Crescent Township Road

18 Pa. Super. 160, 1901 Pa. Super. LEXIS 152
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 25, 1901
DocketAppeal, No. 43
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 18 Pa. Super. 160 (Crescent Township Road) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crescent Township Road, 18 Pa. Super. 160, 1901 Pa. Super. LEXIS 152 (Pa. Ct. App. 1901).

Opinion

Opinion by

W. D. Porter, J.,

This proceeding was commenced in 1887, the report of viewers was set aside and that of the reviewers confirmed absolutely on June 22,1889, the first order to open was issued on June 4, 1890, nothing was done under this order and the whole matter slumbered for ten years. Upon petition of a number of citizens, on May 15,1900, a rule was granted on the commissioners of Crescent township and the supervisors of Moon township to show cause why an attachment should not issue against them for not complying with the order of the court to open said road. The authorities of Moon township, in which a part of the road with one of the termini was located, filed an answer alleging, among other things, that neither the report of reviewers, with the draft attached, or the order to open sufficiently defined the location of said alleged road or its termini, and that they were [162]*162■unable to find or determine the location thereof in Moon township ; that although the order designated that terminal point as near the residence of R. Campbell, the draft attached thereto indicated the said point to be more than 1,000 feet from said residence; that the report of the original viewers and the draft attached located that terminus of the road at the dividing line between the Campbell and Wilson farms, near the residence of R. Campbell, as prayed for in the petition for the road, but this terminus was changed more than 1,000 feet by the reviewers and the road was carried entirely through and beyond the Campbell farm. This was the condition of the record when, on June 18, 1900, the appellant company filed a petition alleging that from 1875 down until the present time it had been the owner and occupant of the farm which, on the draft attached to the report of reviewers, is designated as land of R. Campbell, and that its deed for said tract of land had been on record more than ten years prior to the proceeding for the opening of this road; that it never had released its right to damages for the opening of the road and that neither the board of viewers or reviewers had made any attempt to obtain such release; and it never had any notice or knowledge of the proceeding to locate and open such road until within the past ten days or two weeks. The petition alleged that the road was unnecessary, and that the proceedings of the viewers and reviewers had been irregular in certain respects specified. This petition further alleged that the termini of the road were not in the original petition, the report of viewers or reviewers, or in the order to open sufficiently designated to properly locate the same, and that the report of reviewers had shifted one terminus of the road a quarter of a mile or more away from the point indicated by the petition and the report of the original viewers, thus carrying the road clear across appellant’s land and part of an adjoining farm. The petitioner prayed for leave to file exception nunc pro tunc, and that a rule be granted to show cause why the order of confirmation should not be vacated and all the proceedings quashed. The learned court below allowed the petition to be filed, but subsequently refused its prayer, from which action we have this appeal.

When the petition of appellant was presented to the court below the time for ah appeal from the order of confirmation was [163]*163long past. No irregularity in the proceedings which did not go to the jurisdiction of the court to make the decree, or present upon the face of the order to open the road an insuperable barrier to its execution can now be considered; Cassville Borough Road, 4 Pa. Superior Ct. 511. The refusal of the learned court below to permit exceptions to be filed that went to the merits of the proceeding and raised questions of fact was clearly right. There was nothing upon the face of the proceedings from which it appeared or could be inferred, that the plaintiff was the owner of any land through which the road passed. The record indicates that the land of the plaintiff was then owned and occupied by the heirs of Robert Campbell, that said heirs were notified and damages were awarded to them by the reviewers. The failure of viewers to attempt to procure a release of damages is an irregularity which can only be questioned upon appeal, within the time allowed by law, for it is not jurisdictional in its nature. This leaves for consideration the refusal of the court below to vacate the order of confirmation and quash all the proceedings. This line of attack upon the proceeding is founded upon and must be determined by the condition of the record proper. It is a direct challenge of the authority of the court to make the decree, in the form in which it is sought to be enforced by the order to open the road. This is in the nature of a proceeding to strike off a judgment which is void upon its face; it is an assertion that the judgment does not legally exist. When upon the undisputed facts a court is without authority to enter a decree, that decree may be directly attacked, by a party in interest, at any time before it has been carried into execution: Stevenson v. Virtue, 13 Pa. Superior Ct. 103 and cases there cited. Had this appellant stood by and permitted the public moneys to be expended and the parties, over whose land the road ran, to be prejudiced by an actual opening of the road, it would have been by this course of action estopped. The fact that the appellant never had notice or knowledge of the proceeding, until the recent resurrection of the order from the files of the court,- saves him from any suggestion of failure to assert his rights with promptness. He made his attack directly upon the record, and if that record shows upon its face that no order founded upon it can be enforced without violation of law, then he was entitled to have his lands protected against [164]*164that illegal order. The form of his motion was not material, it included a motion to quash the order to open the road, and if the order is to fall because of invalidity of the decree, the effect is to strike down the whole proceeding. The time within which a party may appeal from the refusal to strike off or quash a decree or order, void upon its face, begins to run from the date of such refusal and not from that of the decree.

The alleged vice of this record is that it does not definitely locate the road which it is now sought to force the supervisors of Moon township to open through this appellant’s farm. The primary cause of this uncertainty is alleged to lie in the failure of the report of the reviewers, which is the foundation of the decree, to define with sufficient precision* the termini of the proposed road. “ The termini of a projected road are its designated and only means of identification. It is by these points it is docketed and indexed. . . . And if the viewers fail to describe the termini of the road as viewed and located it is fatal. They are the initials which describe the proceeding, and limit the authority delegated by the court in its orders to the viewers. To go beyond them is to exceed the authority. When once the viewers cut loose from the order and go outside of it, the whole identity of the proceeding is lost: ” Road in Lower Merion, 58 Pa. 66. The record in this case gives the courses and distances of the proposed road between the terminal points, and if either terminus is fixed with sufficient precision the whole road may be located with reasonable accuracy. In a road proceeding the petition for viewers lies at the foundation of the record and it must state the beginning and ending of the proposed road.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
18 Pa. Super. 160, 1901 Pa. Super. LEXIS 152, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crescent-township-road-pasuperct-1901.