1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7
9 JILLIAN CROCHET, Case No. C 20-01057 WHA
10 Plaintiffs,
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 11 v. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
12 CALIFORNIA COLLEGE OF THE ARTS, et al. 13 Defendants. 14
15 INTRODUCTION 16 In this disability-discrimination action, plaintiff moves for a mandatory preliminary 17 injunction. For the reasons below, the motion is DENIED. 18 STATEMENT 19 In 2017, plaintiff Jillian Crochet enrolled as a graduate student at the California College 20 of the Arts (“CCA”), a private college with campuses in San Francisco and Oakland. She 21 suffers from a rare condition that causes ataxia, loss of sensation, and vision problems. Her 22 condition limits her ability to stand, balance, and walk, and she uses a motorized wheelchair or 23 a walker for mobility. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that she requires accommodations to make 24 housing and transportation accessible. The complaint asserts disability-discrimination claims 25 against CCA and other defendants that contract with CCA to provide student housing and 26 transportation. In particular, it alleges that defendants discriminate against plaintiff in violation 27 of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Fair Housing Act (Compl. 1 ¶¶ 1–2, 6, 11, 15, 21 66). Plaintiff’s claims can be separated into two categories: housing and 2 transportation. 3 In March 2019, plaintiff moved into student housing at the Panoramic Residences, a 4 residence hall in San Francisco. The hall offers three room configurations: (1) double- 5 occupancy units, which cost $12,691 per academic year; (2) single-occupancy units, costing 6 $16,317 per year; and (3) “super” single-occupancy units, costing $20,461 per year. Plaintiff’s 7 motion states that she wanted to live in a double unit because it was the most affordable. She 8 also required wheelchair-accessible housing. She asked the CCA’s Director of Housing 9 whether the double units were wheelchair accessible, to which the director allegedly replied, “I 10 don’t think so.” CCA instead assigned plaintiff to a wheelchair-accessible “super” single unit. 11 The motion explains that while plaintiff accepted this placement, she also made a “reasonable 12 accommodation request” to reduce her rent to the lower rate charged to students living in 13 double units. It further alleges that a CCA administrator denied this request during a phone 14 call with plaintiff. CCA ended up charging plaintiff the intermediate single unit rate for her 15 “super” single unit. Shortly after plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit, CCA informed plaintiff that 16 “she may obtain a credit for the semester on her student account” that would cover the 17 difference between the single unit rate she currently pays and the double unit rate she 18 requested. Plaintiff still lives in the “super” single unit and remains poised to live there until 19 she finishes school in May 2020. Plaintiff alleges that in failing to make double units 20 accessible and then requiring her to pay a single rate, defendants unlawfully discriminate in 21 violation of the Fair Housing Act and Title III of the ADA (Dkt. No. 6 at 9, 12). 22 Turning to plaintiff’s transportation, CCA contracts with defendant Storer Transportation 23 Services (“Storer”) to provide large, over the road buses that act as student shuttles. The 24 shuttles, which operate at no cost to students, run on a fixed route between Oakland and San 25 Francisco campuses, including a stop at plaintiff’s residence hall. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges 26 the buses do not all come equipped with accessibility ramps or lifts, so in order to ride an 27 accessible bus, plaintiff must communicate her schedule to Storer ahead of time. Storer 1 this solution falls short of what the ADA requires and renders her unable to access student 2 transportation on an equal basis with her classmates (Compl. ¶¶ 33–39). Importantly, in the 3 time since plaintiff filed this motion, CCA has terminated operations of the shuttle for all 4 students, including plaintiff, in response to the San Francisco Health Officer’s Shelter in Place 5 Order. The shuttle shall remain suspended “until further notice” (Sedano Decl. at Exh. E). 6 Plaintiff moves for a mandatory preliminary injunction against CCA only. Her motion 7 requests that the injunction order CCA to (1) provide her with accessible housing at the rate 8 she would pay in a double unit (or, alternatively, to retroactively grant her reasonable 9 accommodation request for housing in a single unit at the double unit rate) and (2) provide 10 wheelchair access on all shuttle buses. 11 ANALYSIS 12 To obtain a preliminary injunction, plaintiff must establish (1) that she is likely to 13 succeed on the merits, (2) that she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 14 preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips in her favor, and (4) that an injunction is 15 in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Our 16 court of appeals employs a “sliding scale” version of this test, meaning that “a stronger 17 showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” All. For The Wild Rockies 18 v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). 19 1. HOUSING INJUNCTION 20 Plaintiff’s motion requests an injunction that would allow her to pay a double unit rate 21 while living in accessible housing. Our court of appeals has held that courts may issue 22 mandatory preliminary injunctions to prevent irreparable harm, but not “where the injury 23 complained of is capable of compensation in damages.” Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 24 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 1979). Here, plaintiff can recover the difference between what she wants 25 to pay and what she currently pays in damages, and CCA has offered her a credit to offset the 26 higher rate in the meantime. Thus, plaintiff’s motion may be disposed of on the second Winter 27 element. 1 Plaintiff’s motion argues that “[i]rreparable harm is presumed when a statute provides an 2 injunctive relief remedy” (Dkt. No. 6 at 20). This overstates the principle’s application to 3 plaintiff’s argument. In Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, which the 4 motion cites, our court of appeals held that a court may “presume that the plaintiff has suffered 5 irreparable injury from the fact of the defendant’s violation” and also that “future violation[s] 6 will occur” if plaintiff establishes that defendant has violated a civil rights statute like the Fair 7 Housing Act. 251 F.3d 814, 827 (9th Cir. 2001). This does not characterize plaintiff’s 8 position. In Silver Sage Partners, plaintiffs had already prevailed at trial, so they had 9 established that the city had violated the Fair Housing Act. Id. at 818. Plaintiff has not yet 10 established a violation here. 11 The motion also argues that the Fair Housing Act and ADA specifically provide for 12 injunctive relief and that “standard requirements for equitable relief need not be satisfied when 13 an injunction is sought to prevent the violation of a federal statute which specifically provides 14 for injunctive relief.” Burlington N. R. Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue of State of Wash., 934 F.2d 15 1064, 1074 (9th Cir. 1991). It remains true that both statutes provide for injunctive relief, but 16 the possibility of injunctive relief under a statute does not greenlight mandatory preliminary 17 injunctions when plaintiff’s request only concerns money. 18 Here, plaintiff’s motion requests a preliminary injunction forcing CCA to charge plaintiff 19 the rate that a student renting a double unit would pay (Dkt. No. 6 at 8–9).
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1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7
9 JILLIAN CROCHET, Case No. C 20-01057 WHA
10 Plaintiffs,
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 11 v. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
12 CALIFORNIA COLLEGE OF THE ARTS, et al. 13 Defendants. 14
15 INTRODUCTION 16 In this disability-discrimination action, plaintiff moves for a mandatory preliminary 17 injunction. For the reasons below, the motion is DENIED. 18 STATEMENT 19 In 2017, plaintiff Jillian Crochet enrolled as a graduate student at the California College 20 of the Arts (“CCA”), a private college with campuses in San Francisco and Oakland. She 21 suffers from a rare condition that causes ataxia, loss of sensation, and vision problems. Her 22 condition limits her ability to stand, balance, and walk, and she uses a motorized wheelchair or 23 a walker for mobility. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that she requires accommodations to make 24 housing and transportation accessible. The complaint asserts disability-discrimination claims 25 against CCA and other defendants that contract with CCA to provide student housing and 26 transportation. In particular, it alleges that defendants discriminate against plaintiff in violation 27 of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Fair Housing Act (Compl. 1 ¶¶ 1–2, 6, 11, 15, 21 66). Plaintiff’s claims can be separated into two categories: housing and 2 transportation. 3 In March 2019, plaintiff moved into student housing at the Panoramic Residences, a 4 residence hall in San Francisco. The hall offers three room configurations: (1) double- 5 occupancy units, which cost $12,691 per academic year; (2) single-occupancy units, costing 6 $16,317 per year; and (3) “super” single-occupancy units, costing $20,461 per year. Plaintiff’s 7 motion states that she wanted to live in a double unit because it was the most affordable. She 8 also required wheelchair-accessible housing. She asked the CCA’s Director of Housing 9 whether the double units were wheelchair accessible, to which the director allegedly replied, “I 10 don’t think so.” CCA instead assigned plaintiff to a wheelchair-accessible “super” single unit. 11 The motion explains that while plaintiff accepted this placement, she also made a “reasonable 12 accommodation request” to reduce her rent to the lower rate charged to students living in 13 double units. It further alleges that a CCA administrator denied this request during a phone 14 call with plaintiff. CCA ended up charging plaintiff the intermediate single unit rate for her 15 “super” single unit. Shortly after plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit, CCA informed plaintiff that 16 “she may obtain a credit for the semester on her student account” that would cover the 17 difference between the single unit rate she currently pays and the double unit rate she 18 requested. Plaintiff still lives in the “super” single unit and remains poised to live there until 19 she finishes school in May 2020. Plaintiff alleges that in failing to make double units 20 accessible and then requiring her to pay a single rate, defendants unlawfully discriminate in 21 violation of the Fair Housing Act and Title III of the ADA (Dkt. No. 6 at 9, 12). 22 Turning to plaintiff’s transportation, CCA contracts with defendant Storer Transportation 23 Services (“Storer”) to provide large, over the road buses that act as student shuttles. The 24 shuttles, which operate at no cost to students, run on a fixed route between Oakland and San 25 Francisco campuses, including a stop at plaintiff’s residence hall. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges 26 the buses do not all come equipped with accessibility ramps or lifts, so in order to ride an 27 accessible bus, plaintiff must communicate her schedule to Storer ahead of time. Storer 1 this solution falls short of what the ADA requires and renders her unable to access student 2 transportation on an equal basis with her classmates (Compl. ¶¶ 33–39). Importantly, in the 3 time since plaintiff filed this motion, CCA has terminated operations of the shuttle for all 4 students, including plaintiff, in response to the San Francisco Health Officer’s Shelter in Place 5 Order. The shuttle shall remain suspended “until further notice” (Sedano Decl. at Exh. E). 6 Plaintiff moves for a mandatory preliminary injunction against CCA only. Her motion 7 requests that the injunction order CCA to (1) provide her with accessible housing at the rate 8 she would pay in a double unit (or, alternatively, to retroactively grant her reasonable 9 accommodation request for housing in a single unit at the double unit rate) and (2) provide 10 wheelchair access on all shuttle buses. 11 ANALYSIS 12 To obtain a preliminary injunction, plaintiff must establish (1) that she is likely to 13 succeed on the merits, (2) that she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 14 preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips in her favor, and (4) that an injunction is 15 in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Our 16 court of appeals employs a “sliding scale” version of this test, meaning that “a stronger 17 showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” All. For The Wild Rockies 18 v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). 19 1. HOUSING INJUNCTION 20 Plaintiff’s motion requests an injunction that would allow her to pay a double unit rate 21 while living in accessible housing. Our court of appeals has held that courts may issue 22 mandatory preliminary injunctions to prevent irreparable harm, but not “where the injury 23 complained of is capable of compensation in damages.” Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 24 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 1979). Here, plaintiff can recover the difference between what she wants 25 to pay and what she currently pays in damages, and CCA has offered her a credit to offset the 26 higher rate in the meantime. Thus, plaintiff’s motion may be disposed of on the second Winter 27 element. 1 Plaintiff’s motion argues that “[i]rreparable harm is presumed when a statute provides an 2 injunctive relief remedy” (Dkt. No. 6 at 20). This overstates the principle’s application to 3 plaintiff’s argument. In Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, which the 4 motion cites, our court of appeals held that a court may “presume that the plaintiff has suffered 5 irreparable injury from the fact of the defendant’s violation” and also that “future violation[s] 6 will occur” if plaintiff establishes that defendant has violated a civil rights statute like the Fair 7 Housing Act. 251 F.3d 814, 827 (9th Cir. 2001). This does not characterize plaintiff’s 8 position. In Silver Sage Partners, plaintiffs had already prevailed at trial, so they had 9 established that the city had violated the Fair Housing Act. Id. at 818. Plaintiff has not yet 10 established a violation here. 11 The motion also argues that the Fair Housing Act and ADA specifically provide for 12 injunctive relief and that “standard requirements for equitable relief need not be satisfied when 13 an injunction is sought to prevent the violation of a federal statute which specifically provides 14 for injunctive relief.” Burlington N. R. Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue of State of Wash., 934 F.2d 15 1064, 1074 (9th Cir. 1991). It remains true that both statutes provide for injunctive relief, but 16 the possibility of injunctive relief under a statute does not greenlight mandatory preliminary 17 injunctions when plaintiff’s request only concerns money. 18 Here, plaintiff’s motion requests a preliminary injunction forcing CCA to charge plaintiff 19 the rate that a student renting a double unit would pay (Dkt. No. 6 at 8–9). The parties do not 20 dispute that CCA has offered plaintiff a credit for the remainder of her student tenure that 21 makes up the difference in cost between the rate she wants to pay and the one she currently 22 pays. Plaintiff argues this offer would not rectify a violation, since plaintiff has had to pay the 23 single unit rate “since at least Mid-May 2019” (Dkt. No. 24 at 17–18). If it turns out that CCA 24 has violated the Fair Housing Act or the ADA, this credit certainly would be inadequate, and if 25 plaintiff succeeds at trial or on summary judgment, she will be entitled to the remedies 26 afforded by those statutes, including damages. At this point, however, damages remain beyond 27 the scope of mandatory preliminary injunctions, which do not apply “where the injury 1 this motion seeks a change in plaintiff’s rate of payment, which remains a damages issue, her 2 motion for a mandatory preliminary injunction ordering CCA to provide plaintiff with 3 accessible housing at the double unit rate (or, alternatively, to retroactively grant plaintiff’s 4 request for a reasonable accommodation for housing in a single unit, paying double unit rate) is 5 DENIED. 6 2. TRANSPORTATION INJUNCTION 7 Plaintiff’s complaint claims that by requiring plaintiff to pre-schedule shuttles, rather than 8 providing wheelchair access on all shuttles, CCA discriminates against her in violation the 9 ADA. She motions for a mandatory preliminary injunction ordering CCA to provide 10 wheelchair access on all buses (Dkt. No. 6 at 23). 11 Importantly, CCA’s shuttle service has since ceased operations “indefinitely” due to the 12 March 16 Shelter in Place Order that the City of San Francisco issued in response to the 13 COVID-19 pandemic. No student has access to the shuttle. On March 17, George Sedano, 14 Vice President for Student Affairs at CCA, submitted a declaration stating while the 15 administration had initially hoped to begin in-person classes again on April 13, it now “appears 16 more likely that in-person classes will continue to be suspended until the end of this academic 17 term.” The last day of classes and shuttle service “was scheduled to be May 8,” and plaintiff 18 “is on target” to earn her degree on May 16. CCA has offered to reimburse plaintiff for the 19 cost of Uber for the remainder of the semester (Sedano Decl. ¶¶ 1, 3, 5–6, 9, Exh. E). 20 Because the shuttle remains poised to stay closed through May 8, CCA argues that 21 plaintiff’s motion has become moot. Our court of appeals has held that the “basic question in 22 determining mootness is whether there is a present controversy as to which effective relief can 23 be granted.” Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Gordon, 849 F.2d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 1988). If COVID- 24 19 forces CCA and Storer to cease operating the shuttle for the remainder of plaintiff’s student 25 tenure, then a mandatory preliminary injunction ordering CCA to use only wheelchair- 26 accessible shuttles would not guard plaintiff against further transportation-related 27 discrimination by the school. 1 Mr. Sedano’s declaration states that classes will likely be held virtually for the remainder 2 of the semester. CCA sent out a notice to students informing them that shuttle service will 3 remain suspended “until further notice.” Nothing in the record indicates that in-person classes 4 will resume by May 8. Moreover, plaintiff only has one course to complete this semester, 5 graded on a “pass/fail basis,” and there exists “no reason to doubt that she will pass this 6 course” (Sedano Decl. §/[ 3, 5, Exh. E). Thus, while CCA and Storer’s alleged discrimination 7 remains actionable, plaintiff's motion for a mandatory preliminary injunction is DENIED AS 8 Moot. 9 CONCLUSION 10 For the reasons stated above, plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED.
14 || Dated: April 9, 2020 Pee 15 - (a> IX = 16 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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