Crick v. Globe, City of

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: April 16, 2024
• Docket: 2:21-cv-00978
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 April Carrie Crick, et al., No. CV-21-00978-PHX-JAT

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 City of Globe, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to bifurcate portions of trial. (Doc. 16 119). The beginning of motion states that there is one fact dispute for trial that must be 17 decided by the jury for the Court to then decide qualified immunity and the state law 18 intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. (Doc. 119 at 1). 19 Turning to the state law claim first, what Defendants propose is legally and 20 procedurally incorrect. In essence, Defendants ask that this Court send what would amount 21 to mid-trial fact interrogatories to the jury, and then decide the case itself based on those 22 answers. But the right to trial by jury does not allow the Court to make the ultimate 23 decision when there are fact disputes. Therefore, the request to bifurcate as to the state law 24 claim is denied. 25 Regarding the federal claims, Defendants cite many cases in which a court 26 bifurcated liability from damages. But that is not what Defendants seek here. Defendants 27 seek to have a first trial on the factual dispute(s)1 that precluded this Court from deciding

28 1 Defendants claim a single fact is in dispute. (Doc. 119 at 2, 6). The summary judgment order speaks for itself as to the facts the Court found to be in dispute that precluded a grant 1 qualified immunity on summary judgment. Defendants then want this Court to issue a 2 ruling on qualified immunity, and only if qualified immunity is denied, proceed to trial on 3 liability and damages. Defendants did not cite a case wherein qualified immunity was 4 bifurcated from liability and damages. Conversely the Court of Appeals has articulated a 5 procedure for deciding qualified immunity when there are fact disputes: 6 When there are disputed factual issues that are necessary to a qualified immunity decision, these issues must first be determined by the jury before 7 the court can rule on qualified immunity. Morales v. Fry, 873 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1140 (9th Cir. 8 2019). The issue should be preserved in a Rule 50(a) motion at the close of evidence and then revisited, if appropriate, after the verdict in a Rule 50(b) 9 motion. Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 556 F.3d 1075, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009) (“When a qualified immunity claim cannot be resolved before trial 10 due to a factual conflict, it is a litigant’s responsibility to preserve the legal issue for determination after the jury resolves the factual conflict.”); see also 11 A.D. v. Cal. High. Patrol, 712 F.3d 446, 452 n.2 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that defendant preserved his position on qualified immunity—renewed in Rule 12 50(b) motion after trial—by bringing Rule 50(a) motion for JMOL before case was submitted to jury). Consistent with this case law, there may be 13 particular cases in which a special verdict on a discrete fact is warranted in order to resolve a qualified immunity claim. But a special verdict is not 14 required in every qualified immunity case involving disputed issues of material fact for the purpose of evaluating a post-verdict qualified immunity 15 defense. See Lam v. City of San Jose, 869 F.3d 1077, 1086 (9th Cir. 2017). 16 Manual of Model Civil Jury Instructions, 9. Civil Rights Actions–42 U.S.C. 1983, 9.34 17 Qualified Immunity, ¶ 12 (current as of April 15, 2024). 18 The foregoing shows bifurcation of qualified immunity from liability and damages 19 is not the preferred procedure. Based on this law, the motion to bifurcate qualified 20 immunity from liability and damages is denied. 21 Moreover, here, the disputed issues of fact regarding liability and the disputed issues 22 of fact regarding qualified immunity are the same issues. Thus, there would be no time 23 savings by bifurcation; instead, bifurcation would require every eyewitness to testify about 24 the exact same factual scenario twice. Accordingly, Defendants claims of “undue 25 sympathies and misapplied emotions” are baseless because the facts to be decided for either 26 of summary judgment. (Doc. 82). However, the Court notes that even Defendants’ 27 characterization of the one fact in dispute subsumes more that one fact. Specifically, Defendants claim the “fact” in dispute is: “whether April Crick dangerously accelerated 28 her vehicle while Officer Hernandez was positioned between the driver’s door of Crick’s vehicle and in close proximity to the wall of Crick’s building.” qualified immunity or liability all arise from the same interaction between Plaintiff April Crick and Defendants. (Doc. 119 at 6). 3 As indicated above, the beginning of the motion seeks to bifurcate qualified 4|| immunity from liability and damages. (Doc. 119 at 1). By the end of the motion, || Defendants seem to seek to bifurcate liability from damages. (Doc. 119 at 6 (“Here, the 6|| issues of liability and damages are separate and distinct.) (emphasis omitted)). The Court is unclear if this is just sloppy language, or an actual pivot in what is being requested. 8 || Assuming it is a pivot, and Defendants are seeking to bifurcate liability from damages, like with the state law claim, this Court cannot decide liability when there are disputed issues 10] of fact.?, Thus, having the jury answer a special interrogatory on a fact dispute does not 11 || vest in this Court the power to then decide liability based on those factual findings by the □□ jury. The entire issue of liability must be decided by the jury. For these reasons, to the 13 || extent the motion seeks to bifurcate liability from damages based on the jury resolving fact disputes, the motion is in conflict with the right to trial by jury; and accordingly denied. 15 Based on the foregoing, 16 IT IS ORDERED that the motion to bifurcate (Doc. 119) is denied. 17 Dated this 16th day of April, 2024. 18 19 i C 20 1 _ James A. Teil Org Senior United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 Conversely, if there are no relevant fact disputes, or once all fact disputes are resolved, qualified Toy 1 OY é oe 3808) law for the court. See Torres v. City of Los Angeles,

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