts to secure a reduced sentence and, therefore, she

should have cancelled the plans to transfer him. He also

complains that once his transfer to Colorado was complete, the

State failed to arrange for his transportation back to New

Hampshire for the original court hearing on his motion - a

failure he attributes to defendant. He claims that if he had

8 been present for that hearing, he would have been able to testify

on his own behalf, as well as obtain the favorable testimony of

friends and family, in support of his efforts to secure a

reduction of his sentence. He says he was directly and

demonstrably injured by defendant’s conduct insofar a s , once the

court denied his motion, state law prevented him from filing

another motion for sentence reduction for three years. See N.H.

Rev. Stat. Ann. 651:20.

Discussion

While Croft’s disappointment and frustration over the

State’s failure to produce him for the original hearing on his

motion for sentence reduction are understandable, his claim

against defendant is without merit. It i s , of course, well-

established that the Constitution guarantees inmates the right to

a “reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations

of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.” Bounds v .

Smith, 430 U.S. 8 1 7 , 825 (1977). That right of access, however,

is not unbounded. The constitution obligates prisons and prison

administrators to afford inmates “adequate, effective, and

meaningful” access to the courts. Id. at 822. But, as the Court

of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has observed, “[t]he

constitutionally relevant benchmark is meaningful, not total or

9 unlimited access.” Campbell v . Miller, 787 F.2d 2 1 7 , 226 (7th

Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original). See also Lewis v . Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 355 (1996) (“Bounds does not guarantee inmates the

wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines

capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions

to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to be provided

are those that the inmates need in order to attack their

sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge

the conditions of their confinement.”).

To prevail on his claim that defendant violated his

constitutionally protected right of adequate and meaningful

access to the courts, Croft must demonstrate that he suffered an

actual injury as a result of his transfer to Colorado, such as

the inability to provide adequate legal support for his motion

due to insufficient legal resources at the correctional facility

in Colorado or the dismissal of his motion for failure to

prosecute. See, e.g., Casey, 518 U.S. at 349-51 (holding that

inmates must do more than simply demonstrate that their

constitutional right of meaningful access to the courts was

impaired in some theoretical sense). Croft has not done s o .

And, his opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment is

insufficient to demonstrate the existence of any genuinely

10 disputed material facts or prevent the entry in defendant’s favor

of judgment as a matter of law.

The New Hampshire Supreme Court has made clear that an

inmate who files a motion seeking a reduction in his or her

sentence is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on that motion

as a matter of right. Instead, the court in which the motion is

pending has the discretion to grant or deny an inmate’s request

for oral argument or an evidentiary hearing. See State v . Roy,

138 N.H. 9 7 , 98 (1993). In this case, although the state

superior court originally scheduled a hearing on Croft’s motion

(and then rescheduled that hearing when Croft missed the original

hearing), it ultimately ruled on the merits of Croft’s motion,

without the benefit of oral argument. While Croft was not

afforded the opportunity to present oral argument in support of

his motion, he was able to fully and fairly present his claims to

the court, which considered them on the merits. It necessarily

follows that, as a matter of law, he was not denied “adequate,

effective, and meaningful” access to the courts. See, e.g.,

Demoran v . Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 158 (9th Cir. 1986) (“A plaintiff

in a civil suit who is confined in state prison at the time of a

hearing has no absolute right to appear personally.”).

11 If Croft objected to the lower state court’s decision to

rule on the merits of his motion based solely on the written

submissions and without the benefit of oral argument, he should

have either moved for reconsideration or appealed that decision

to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. He did neither. As a

result, his claim that the he likely would have prevailed on the

motion, had he only be able to attend the originally scheduled

hearing, is pure speculation. See generally Cadle, 116 F.3d at

960. It is certainly not the type of “injury” that is sufficient

to vest him with standing to pursue a section 1983 claim for

interference with his constitutionally protected right to

meaningful access to the courts.

Conclusion

I f , when Croft was unable to attend the original state court

hearing on his motion seeking a reduced sentence, the court had

dismissed his motion for failure to prosecute, this might be an

entirely different case. But it did not. Instead, the state

court addressed and rejected Croft’s motion on the merits. While

it is possible to speculate (as does Croft) that he might have

been able to more forcefully and/or persuasively present his case

had he been afforded the opportunity to argue his motion orally,

the state court obviously determined that it could rule on

12 Croft’s motion based solely on the written record. That decision

i s , under New Hampshire law, committed to the court’s discretion.

If Croft disagreed with either the court’s decision on the merits

or its decision to proceed without oral argument, he should have

moved for reconsideration or filed an appeal with the New

Hampshire Supreme Court.

Because Croft cannot demonstrate that he suffered any actual

injury as a result of defendant’s alleged conduct, he cannot, as

a matter of law, prevail on his claim that defendant interfered

with his constitutionally protected right to adequate, effective,

and meaningful access to the courts. For the foregoing reasons,

as well as those set forth in defendant’s memorandum of law,

defendant’s motion for summary judgment (document n o . 13) is

granted. Plaintiff’s petition for writ of habeas corpus ad

prosequendum (document n o . 15) is denied as moot.

The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with

this order and close the case.

13 SO ORDERED.

£. S/teven J. McAuliffe Chief Judge

June 1 4 , 2006

cc: Sean Croft, pro se Andrew B . Livernois, Esq.