[Cite as Crenshaw v. Integrity Realty, L.L.C., 2012-Ohio-4166.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 98051
MARIAH CRENSHAW PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
INTEGRITY REALTY, LLC, D.B.A., SHAKER NORTH, LTD. DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-749067
BEFORE: Cooney, J., Stewart, P.J., and S. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 13, 2012 FOR APPELLANT
Mariah Crenshaw, pro se 3472 E. 114th Street Cleveland, Ohio 44104
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David M. Gareau Michael R. Gareau Michael R. Gareau, Jr. Michael R. Gareau & Associates, Co., L.P.A. 23823 Lorain Road, Suite 200 North Olmsted, Ohio 44070 COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J.:
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Mariah S. Crenshaw (“Crenshaw”), appeals the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, Integrity Realty, LLC,
d.b.a. Shaker North, Ltd. (“Integrity”). We find no merit to the appeal and affirm.
{¶2} Crenshaw is a former tenant of an apartment complex managed by Integrity.
The parties entered into a lease agreement for a twelve-month term beginning on April 1,
2009. On March 18, 2010, Integrity, through its business name Shaker North, filed a
forcible entry and detainer action against Crenshaw in the Cleveland Municipal Court
seeking possession of the premises, back rent, and late charges. Crenshaw filed an answer
and counterclaim, alleging religious discrimination, retaliation, breach of the lease
agreement, and breach of an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.
{¶3} The Cleveland Municipal Court dismissed Integrity’s claim for possession
when Crenshaw moved out of the apartment. It later dismissed Integrity’s remaining
claims for back rent and late fees and granted Crenshaw’s motion for summary judgment
on her counterclaims. Integrity filed a motion for reconsideration and for relief from
judgment. In January 2011, both parties agreed to voluntarily dismiss their claims before
the Cleveland Municipal Court. The parties signed an agreed judgment entry, which
stated in part: By agreement of the parties and approval of the Court:
1. [Shaker North, Ltd.]’s motion for reconsideration is granted, the case restored to original status quo at the time of completion of filing of pleadings, the entry dismissing [Shaker North, Ltd.]’s second cause of action and granting [Crenshaw]’s judgment on her counterclaim, being, accordingly, vacated. Plaintiff’s first cause was already dismissed.
2. [Shaker North, Ltd.] dismisses its second cause of action with prejudice.
3. [Crenshaw] dismisses her counterclaim with prejudice.
4. [Shaker North, Ltd.] shall bear costs.
5. Nothing herein shall be taken as an admission of liability by either party.
{¶4} Thereafter, Crenshaw filed this action in the Cuyahoga County Common
Pleas Court based on the same lease, alleging fraud, breach of contract, and a frivolous
lawsuit. Integrity promptly filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court
granted the motion on grounds that Crenshaw’s claims were barred by res judicata and by
Crenshaw’s settlement of a separate common pleas action. Crenshaw now appeals,
raising two assignments of error.
Standard of Review
{¶5} An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary
judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105,
1996-Ohio-336, 671 N.E.2d 241. Summary judgment is appropriate when, construing
the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, (1) there is no genuine issue
of material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3)
reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, that conclusion being adverse to the nonmoving party. Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 369-370,
1998-Ohio-389, 696 N.E.2d 201, citing Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp., 73 Ohio St.3d
679, 1995-Ohio-286, 653 N.E.2d 1196, paragraph three of the syllabus.
Res Judicata
{¶6} In her first assignment of error, Crenshaw argues the trial court erred in
finding that her claims were barred by res judicata. Crenshaw contends Integrity and
Shaker North are not the same entity and that, because Integrity was not a party to the
prior litigation, res judicata is inapplicable. We find this issue dispositive.
{¶7} Under the doctrine of res judicata, “[a] valid, final judgment rendered upon
the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction
or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.” Grava v. Parkman
Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 1995-Ohio-331, 653 N.E.2d 226, syllabus. To be barred by res
judicata, “the parties to the subsequent suit must either be the same or in privity with the
parties to the original suit.” Onesti v. DeBartolo Realty Corp., 113 Ohio St.3d 59,
2007-Ohio-1102, 862 N.E.2d 803, ¶ 9.
{¶8} “Privity is defined as mutual or successive relationships to the same right of
property, or such an identification of interest of one person with another as to represent
the same legal right.” Buchanan v. Palcra, Inc., 6th Dist. No. E-87-22, 1987 Ohio App.
LEXIS 10285 (Dec. 31, 1987), quoting Peterson v. Fee Internatl. Ltd., 435 F. Supp. 938
(D.C. Okl. 1975). A determination of whether the doctrine of res judicata bars an action is a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo. Payne v. Cartee, 111 Ohio
App.3d 580, 586-587, 676 N.E.2d 946 (4th Dist.1996).
{¶9} Crenshaw’s claims in this case arise from the same transaction or occurrence
that was the subject of the Cleveland Municipal Court case. Her counterclaim in the
eviction action alleged breach of the lease agreement between herself, as tenant, and
Shaker North, as landlord. Integrity is the property manager of the Shaker North
Apartments As an agent of Shaker North, Integrity shared the same interest in
Crenshaw’s lease agreement. They shared a mutual relationship to the same property
interest and were in privity with each other. Res judicata bars this subsequent action
against Integrity because Crenshaw’s claims for breach of contract were previously
litigated in the Cleveland Municipal Court. Crenshaw’s frivolous lawsuit claim is
similarly barred because it could have been litigated in the prior action. Therefore,
Crenshaw’s breach of contract and fraud claims are barred by res judicata by virtue of the
prior eviction action against her.
Fraud
{¶10} Crenshaw’s fraud claim relates to events that allegedly occurred during a
pretrial conference in the Cleveland Municipal Court. She claims that Shaker North
presented the court with a false ledger in its effort to prove she had not paid rent.
{¶11} Collateral estoppel, which is a derivative of res judicata, bars the relitigation
of a point of law or fact that was at issue in a former action between the same parties and
was passed on by a court of competent jurisdiction. State ex rel. Kincaid v. Allen Refractories Co., 114 Ohio St.3d 129, 2007-Ohio-3758, 870 N.E.2d 701, ¶ 18, quoting
Office of Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util.
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[Cite as Crenshaw v. Integrity Realty, L.L.C., 2012-Ohio-4166.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 98051
MARIAH CRENSHAW PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
INTEGRITY REALTY, LLC, D.B.A., SHAKER NORTH, LTD. DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-749067
BEFORE: Cooney, J., Stewart, P.J., and S. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 13, 2012 FOR APPELLANT
Mariah Crenshaw, pro se 3472 E. 114th Street Cleveland, Ohio 44104
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David M. Gareau Michael R. Gareau Michael R. Gareau, Jr. Michael R. Gareau & Associates, Co., L.P.A. 23823 Lorain Road, Suite 200 North Olmsted, Ohio 44070 COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J.:
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Mariah S. Crenshaw (“Crenshaw”), appeals the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, Integrity Realty, LLC,
d.b.a. Shaker North, Ltd. (“Integrity”). We find no merit to the appeal and affirm.
{¶2} Crenshaw is a former tenant of an apartment complex managed by Integrity.
The parties entered into a lease agreement for a twelve-month term beginning on April 1,
2009. On March 18, 2010, Integrity, through its business name Shaker North, filed a
forcible entry and detainer action against Crenshaw in the Cleveland Municipal Court
seeking possession of the premises, back rent, and late charges. Crenshaw filed an answer
and counterclaim, alleging religious discrimination, retaliation, breach of the lease
agreement, and breach of an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.
{¶3} The Cleveland Municipal Court dismissed Integrity’s claim for possession
when Crenshaw moved out of the apartment. It later dismissed Integrity’s remaining
claims for back rent and late fees and granted Crenshaw’s motion for summary judgment
on her counterclaims. Integrity filed a motion for reconsideration and for relief from
judgment. In January 2011, both parties agreed to voluntarily dismiss their claims before
the Cleveland Municipal Court. The parties signed an agreed judgment entry, which
stated in part: By agreement of the parties and approval of the Court:
1. [Shaker North, Ltd.]’s motion for reconsideration is granted, the case restored to original status quo at the time of completion of filing of pleadings, the entry dismissing [Shaker North, Ltd.]’s second cause of action and granting [Crenshaw]’s judgment on her counterclaim, being, accordingly, vacated. Plaintiff’s first cause was already dismissed.
2. [Shaker North, Ltd.] dismisses its second cause of action with prejudice.
3. [Crenshaw] dismisses her counterclaim with prejudice.
4. [Shaker North, Ltd.] shall bear costs.
5. Nothing herein shall be taken as an admission of liability by either party.
{¶4} Thereafter, Crenshaw filed this action in the Cuyahoga County Common
Pleas Court based on the same lease, alleging fraud, breach of contract, and a frivolous
lawsuit. Integrity promptly filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court
granted the motion on grounds that Crenshaw’s claims were barred by res judicata and by
Crenshaw’s settlement of a separate common pleas action. Crenshaw now appeals,
raising two assignments of error.
Standard of Review
{¶5} An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary
judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105,
1996-Ohio-336, 671 N.E.2d 241. Summary judgment is appropriate when, construing
the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, (1) there is no genuine issue
of material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3)
reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, that conclusion being adverse to the nonmoving party. Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 369-370,
1998-Ohio-389, 696 N.E.2d 201, citing Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp., 73 Ohio St.3d
679, 1995-Ohio-286, 653 N.E.2d 1196, paragraph three of the syllabus.
Res Judicata
{¶6} In her first assignment of error, Crenshaw argues the trial court erred in
finding that her claims were barred by res judicata. Crenshaw contends Integrity and
Shaker North are not the same entity and that, because Integrity was not a party to the
prior litigation, res judicata is inapplicable. We find this issue dispositive.
{¶7} Under the doctrine of res judicata, “[a] valid, final judgment rendered upon
the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction
or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.” Grava v. Parkman
Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 1995-Ohio-331, 653 N.E.2d 226, syllabus. To be barred by res
judicata, “the parties to the subsequent suit must either be the same or in privity with the
parties to the original suit.” Onesti v. DeBartolo Realty Corp., 113 Ohio St.3d 59,
2007-Ohio-1102, 862 N.E.2d 803, ¶ 9.
{¶8} “Privity is defined as mutual or successive relationships to the same right of
property, or such an identification of interest of one person with another as to represent
the same legal right.” Buchanan v. Palcra, Inc., 6th Dist. No. E-87-22, 1987 Ohio App.
LEXIS 10285 (Dec. 31, 1987), quoting Peterson v. Fee Internatl. Ltd., 435 F. Supp. 938
(D.C. Okl. 1975). A determination of whether the doctrine of res judicata bars an action is a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo. Payne v. Cartee, 111 Ohio
App.3d 580, 586-587, 676 N.E.2d 946 (4th Dist.1996).
{¶9} Crenshaw’s claims in this case arise from the same transaction or occurrence
that was the subject of the Cleveland Municipal Court case. Her counterclaim in the
eviction action alleged breach of the lease agreement between herself, as tenant, and
Shaker North, as landlord. Integrity is the property manager of the Shaker North
Apartments As an agent of Shaker North, Integrity shared the same interest in
Crenshaw’s lease agreement. They shared a mutual relationship to the same property
interest and were in privity with each other. Res judicata bars this subsequent action
against Integrity because Crenshaw’s claims for breach of contract were previously
litigated in the Cleveland Municipal Court. Crenshaw’s frivolous lawsuit claim is
similarly barred because it could have been litigated in the prior action. Therefore,
Crenshaw’s breach of contract and fraud claims are barred by res judicata by virtue of the
prior eviction action against her.
Fraud
{¶10} Crenshaw’s fraud claim relates to events that allegedly occurred during a
pretrial conference in the Cleveland Municipal Court. She claims that Shaker North
presented the court with a false ledger in its effort to prove she had not paid rent.
{¶11} Collateral estoppel, which is a derivative of res judicata, bars the relitigation
of a point of law or fact that was at issue in a former action between the same parties and
was passed on by a court of competent jurisdiction. State ex rel. Kincaid v. Allen Refractories Co., 114 Ohio St.3d 129, 2007-Ohio-3758, 870 N.E.2d 701, ¶ 18, quoting
Office of Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 16 Ohio St.3d 9, 10, 475 N.E.2d 782
(1985). Like res judicata, for collateral estoppel to apply, the parties to the subsequent
suit must either be the same or in privity with the parties to the original suit. Id.
{¶12} The ledger Shaker North presented as evidence that Crenshaw failed to pay
rent relates to a material fact at issue in the prior action. The eviction case was based on
the allegation that Crenshaw failed to pay rent as required by the lease agreement. To
prevail in that action, Shaker North had the burden of proving that Crenshaw breached the
lease agreement by failing to pay rent. Having been previously litigated in the prior
action, the veracity of the ledger is barred by collateral estoppel. Crenshaw’s fraud claim
constitutes a collateral attack on the municipal court’s final judgment related to that issue
and is not permitted.
{¶13} The trial court properly dismissed Crenshaw’s claims as barred by res
judicata. Therefore, we overrule the first assignment of error.
Settlement Agreement
{¶14} In her second assignment of error, Crenshaw argues the trial court erred in
relying on an unsigned settlement agreement in another case at common pleas court to
reach its conclusion that her claims were barred. First, we need not reach this issue
because our disposition of the first assignment of error is dispositive. But even if we do
reach it, we affirm the trial court. {¶15} In support of its motion for summary judgment, Integrity submitted a
certified copy of the settlement agreement and properly authenticated it with an affidavit
as required by Civ.R. 56(E). The certified copy was signed by all the parties.
Therefore, the trial court was authorized to consider the settlement agreement, although it
was only a second reason the court gave in granting summary judgment.
{¶16} The second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶17} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________________________________ COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, JUDGE
MELODY J. STEWART, P.J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR