Critchfield v. Preston Pipelines Inc.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: August 5, 2020
• Docket: 3:20-cv-02981
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 San Francisco Division 11 JAMES CRITCHFIELD, Case No. 20-cv-02981-LB

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 13 v. DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

14 PRESTON PIPELINES INC., et al., Re: ECF No. 9 15 Defendants. 16 17 INTRODUCTION 18 Plaintiff James Critchfield, who is representing himself, sued his former employer Preston 19 Pipelines and five Preston employees (Mike Preston, Ron Bianchini, Rich Lewis, Dennis Daikoku, 20 and Tom Ryan), alleging that they fired him for impermissible, discriminatory reasons.1 He 21 checked the box “Other” on the Northern District’s form employment complaint and specified that 22 he “was passed over for many promotions or lateral moves because they would use it to harass[] 23 me.”2 The defendants collectively moved to dismiss the complaint (1) under Federal Rule of Civil 24 Procedure 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process under Rule 4, (2) under Rule 12(b)(6) for 25 failure to state a claim, (3) and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies with the Equal 26 27 1 Compl. – ECF No. 1. Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents. 1 Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) for any claim except an age-discrimination 2 claim against Preston and for all claims against the individual defendants.3 The court can decide 3 the motion without oral argument, see Civ. L. R. 7-1(b), and grants the motion to dismiss. 4 5 STATEMENT 6 The following sections summarize (1) the complaint and other documents that the court can 7 consider and (2) relevant procedural history. 8 9 1. The Complaint And Other Documents 10 Mr. Critchfield claims that the defendants fired him for impermissible, discriminatory reasons 11 and that they passed him over for promotions or lateral moves to harass him.4 He attached three 12 documents to the complaint.5 The first is a letter with witnesses who can substantiate his claims, 13 including information about Tom Ryan’s yelling at, harassing, and abusing other employees, and 14 Preston Pipeline’s firing the employees “for complaining such as myself.”6 The second is Preston 15 Pipeline’s January 17, 2020 response to the EEOC charge, where Preston contends that (a) Mr. 16 Critchfield’s work performance over his tenure — 2014 (when he was hired at age 56 as an entry- 17 level shop attendant) to 2019 — began as average and regressed due to anger-management issues 18 that involved verbal attacks on other employees, (b) it restructured and eliminated his position and 19 did not fire him (decisions made by Mr. Critchfield’s direct supervisor Dennis Daikoku (age 58) 20 and Tom Ryan (age 61)), and (c) over half of Preston’s employees are over 40, 68 are 55 and 21 older, and six are between 65 and 70, and it is committed to hiring qualified employees of all ages 22 23 3 Mot. – ECF No. 9-1 at 5–17. 4 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 3–4 (¶¶ 4–6). 24 5 The court considers the attachments to the complaint under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine 25 and considers the other EEOC filings under that doctrine (in that selective attachment of documents to the complaint does not prevent consideration of the full EEOC complaint) or by judicially noticing 26 them. Fed. R. Evid. 201; Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2005); Wyatt v. City of Burlingame, No. 16-cv-02681-DMR, 2017 WL 565303, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2017) (judicially 27 noticing EEOC documents; “[c]ourts in this district have routinely taken judicial notice of documents in the EEOC and [the Department of Fair Employment and Housing] DFEH administrative records”). 1 (and its handbook prohibits age discrimination).7 The third is Mr. Critchfield’s January 23, 2020 2 response to Preston’s January 17, 2020 EEOC response, where he contests Preston’s fact 3 assertions, contests his poor performance (pointing to his lack of bad-performance reviews and his 4 yearly salary increases), notes Tom Ryan’s verbal abuses, mentions discrimination and 5 harassment, says that he was never warned about anger management, admits his use of profanity 6 after he was terminated, and identifies profanity, yelling, and harassment that others directed 7 against him.8 The cover sheet to Mr. Critchfield’s complaint (Form JS-CAND 44) specifies that 8 his claims are “Fair Employment and Harassment” and that he “was fired for complaining about 9 the abuse from his superiors.”9 10 In his charge with the EEOC, Mr. Critchfield alleged that Preston’s termination of his 11 employment was age discrimination (based on his age of 61) and pointed to the hiring of a 21- 12 year-old employee to replace him.10 13 On February 6, 2020, the EEOC issued its determination that it was “unable to conclude” that 14 there was any violation of “the statutes.”11 15 16 2. Procedural History 17 Mr. Critchfield filed his complaint on April 30, 2020.12 He mailed the defendants the summons 18 and complaint, by certified mail, to Preston’s offices in Milpitas, California.13 The parties 19 consented to magistrate-judge jurisdiction.14 20

21 7 Letter – id. at 7–9. 22 8 Letter – id. at 10–15. 9 Civil Cover Sheet – ECF No. 1 at 2. 23 10 EEOC Charge, Ex. A to Req. for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) – ECF No. 9-8 at 6. 24 11 EEOC Dismissal and Notice of Rights, Ex. B to RJN – ECF No. 9-8 at 10. 25 12 Compl. – ECF No. 1. 13 Proofs of Service – ECF Nos. 13–18; Boudinot Decl. – ECF No. 9-7 at 2 (¶¶ 3–4); Envelopes, Exs. 26 A–B to Boudinot Decl. – ECF No. 9-7 at 3–10. 27 14 Consents – ECF Nos. 8, 10. A defendant’s consenting to magistrate-judge jurisdiction does not waive any defenses, including a defense of lack of service. Harper v. City of Cortez, No. 14-cv-02984- 1 ANALYSIS 2 The defendants move to dismiss for insufficiency of service under Rule 12(b)(5) and Rule 4, 3 failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and failure to exhaust remedies with the EEOC. The 4 court grants the motion to dismiss. 5 6 1. Service of Process 7 Federal courts cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant without proper service of 8 process. Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987). Insufficient service can 9 result in dismissal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). The sufficiency of service is determined by Federal 10 Rule of Civil Procedure 4, which is flexible and liberally construed. See Emp. Painters’ Trust v. 11 Ethan Enters., Inc., 480 F.3d 993, 998–99 (9th 2007); United Food & Commercial Workers Union 12 v. Alpha Beta Co., 736 F.2d 1371, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984). “Once service is challenged, plaintiffs 13 bear the burden of establishing that service was valid under [Rule] 4.” Brockmeyer v. May, 383 14 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2004). 15 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e), a plaintiff may serve an individual defendant 16 using any method permitted by the law of the state in which the district court is located or in 17 which service is effected. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). California law allows for five basic methods of 18 service: (1) personal delivery to the party, see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.10; (2) delivery to 19 someone else at the party’s usual residence or place of business with mailing after (known as 20 “substitute service”), see id. § 415.20; (3) service by mail with acknowledgment of receipt, see id. 21 § 415.30; (4) service on persons outside the state by certified or registered mail with a return 22 receipt requested, see id. § 415.40; and (5) service by publication, see id. § 415.50. California 23 Code of Civil Procedure § 413.30 also provides that a court “may direct that summons be served 24 in a manner which is reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the party served.” 25

26 magistrate-judge jurisdiction did not waive service or jurisdiction defenses). To hold otherwise would put parties in the unfair position of being unable to consent to a magistrate judge without also having 27 to waive defenses. See id.; cf. Miller v. Wholesale Am. Mortg., Inc., No. 17-cv-05495-LB, 2018 WL 306714, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2018) (parties who want to consent to magistrate-judge jurisdiction 1 A plaintiff may serve a corporation through a person “designated as agent for service of 2 process” or a listed officer of the corporation. Cal. Civ. Proc. § 416.10(a)–(b). 3 Mr. Critchfield personally mailed the summons and complaint, via certified mail, to all 4 defendants at Preston’s office in Milpitas, California.15 This does not comply with the service 5 rules, because Mr. Critchfield cannot serve the summons and complaint himself and instead must 6 use a non-party “at least 18 years old.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2). Also, Mr. Critchfield needs to 7 comply with the above rules when he re-serves the defendants, such as serving Preston and the 8 individual defendants. 9 10 2. Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6) 11 A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 12 entitled to relief” to give the defendant “fair notice” of what the claims are and the grounds upon 13 which they rest. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A 14 complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the 15 ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 16 recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to 17 raise a claim for relief above the speculative level[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (cleaned up). 18 To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, which 19 when accepted as true, “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 20 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when 21 the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 22 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 23 ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 24 unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are 25 26 27 15 Proofs of Service – ECF Nos. 13–18; Boudinot Decl. – ECF No. 9-7 at 2 (¶¶ 3–4); Envelopes, Exs. 1 merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and 2 plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 3 “A pro se complaint must be ‘liberally construed,’ since ‘a pro se complaint, however 4 inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 5 lawyers.’” Entler v. Gregoire, 872 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 6 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). 7 If a court dismisses a complaint, it should give leave to amend unless the “pleading could not 8 possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” United States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 9 848 F.3d 1161, 1182 (9th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). But “leave to amend may be denied when a 10 plaintiff has demonstrated a ‘repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 11 allowed.” Id. at 1183. “It is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend when any proposed 12 amendment would be futile.” Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990) 13 (cleaned up). 14 First, under the ADEA and (to the extent that Mr. Critchfield raises a claim, the Civil Rights 15 Act of 1964), the statutes do not provide a cause of action for damages against supervisors or 16 fellow employees. Holly D. v. California Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We 17 have consistently held that Title VII does not provide a cause of action for damages against 18 supervisors or fellow employees.”) (citation omitted); Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 19 587–88 (9th Cir. 1993) (Congress imposed liability only on employers under Title VII and the 20 ADEA, not individuals); Cai v. Chiron Corp., C 04-1587-CRB, 2004 WL 1837985, at *2–3 (N.D. 21 Cal. Aug. 17, 2004) (dismissing Title VII and ADEA claims against individual defendants with 22 prejudice); Grimes v. San Mateo Cnty. Transit Dist., No. C 12–06381 LB, 2013 WL 1739470, at 23 *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2013) (same). 24 Second, there are no fact allegations against the individual defendants or Preston sufficient to 25 plausibly allege a claim of age discrimination. 26 To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must plausibly plead that he 27 was (1) at least forty years old, (2) performing his job satisfactorily, (3) discharged, and (4) “either 1 under circumstances otherwise giving rise to an inference of age discrimination.” Sheppard v. 2 David Evans & Assoc., 694 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2012); accord Drevaleva v. U.S. Dep’t of 3 Veterans Affairs, C 18-3748-WHA, 2018 WL 6305612, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2018); see also 4 Fitch v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., No. 15-cv-02769-SI, 2015 WL 6551668, at *5 (N.D. 5 Cal. Oct. 29, 2015) (while a plaintiff is “not required to plead a prima facie case of discrimination 6 in order to survive a motion to dismiss . . . courts still look to the elements of the prima facie case 7 to decide . . . whether the challenged complaint contains sufficient factual matter . . . to state a 8 claim”) (cleaned up). 9 Here, Mr. Critchfield sufficiently alleges the first three elements: his age; his satisfactory 10 performance of his job by receiving a yearly raise of two dollars and no bad performance reviews; 11 and his discharge.16 Sheppard, 694 F.3d at 1050 (plaintiff plausibly pled satisfactory performance 12 when he alleges that “[]he received consistently good performance reviews”). But he did not 13 plausibly allege that he was replaced by a younger employee within equal or inferior qualifications 14 (or any other facts giving rise to an inference of age discrimination) and alleged only that Preston 15 “hired another much younger person the same week they say there is restructuring.”17 16 Third, to the extent that Mr. Critchfield purports to bring a claim under Title VII of the Civil 17 Rights Act, an issue is whether he exhausted administrative remedies. 18 A plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a written charge with the 19 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or a qualifying state agency. Scott v. Gino Morena 20 Enters., LLC, 888 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2018) (analyzing Title VII) (citation omitted). The 21 plaintiff must file an administrative charge within 180 days of when the allegedly unlawful 22 employment practice occurred. Id. at 1106 (citation omitted). If a plaintiff does not timely file an 23 administrative charge, claims that he may later bring in court are subject to dismissal. Cf. 24 MacDonald v. Grace Church Seattle, 457 F.3d 1079, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[Plaintiff] did not file 25 26

27 16 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 2–3, 10. 1 her charges with the EEOC within the 180-day time limit, and as a result her Title VII claims were 2 || properly dismissed.”). 3 “When an employee brings suit for incidents not listed in his prior EEOC charge, a federal 4 || court may hear the new Title VII claims if they are ‘like or reasonably related to the allegations of 5 the EEOC charge.’” Stache v. Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, AFL-CIO, 852 F.2d 6 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Brown v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship & Training Trust, 7 732 F.2d 726, 729 (9th Cir. 1984)). “[I]f the two claims are not so closely related that a second 8 administrative investigation would be redundant, the EEOC must be allowed to investigate the 9 dispute before the employee may bring a Title VII suit.” Jd. 10 The complaint here has conclusory allegations of harassment and retaliation.!® The plaintiff is 11 not necessarily alleging claims that exceed the charge to the EEOC. Given the court’s dismissal of 12 || the complaint, Mr. Critchfield can address the scope of his charges in any amended complaint.

CONCLUSION 15 The court grants the motion to dismiss with leave to amend under Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(5) for 16 insufficient service under Rule 4 and under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). An amended complaint must 5 17 be filed by August 27, 2020, and Mr. Critchfield must comply with the rules for service. 18 This disposes of ECF No. 9. 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 Dated: August 5, 2020 LAS 22 LAUREL BEELER 23 United States Magistrate Judge 24 25 26 27 28 || '8 See Compl. — ECF No. 1 at 10-15.