CRESCENT CITY PROPERTY * NO. 2025-CA-0039 REDEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, LLC D/B/A * CRESCENT CITY PROPERTY COURT OF APPEAL SERVICES AND CRESCENT * CITY PROPERTY FOURTH CIRCUIT REDEVELOPMENT * SERVICES, INC. STATE OF LOUISIANA ASSOCIATION D/B/A ******* CRESCENT CITY PROPERTY
VERSUS
SUCCESSION OF JAMES W. STROUGHTER, SUCCESSION OF FRANCES COLLINS A/K/A FRANCES COLLINS STROUGHTER, CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, VETTER LUMBER COMPANY, INC., COMMONWEALTH SAVINGS ASSOCIATION AND/OR ITS SUCCESSOR CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION D/B/A CAPITAL ONE BANK, ET AL.
APPEAL FROM CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH NO. 2021-01406, DIVISION “D” Honorable Monique E. Barial, Judge ****** Judge Rosemary Ledet ****** (Court composed of Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Paula A. Brown)
Reid S. Uzee UZEE LAW FIRM 6218 Argonne Blvd. New Orleans, LA 70124
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Charles L. Stern, Jr. Richard L. Traina STEEG LAW FIRM, LLC 201 St. Charles Ave., Suite 3201 New Orleans, LA 70170
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
AFFIRMED July 31, 2025 RML DLD PAB This appeal arises from an ownership dispute regarding 3701-3703 Baronne
Street and 1804 Amelia Street (“Property”) as a result of two tax sales. Crescent
City Property Redevelopment Association, LLC (“CCPRA”) d/b/a Crescent City
Property Redevelopment Services, LLC (“CCPRS”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”)
purchased the Property through a 2002 tax sale and filed suit to quiet title on the
Property. Theodore Mondale, a defendant claiming good title by way of purchase
from the original owner, filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ claims. The trial court granted Mr. Mondale’s motion for summary
judgment in part, dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims regarding ownership via the 2002
tax sale deed and ten-year acquisitive prescription with prejudice.
Plaintiffs appeal, contending Mr. Mondale lacked standing to challenge their
ownership, that sufficient notice was provided on the 2002 tax sale, and that they
possessed “just title” to satisfy the requirements of ten-year acquisitive
prescription. We find Mr. Mondale, as a successor in title, has standing to
challenge Plaintiffs’ ownership claims. Further, we find no genuine issues of
material fact remain pertaining to Plaintiffs’ ownership claims pursuant to the 2002
1 tax sale deed (“Deed”), as notice was invalid, and via ten-year acquisitive
prescription because they were divested of just title. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1971, James and Frances Stroughter purchased the Property. Mr.
Stroughter died intestate in 1995, and Mrs. Stroughter died intestate in 2004. In
2002, the City of New Orleans (“City”) issued a tax sale deed for the Property to
CCPRA, as a result of a tax auction due to unpaid taxes from 1997-2000.
CCPRA secured the Property and began renovations. In 2006, CCPRA transferred
its interest in the Property to CCPRS via quitclaim deed. Neither CCPRA nor
CCPRS paid any of the taxes on the Property. As a result, in September 2012, the
Property was adjudicated to the City for unpaid taxes.
In February 2021, Plaintiffs filed a petition to quiet title, to annul tax sale,
and to cancel prescribed encumbrances.1 Meanwhile, in 2022, after being
appointed as succession administrator,2 the Stroughters’ son, Adrian, sold the
Property to Mr. Mondale for $110,000.00. As a result, Plaintiffs amended their
petition to add Mr. Mondale; DeShontae McNeal;3 Crescent Title, LLC; and
Adrian4 as additional defendants in their quiet title action.
In March 2024, Mr. Mondale filed a motion for summary judgment and
exception of no right of action, seeking the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against
him for these three reasons: (1) lack of constitutionally required notice, which
1 Plaintiffs named the following parties as defendants: both Stroughter successions; the City of
New Orleans; Vetter Lumber Company, Inc.; Commonwealth Savings Association; Advance Mortgage Company, LLC.; Bernard Dyer (unopened succession, heirs, legatees, and assigns); Dianne Blasé (unopened succession, heirs, legatees, and assigns); and Isabell Cannon (unopened succession, heirs, legatees, and assigns). These defendants are not relevant to the issues presented in this appeal. 2 Plaintiffs contest the validity of Adrian’s appointment, but this issue is not before the Court. 3 Ms. McNeal was granted the right to purchase the Property and assigned her rights to Mr.
Mondale. 4 The Plaintiffs’ first amending and supplemental petition mislabels Adrian as Amos.
2 means the 2002 tax sale is an absolute nullity; (2) lack of “just title” for ten-year
acquisitive prescription; and (3) lack of standing to challenge actions taken in the
succession case. The trial court granted Mr. Mondale’s motion for summary
judgment in part, dismissing: (1) Plaintiffs’ ownership claims regarding the July
21, 2002 tax sale deed, with prejudice, and (2) Plaintiffs’ ownership claims
regarding ten-year acquisitive prescription, with prejudice. Otherwise, Mr.
Mondale’s motion for summary judgment and exception of no right of action were
denied.5 Plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial, which was denied, and this appeal
followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court has established the standard of review appellate courts utilize
when reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment as follows:
Appellate courts review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo, using the same criteria applied by trial courts to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. This standard of review requires the appellate court to look at the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, to determine if they show that no genuine issue as to a material fact exists, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A fact is material when its existence or nonexistence may be essential to the plaintiffs [sic] cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery; a fact is material if it potentially insures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant’s ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal dispute. A genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, no need for trial on that issue exists and summary judgment is appropriate. To affirm a summary judgment, we must find reasonable minds would inevitably conclude that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of the applicable law on the facts before the court.
5 The trial court designated the judgment as final pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(1).
3 Mandina, Inc. v. O’Brien, 2013-0085, pp. 8-9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/31/13), 156 So.3d
99, 104. (internal citations omitted).
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
“The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action, except those disallowed by Article
969.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). “The procedure is favored and shall be construed
to accomplish these ends.” Id. “A party may move for a summary judgment for
all or part of the relief for which he has prayed.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(1). The
plaintiff may file after the answer, but the defendant can file at any time. Id.
The trial court may grant a motion for summary judgment after there has
been time for adequate discovery “if the motion, memorandum, and supporting
documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the
mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3).
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment:
The only documents that may be filed or referenced in support of or in opposition to the motion are pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, certified medical records, certified copies of public documents or public records, certified copies of insurance policies, authentic acts, private acts duly acknowledged, promissory notes and assignments thereof, written stipulations, and admissions.
La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(4)(a).6 “No additional documents may be filed with the
reply memorandum.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(3).
The mover bears the burden of proof. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). However,
“if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the
court . . . the mover’s burden on the motion does not require him to negate all
essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense.” Id. Instead,
6 Effective August 1, 2023.
4 the mover must then “point out to the court the absence of factual support for one
or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense.” Id.
The burden then shifts to “the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to
establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
Once presented with supporting and opposing documentation, the trial
court’s role is as follows:
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge’s role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead, to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Hines, 04–0806, p. 1, 876 So.2d at 765. A “genuine issue” is a triable issue, or one as to which reasonable persons could disagree. 1026 Conti Condominiums, LLC v. 1025 Bienville, LLC, 11-1055, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/8/12), 84 So.3d 778, 781; Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., 93-2512, p. 27 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751. Similarly, a fact is “material” when its existence or non-existence may “insure or preclude recovery, affect a litigant’s ultimate success, or determine the outcome of the legal dispute.” Hayes, 14-0675, pp. 3-4, 156 So.3d at 1196; FMC Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Prytania-St. Mary Condominiums Ass’n, Inc., 12–1634, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/15/13), 117 So.3d 217, 222. Despite the legislative mandate that summary judgments are favored, any doubt as to a dispute regarding a material issue of fact must be resolved against granting the motion and in favor of a trial on the merits. Willis v. Medders, 00-2507, p. 2 (La.12/8/00), 775 So.2d 1049, 1050; FMC Enterprises, 12-1634, pp. 6-7, 117 So.3d at 222-23; Windham v. Murray, 06-1275, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/30/07), 960 So.2d 328, 331.
Bridgewater v. New Orleans Reg’l Transit Auth., 2015-0922, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4
Cir. 3/9/16), 190 So.3d 408, 412.
Furthermore, “[a] trial judge cannot make credibility determinations on a
motion for summary judgment.” Sislo v. New Orleans Ctr. for Creative Arts,
2016-0178, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/17/16), 198 So.3d 1202, 1206. “It is not the
function of the district court on a motion for summary judgment to determine or
even inquire into the merits of the issues raised.” Thibodeaux v. Asbestos Corp.,
5 2007-0617, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/20/08), 976 So.2d 859, 862 (quoting Knowles v.
McCright’s Pharmacy, Inc., 34,559, p. 3 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/4/01), 785 So.2d 101,
103). “Additionally, the weighing of conflicting evidence has no place in
summary judgment procedure.” Id.
Discussion
Standing
Plaintiffs contend Mr. Mondale lacks standing to intervene in the July 2002
tax sale, “as he was neither a party to the transaction or an owner of the Baronne
Property at the time of the sale.” For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs’ assertion
lacks merit.
Plaintiffs rely upon In re Marie Placide Praying for Monition, 2022-0438
(La. App. 4 Cir. 7/27/22), 345 So.3d 1039, in support of their contention that Mr.
Mondale lacks standing. Plaintiffs’ reliance is misplaced. This Court, in Placide,
held that decedent’s child was not a proper party to annul the tax sale of decedent’s
property because he was not listed as an interested party in “an act of sale recorded
in the conveyance records of Orleans Parish.” 2022-0438, pp. 4-5, 345 So.3d at
1042.
Conversely, in the present matter, it is undisputed that Adrian conveyed the
Property to Mr. Mondale.7 The Louisiana Supreme Court examined a similar
situation in Mooring Tax Asset Grp., L.L.C. v. James, 2014-0109 (La. 12/9/14),
156 So.3d 1143. The original owners of the property in Mooring sold the property
to buyer 1, presumably unaware of a previous tax sale. 2014-0109, p. 2, 56 So.3d
at 1145. Buyer 1 then sold the property to the defendant. Id. The Louisiana
Supreme Court held that the current record owner was the proper party to seek to
7 The validity of said conveyance is not presently before us.
6 clear the title. Id., 2014-0109, pp. 11-12, 56 So.3d at 1151 (finding “it remains the
obligation of the property owner to clear the title. Thus, it was [defendant] who
properly sought to annul the tax sale even though he was not the tax debtor or
property owner at the time of the tax sale.”). Thus, as Mr. Mondale is a successor
in title, Plaintiffs’ assertion fails.8
Notice
Plaintiffs maintain the trial court erred by finding that notice provided to the
Stroughters of the 2002 tax sale was procedurally improper because “[t]he City,
Appellants, and an appointed Succession Representative exhausted all possible
avenues for notifying the Stroughters, but they took no action or interest in the
transfer of the Baronne Property.”
The parties do not dispute that the Property was sold in 1971 to Mr.
Stroughter. However, Plaintiffs contend Mrs. Stroughter was not included in the
sale, meaning notice of the tax sale was only required for Mr. Stroughter.
Whereas, Mr. Mondale avers that community property was the default regime in
1971, which would require notice be given to Mrs. Stroughter, as a co-owner in
indivision. It is undisputed that notice was not sent to Mrs. Stroughter.
In 2002, La. R.S. 47:2180(B) provided that notice shall be provided to “each
taxpayer.” See also Lewis v. Succession of Johnson, 2005-1192 (La. 4/4/06), 925
So.2d 1172. Accordingly, we must determine whether Mrs. Stroughter was a
8 “[T]he law governing the payment and collection of property taxes, tax sales, and adjudicated
property . . . was substantively revised by the legislature in 2008 by La. Acts, No. 819, effective January 1, 2009.” Cent. Props. v. Fairway Gardenhomes, LLC, 2016-1855, 2016-1946, p. 10 (La. 6/27/17), 225 So.3d 441, 448. Plaintiffs’ remaining citations are to statutes enacted in 2009 and post-revision jurisprudence. See La. R.S. 47:2286 and Lepree v. Dorsey, 2022-0853 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/11/23), 370 So.3d 1191, writ denied, 2023-01238 (La. 12/5/23), 373 So.3d 982. “The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained that the law in effect at the time of the tax sale is controlling regardless of when the case is adjudicated.” Cloud v. Gibson, 2023-0435, p. 17 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/30/24), 399 So.3d 604, 615, writ denied, 2024-01078 (La. 11/20/24), 396 So.3d 68 (citing Cent. Props., 2016-1855, 2016-1946, p. 10, 225 So.3d at 448).
7 “taxpayer” such that notice was required.
“[U]ntil the 1979 revision of Book III, Title VI of the Louisiana Civil Code
(Matrimonial Regimes) accomplished by 1979 La.Acts, No. 709 (effective Jan. 1,
1980), the marital property law of this state characterized the husband as ‘head and
master’ of the community of acquets and gains.” Camel v. Waller, 526 So.2d
1086, 1090-91 (La. 1988). Moreover, in 1971, property purchased during the
marriage was presumed to be community property unless the act of sale included a
“double declaration that he purchased the property with his separate funds and for
his separate estate.” Id., 526 So.2d at 1091. See also Talbot v. Talbot, 2003-0814,
p. 11 (La. 12/12/03), 864 So.2d 590, 599.
Plaintiffs rely upon Future Trends, LLC v. Armit, 2004-525, p. 4 (La. App. 5
Cir. 11/16/04), 890 So.2d 13, 15, for the premise that “no statute clearly states
whether or not both spouses in a community must receive notice on delinquent
taxes due on community property.” However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
opined that the wife, as an owner in indivision with her husband, “must receive
notice of the delinquent taxes due and notice of the tax sale.” Id., 2004-525, p. 5,
890 So.2d at 15. Moreover, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in addressing
jurisprudence requiring notice to co-owners prior to the 2009 revisions, held:
Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Louisiana constitution require proper notice to each owner in indivision to guard against a deprivation of property without due process of law. Consequently, we find the failure to provide the requisite notice to each co-owner of record renders the tax sale null and void in its entirety.
C & C Energy, L.L.C. v. Cody Invs., L.L.C., 2009-2160, pp. 9-10 (La. 7/6/10), 41
So.3d 1134, 1140-41 (superseded by statute as enunciated by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Cent. Props., 2016-1855, 2016-1946, p. 10, 225 So.3d at 448).
The 1971 Act of Sale and Assumption included the following language:
8 James W. Stroughter, a person of the full age of majority and a resident of the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, who after being by me first duly sworn, did depose and state that he has been married but once and then to Frances Collins, with whom he is presently living and residing at 4229 Alfred Street, New Orleans, Louisiana. (reformatted).
The 2002 Deed was directed to Mr. Stroughter. Further, the Deed indicated that a
“certified letter a notice in conformity with said Laws of the State and the said Mr.
James W. Stroughter” was mailed notifying Mr. Stroughter of the pending sale for
his failure to pay ad valorem taxes for 1997-2000. The Deed also provided that
notice was published in the Times-Picayune. However, there is no evidence that
Mrs. Stroughter was provided notice, which was required given her status as a co-
owner. Indeed, Plaintiffs do not assert she was provided notice. Lack of this
constitutional requirement is fatal to a tax sale prior to the revisions. See Lewis,
2005-1192, pp. 8-9, 925 So.2d at 1177. As such, no genuine issues of material fact
remain regarding the failure to comply with the notice requirements. Accordingly,
we find the trial court did not err by granting Mr. Mondale’s motion for summary
judgment as it relates to Plaintiffs’ claims of ownership based upon the Deed.
Just Title
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by dismissing their claims of
ownership of the Property by “virtue of ten-year acquisitive prescription.”
Louisiana Civil Code article 3475 provides, “[t]he requisites for the acquisitive
prescription of ten years are: possession of ten years, good faith, just title, and a
thing susceptible of acquisition by prescription.” Plaintiffs maintain the trial court
erred by finding they lacked the “just title” component; thus, defeating their
ownership claims pursuant to ten-year acquisitive prescription.
Following Plaintiffs’ tax sale purchase of the Property in 2002, they failed to
9 pay ad valorem taxes.9 As a result, the Property was adjudicated to the City in
2012. Mr. Mondale attached the tax sale certificate reflecting the September 25,
2012 adjudication to the City, which stated notice was sent by certified mail to
Plaintiffs at their registered address and that the tax sale was advertised on August
24, 2012, and September 21, 2012. The tax sale certificate was recorded on July 6,
2016.
Plaintiffs claim the 2012 tax sale was a nullity for failure to provide them
with “post-sale” notice. “Under the 2008 revision[s], ‘the tax collector no longer
auctions the real estate itself; instead, the tax collector auctions a tax sale title to
the property, as evidenced by a tax sale certificate per La.[R.S.] 47:2155, which
neither transfers nor terminates the property interest of any person in the
property.’” Precept Credit Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. Walker, 2021-0670, p. 7
(La. App. 4 Cir. 6/22/22), 343 So.3d 299, 305 (quoting Fairway Gardenhomes, 16-
1855, p. 11, 225 So.3d at 448. Further, as this Court previously noted, “[u]nder the
2008 revisions, ‘[t]ax sales may no longer be attacked as absolute nullities. Instead,
there are three statutorily enumerated challenges, which if proven, will nullify a tax
sale certificate—–[i] a payment nullity, [ii] [a] redemption nullity, or [iii] a nullity
under La. R.S. 47:2162 [a sale to a prohibited buyer].’” Precept, 2021-0670, p. 8,
343 So.3d at 305 (quoting Stow-Serge v. Side by Side Redevelopment, Inc., 20-
0015, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/10/20), 302 So.3d 71, 76). As these challenges can be
cured, they are considered relative nullities and do no create a nullity action.
Precept, 2021-0670, p. 8, 343 So.3d at 305.
A redemption nullity is the only nullity that could arguably apply in this
9 Plaintiffs claim CCPRS is a nonprofit, such that no ad valorem taxes were ever due. However, CCPRS’s applications for this exemption, according to Plaintiffs, were not acted upon by the City.
10 matter. Indeed, Plaintiffs contend post-sale notice was lacking. “A ‘redemption
nullity’ is ‘the right of a person to annul a tax sale in accordance with La. R.S.
47:2286 because he was not duly notified at least six months before the termination
of the redemptive period.’” Stow-Serge, 2020-0015, p. 5, 302 So.3d at 76 (quoting
La. R.S. 47:2122(10)).
“[T]ax sales are presumed valid.” Heirs of John Beckwith LLC v. Sims,
2020-0476, p. 27 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/10/21), 315 So.3d 306, 326. Once the record
included a presumptively valid tax sale certificate, the burden shifted to Plaintiffs
to provide evidence of defects in the tax adjudication. Lepree, 2022-0853, p. 17,
370 So.3d at 1202. In Lepree, the non-moving party was tasked with opposing a
summary judgment after a valid tax sale was presented. Id. The non-mover
“merely argued that she did not receive notice of the sale of the Property and that
the record was lacking proof of post-tax sale notice of her right to redeem the
Property.” Id. This Court held that “[t]his was insufficient to rebut the
presumption of validity.” Id. Specifically, we opined:
[non-mover] did not even attach an affidavit to her Opposition with an attestation about her alleged lack of post-sale notice; and she otherwise failed to include any exhibits and evidence to support her arguments. Rather, [non-mover’s] reliance on only the arguments of her counsel in her Opposition to [mover’s] Motion for Summary Judgment was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the validity of the tax sale deed.
Id. See also Equity Tr. Co., FBO 200267986 (59.51%) & 200267988 (40.49%) v.
Thorrick, 2023-0779, pp. 20-22 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/10/24), 399 So.3d 454, 467-68
(finding non-mover “also did not provide any evidence or exhibits to otherwise
rebut the validity of the tax sale.”).
Much like the non-movers in Lepree and Equity, Plaintiffs’ opposition
lacked evidence of a defect in the 2012 tax adjudication. Plaintiffs contend the
11 “list” attached to their opposition shows that the City failed to comply with post-
sale notice requirements and, thus, creates a genuine issue of material fact. We
disagree. The list is unlabeled and unauthenticated. Plaintiffs did not attach an
affidavit from a City employee explaining what the “list” means or purports to
display. We find this equates with nothing more than argument of counsel
attempting to tell this Court, and the trial court, what the “list” allegedly embodies.
Plaintiffs appear to concede this fact in their reply brief when they asserted, “[t]he
reason that Crescent City Property did not produce evidence of a ‘post-sale’ notice
is because none exists!”
Moreover, once a party is divested of possession under a just title pursuant
to a tax sale, the property cannot be “acquire[d] by possession of less than thirty
years.” Cole v. Martin, 343 So.2d 334, 336 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2/14/77). See also
Crescent City Prop. Redevelopment Ass’n, LLC v. Muniz, 2020-0421, pp. 8-9 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 2/10/21), 313 So.3d 406, 412, writ granted, judgment rev’d on other
grounds, 2021-00371 (La. 6/1/21), 347 So.3d 682 (“Louisiana jurisprudence does
not allow a party to claim just title where it has not paid the taxes and the property
is sold at a tax sale.”) (Supreme Court reversed on other grounds and found the
issue of just title premature).
Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err by granting Mr. Mondale’s
summary judgment motion and dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims of ownership pursuant
to ten-year acquisitive prescription.
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Plaintiffs’ motion for appeal also designated the trial court’s August 13,
2024 denial of their motion for new trial for appeal. Neither Plaintiffs’ appellate
brief nor their reply brief assigned the motion for new trial as an assignment of
12 error, discussed the standard of review for motions for new trial, or discussed the
alleged error of the trial court’s ruling. Rule 2-12.4(B)(4) of the Uniform Rules –
Courts of Appeal provides that “[t]he court may deem as abandoned any
assignment of error or issue for review which has not been briefed.” See also
Alexander v. Blue Williams, L.L.P., 2023-0216, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/31/24), 399
So.3d 621, 625, writ not considered, 2024-01094 (La. 11/20/24), 396 So.3d 66,
reconsideration denied, 2024-01094 (La. 2/19/25), 400 So.3d 921; Hardy v. Juv.
Just. Intervention Ctr., 2021-0715, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/15/22), 342 So.3d 1076,
1082; Cmty. Dev. Cap. v. Hous. Corp. of Am., 2019-0045, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir.
7/31/19), 363 So.3d 389, 395. Accordingly, we pretermit discussion of same.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we find the trial court did not err by granting Mr.
Mondale’s motion for summary judgment in part as it pertains to Plaintiffs’ claims
of ownership based on the 2002 tax deed and ten-year acquisitive prescription. We
affirm.
AFFIRMED