1 2
3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 CRISTIAN NAVARRETE, CASE NO. 2:22-cv-01431 8 Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v. 10 CITY OF KENT, a municipal 11 corporation, and JAMES SHERWOOD, and his marital community, 12 Defendants. 13
14 1. INTRODUCTION 15 Defendant’s motion to stay proceedings pending interlocutory appeal comes 16 before the Court. Dkt. No. 147. Having considered the briefing and the relevant law, 17 the Court is fully informed and GRANTS the motion for the reasons below. 18 2. BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff Cristian Navarrete sued the City of Kent and Officer James 20 Sherwood, asserting claims under state law and 28 U.S.C. § 1983. Navarrete’s 21 Section 1983 claims include a judicial deception claim and a Due Process claim for 22 his allegedly unlawful arrest and prosecution. Defendants moved for summary 23 1 judgment, with Officer Sherwood asserting qualified immunity. He argued that 2 while Navarrete’s constitutional rights were clearly established, he did not violate
3 them, as a matter of law. 4 On October 8, 2025, the Court granted summary judgment in part, 5 dismissing the City of Kent but denying Officer Sherwood’s motion for summary 6 judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Dkt. No. 145. The Court found that 7 genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on whether Officer 8 Sherwood violated Navarrete’s constitutional rights. Id. at 23–28.
9 Officer Sherwood filed a notice of appeal on October 10, 2025, Dkt. No. 146, 10 and moved to stay proceedings pending his interlocutory appeal, Dkt. No. 147. 11 Navarrete opposes the stay and requests that the Court certify the appeal as 12 frivolous. Dkt. No. 152. 13 3. DISCUSSION 14 3.1 Legal standard. 15 When a claim is “immediately appealable,” the filing of an interlocutory 16 appeal “divests the district court of jurisdiction to proceed with trial.” Chuman v. 17 Wright, 960 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir. 1992). “[I]n the qualified immunity context, [the 18 Ninth Circuit] typically ha[s] jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from the denial 19 of summary judgment.” Est. of Anderson v. Marsh, 985 F.3d 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2021) 20 (citing Foster v. City of Indio, 908 F.3d 1204, 1209 (9th Cir. 2018)). This jurisdiction 21 exists because qualified immunity is an immunity from suit itself, which would be 22 23 1 “effectively lost” if the case erroneously proceeds to trial. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 2 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
3 That said, important limits exist on such appeals. The Ninth Circuit lacks 4 jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals over “a fact-related dispute about the 5 pretrial record, namely, whether or not the evidence in the pretrial record was 6 sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact for trial.” Est. of Anderson, 985 F.3d at 730 7 (citation modified). The key question is whether the appeal presents genuine legal 8 issues or merely challenges the district court’s assessment of factual disputes. If a
9 defendant argues only that the evidence is insufficient to support the plaintiff’s 10 claims, the appeal exceeds jurisdictional bounds. Id. at 731. But if the defendant 11 argues on appeal that their conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional 12 rights, even when the disputed facts are taken in the light most favorable to the 13 plaintiff, that appeal presents a question of law, and the appellate court has 14 interlocutory review jurisdiction. Knox v. Sw. Airlines, 124 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 15 1997). If a district court’s rejection of a qualified-immunity defense rests on a
16 question of law, then its decision is immediately appealable. Williams v. City of 17 Sparks, 112 F.4th 635, 642 (9th Cir. 2024). 18 Additionally, “[i]f the district court concludes that a defendant’s “claim of 19 qualified immunity is frivolous or has been waived, the district court may certify in 20 writing, that defendants have forfeited their right to a pretrial appeal, and may 21 proceed with trial.” Chuman, 960 F.2d at 105. An appeal is frivolous “if the results
22 are obvious, or the arguments of error are wholly without merit.” Fair v. King Cnty., 23 No. 2:21-cv-01706-JHC, 2025 WL 1953077, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 16, 2025) 1 (quoting Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, 796 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2 2015)).
3 3.2 Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are subject to interlocutory appeal. 4 Officer Sherwood intends to establish on appeal that even when the evidence 5 is viewed in the light most favorable to Navarrete, his actions did not violate 6 Navarrete’s constitutional rights, as a matter of law. Thus, Officer Sherwood’s 7 appeal is not based on factual disagreements, but rather a disagreement about the 8 legal effect of the facts, when taken in the light most favorable to Navarrete. 9 For Navarrete’s Fourth Amendment judicial deception claim, the Court found 10 that Officer Sherwood’s warrant affidavit contained material omissions and 11 misrepresentations. Dkt. No. 145 at 15–23. The Court explicitly held that 12 materiality is a question of law for the court to decide. Id. at 15 (citing Bravo v. City 13 of Santa Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011)). The Ninth Circuit exercises 14 jurisdiction over materiality determinations in interlocutory appeals. Hart v. City of 15 Redwood City, 99 F.4th 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2024) (“’[A]ny issue of law, including the 16 materiality of the disputed issues of fact, is a permissible subject for appellate 17 review.’” (quoting Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 903, 904 (9th Cir. 2001)). Thus, 18 Officer Sherwood may also challenge the Court’s materiality finding before the 19 Ninth Circuit. 20 More problematic is the second element of judicial deception: whether 21 Sherwood made the misrepresentations or omissions intentionally or with reckless 22 disregard for the truth. The Court found that Navarrete made the required 23 1 “substantial showing” on this element, but emphasized that “‘the question of intent 2 or recklessness is a factual determination for the trier of fact.’” Dkt. No. 145 at 23
3 (quoting Bravo, 665 F.3d at 1083). While the Ninth Circuit has sometimes reviewed 4 such determinations, see Finkelstein v. Jangla, 816 F. App’x 98, 101–02 (9th Cir. 5 2020), Officer Sherwood faces a steep climb to address this element without 6 improperly challenging factual findings. 7 As for Navarrete’s Fourteenth Amendment deliberate fabrication claim, the 8 Court found substantial evidence that Officer Sherwood deliberately fabricated
9 evidence, including his persistence in pursuing charges despite observing that 10 Navarrete did not match the description of the alleged suspect. Dkt. No. 145 at 24– 11 26. Officer Sherwood relies on Cunningham v. Gates to argue that the “Ninth 12 Circuit may also consider whether there is evidence of fabrication at all on 13 interlocutory appeals of denials of qualified immunity.” Dkt. No. 147 at 4 (citing 14 Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1291–92 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2
3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 CRISTIAN NAVARRETE, CASE NO. 2:22-cv-01431 8 Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v. 10 CITY OF KENT, a municipal 11 corporation, and JAMES SHERWOOD, and his marital community, 12 Defendants. 13
14 1. INTRODUCTION 15 Defendant’s motion to stay proceedings pending interlocutory appeal comes 16 before the Court. Dkt. No. 147. Having considered the briefing and the relevant law, 17 the Court is fully informed and GRANTS the motion for the reasons below. 18 2. BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff Cristian Navarrete sued the City of Kent and Officer James 20 Sherwood, asserting claims under state law and 28 U.S.C. § 1983. Navarrete’s 21 Section 1983 claims include a judicial deception claim and a Due Process claim for 22 his allegedly unlawful arrest and prosecution. Defendants moved for summary 23 1 judgment, with Officer Sherwood asserting qualified immunity. He argued that 2 while Navarrete’s constitutional rights were clearly established, he did not violate
3 them, as a matter of law. 4 On October 8, 2025, the Court granted summary judgment in part, 5 dismissing the City of Kent but denying Officer Sherwood’s motion for summary 6 judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Dkt. No. 145. The Court found that 7 genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on whether Officer 8 Sherwood violated Navarrete’s constitutional rights. Id. at 23–28.
9 Officer Sherwood filed a notice of appeal on October 10, 2025, Dkt. No. 146, 10 and moved to stay proceedings pending his interlocutory appeal, Dkt. No. 147. 11 Navarrete opposes the stay and requests that the Court certify the appeal as 12 frivolous. Dkt. No. 152. 13 3. DISCUSSION 14 3.1 Legal standard. 15 When a claim is “immediately appealable,” the filing of an interlocutory 16 appeal “divests the district court of jurisdiction to proceed with trial.” Chuman v. 17 Wright, 960 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir. 1992). “[I]n the qualified immunity context, [the 18 Ninth Circuit] typically ha[s] jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from the denial 19 of summary judgment.” Est. of Anderson v. Marsh, 985 F.3d 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2021) 20 (citing Foster v. City of Indio, 908 F.3d 1204, 1209 (9th Cir. 2018)). This jurisdiction 21 exists because qualified immunity is an immunity from suit itself, which would be 22 23 1 “effectively lost” if the case erroneously proceeds to trial. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 2 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
3 That said, important limits exist on such appeals. The Ninth Circuit lacks 4 jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals over “a fact-related dispute about the 5 pretrial record, namely, whether or not the evidence in the pretrial record was 6 sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact for trial.” Est. of Anderson, 985 F.3d at 730 7 (citation modified). The key question is whether the appeal presents genuine legal 8 issues or merely challenges the district court’s assessment of factual disputes. If a
9 defendant argues only that the evidence is insufficient to support the plaintiff’s 10 claims, the appeal exceeds jurisdictional bounds. Id. at 731. But if the defendant 11 argues on appeal that their conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional 12 rights, even when the disputed facts are taken in the light most favorable to the 13 plaintiff, that appeal presents a question of law, and the appellate court has 14 interlocutory review jurisdiction. Knox v. Sw. Airlines, 124 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 15 1997). If a district court’s rejection of a qualified-immunity defense rests on a
16 question of law, then its decision is immediately appealable. Williams v. City of 17 Sparks, 112 F.4th 635, 642 (9th Cir. 2024). 18 Additionally, “[i]f the district court concludes that a defendant’s “claim of 19 qualified immunity is frivolous or has been waived, the district court may certify in 20 writing, that defendants have forfeited their right to a pretrial appeal, and may 21 proceed with trial.” Chuman, 960 F.2d at 105. An appeal is frivolous “if the results
22 are obvious, or the arguments of error are wholly without merit.” Fair v. King Cnty., 23 No. 2:21-cv-01706-JHC, 2025 WL 1953077, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 16, 2025) 1 (quoting Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, 796 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2 2015)).
3 3.2 Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are subject to interlocutory appeal. 4 Officer Sherwood intends to establish on appeal that even when the evidence 5 is viewed in the light most favorable to Navarrete, his actions did not violate 6 Navarrete’s constitutional rights, as a matter of law. Thus, Officer Sherwood’s 7 appeal is not based on factual disagreements, but rather a disagreement about the 8 legal effect of the facts, when taken in the light most favorable to Navarrete. 9 For Navarrete’s Fourth Amendment judicial deception claim, the Court found 10 that Officer Sherwood’s warrant affidavit contained material omissions and 11 misrepresentations. Dkt. No. 145 at 15–23. The Court explicitly held that 12 materiality is a question of law for the court to decide. Id. at 15 (citing Bravo v. City 13 of Santa Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011)). The Ninth Circuit exercises 14 jurisdiction over materiality determinations in interlocutory appeals. Hart v. City of 15 Redwood City, 99 F.4th 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2024) (“’[A]ny issue of law, including the 16 materiality of the disputed issues of fact, is a permissible subject for appellate 17 review.’” (quoting Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 903, 904 (9th Cir. 2001)). Thus, 18 Officer Sherwood may also challenge the Court’s materiality finding before the 19 Ninth Circuit. 20 More problematic is the second element of judicial deception: whether 21 Sherwood made the misrepresentations or omissions intentionally or with reckless 22 disregard for the truth. The Court found that Navarrete made the required 23 1 “substantial showing” on this element, but emphasized that “‘the question of intent 2 or recklessness is a factual determination for the trier of fact.’” Dkt. No. 145 at 23
3 (quoting Bravo, 665 F.3d at 1083). While the Ninth Circuit has sometimes reviewed 4 such determinations, see Finkelstein v. Jangla, 816 F. App’x 98, 101–02 (9th Cir. 5 2020), Officer Sherwood faces a steep climb to address this element without 6 improperly challenging factual findings. 7 As for Navarrete’s Fourteenth Amendment deliberate fabrication claim, the 8 Court found substantial evidence that Officer Sherwood deliberately fabricated
9 evidence, including his persistence in pursuing charges despite observing that 10 Navarrete did not match the description of the alleged suspect. Dkt. No. 145 at 24– 11 26. Officer Sherwood relies on Cunningham v. Gates to argue that the “Ninth 12 Circuit may also consider whether there is evidence of fabrication at all on 13 interlocutory appeals of denials of qualified immunity.” Dkt. No. 147 at 4 (citing 14 Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1291–92 (9th Cir. 2000)). But the 15 circumstances here are markedly different from Cunningham, in which the Ninth
16 Circuit found that the plaintiffs produced “not an iota of evidence” of fabricated 17 evidence against certain officers. Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1291–92. 18 Here, this Court found direct and circumstantial evidence supporting an 19 inference that Officer Sherwood deliberately fabricated evidence. Dkt. No. 145 at 20 25. And it concluded that “[w]hether Officer Sherwood deliberately fabricated 21 evidence through mischaracterizing witness statements, inventing incriminating
22 admissions, or continuing prosecution despite knowledge of innocence presents 23 disputed issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.” Id. at 26. 1 Whether Officer Sherwood can challenge this conclusion without arguing a “a fact- 2 related” dispute remains doubtful, but he may permissibly challenge whether these
3 disputed facts are material and whether he is entitled to qualified immunity even 4 when the material facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Navarrete. Hart, 5 99 F.4th at 548. 6 Navarrete argues that the Court should certify Sherwood’s appeal as 7 frivolous, citing Ramirez v. Cnty. of L.A., 397 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (C.D. Cal. 2005), and 8 Fair v. King Cnty., No. 2:21-cv-01706-JHC, 2025 WL 1953077 (W.D. Wash. July 16,
9 2025). In Ramirez, the court found that an appeal from denial of qualified immunity 10 on judicial deception and other claims “would do nothing but unreasonably delay 11 the time when [the plaintiff] gets his day in Court.” 397 F. Supp. 2d at 1230. In 12 Fair, a case involving strikingly similar claims of judicial deception and fabricated 13 evidence in a wrongful conviction case, the court certified the defendants’ appeals as 14 frivolous, finding among other things that the defendants admitted intending to 15 appeal the sufficiency of the evidence presented on summary judgment. 2025 WL
16 1953077, at *3, *5. 17 The parallels are concerning. Like the defendants in those cases, Officer 18 Sherwood seeks to appeal shortly after an adverse ruling that rested explicitly on 19 factual disputes. His motion blurs the line between legal and factual arguments. 20 Still, the Court cannot say that the appeal is frivolous. Officer Sherwood maintains 21 he will argue that accepting all of Navarrete’s facts as true, no constitutional
22 violation occurred as a matter of law. Dkt. No. 153 at 3. While the Court is skeptical 23 that Officer Sherwood can maintain this position without veering into 1 impermissible factual challenges, it cannot say that his claimed pure legal 2 arguments are wholly baseless. See Blixseth, 796 F.3d at 1007.
3 Finally, the Court acknowledges the prejudice to Navarrete caused by further 4 delay. Five years have passed since Officer Sherwood arrested Navarrete, who 5 spent 141 days detained during the COVID-19 pandemic. Dkt. No. 145 at 12. The 6 Court agrees with Navarrete’s observation that justice delayed is often justice 7 denied. But the filing of a notice of appeal on qualified immunity grounds 8 automatically divests this Court of jurisdiction, regardless of the hardship imposed.
9 See Chuman, 960 F.2d at 105 (“In the absence of such certification, the district court 10 is automatically divested of jurisdiction to proceed with trial pending appeal.”). 11 Only if the appeal is demonstrably frivolous may the Court retain jurisdiction, and 12 despite strong doubts, the Court cannot make that finding with the certainty 13 required. Id. 14 3.3 The Court stays Plaintiff’s state-law claims pending interlocutory appeal, finding that they are inextricably intertwined with his 15 constitutional claims. 16 When a state-law claim is “inextricably intertwined” with a properly 17 reviewable claim on collateral appeal, the Ninth Circuit has pendent jurisdiction 18 over it. Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 905 (9th Cir. 2000). “[A] pendent 19 appellate claim can be regarded as inextricably intertwined with a properly 20 reviewable claim on collateral appeal only if the pendent claim is coterminous with, 21 or subsumed in, the claim before the court on interlocutory appeal—that is, when 22 the appellate resolution of the collateral appeal necessarily resolves the pendent 23 1 claim as well.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 2 F.3d 924, 930 (10th Cir. 1995)).
3 Officer Sherwood’s appeal will challenge whether—viewing the evidence in 4 Navarrete’s favor—his actions violated Navarrete’s constitutional rights. 5 Navarrete’s state-law claims are premised on the same constitutional rights 6 violations. Accordingly, the Court finds that his state and federal claims are 7 inextricably intertwined for jurisdiction purposes. Id. (quoting Moore, 57 F.3d at 8 930). Alternatively, the Court stays Navarrete’s state-law claims under Landis v.
9 North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936). Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1109 10 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A district court has discretionary power to stay proceedings in its 11 own court[.]”). 12 4. CONCLUSION 13 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to stay pending 14 interlocutory appeal. Dkt. No. 147. This matter is STAYED pending the resolution 15 of Defendant’s interlocutory appeal. The Court STRIKES the Parties’ motions to
16 exclude expert testimony, motions in limine, and related motions to seal with leave 17 to re-file. Dkt. Nos. 86, 91, 93, 137, 139, 140, and 141. The Court retains jurisdiction 18 to resolve its show cause order at Dkt. No. 133. The Court further ORDERS the 19 Parties to submit a status report within 14 days of the resolution of Defendant’s 20 interlocutory appeal. 21
22 23 1 Dated this 22nd day of October, 2025.
° fake — 3 amal N. Whitehead United States District Judge 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23