Creel v. N.C. Dhhs

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedJune 18, 2001
DocketI.C. NO. TA-15663
StatusPublished

This text of Creel v. N.C. Dhhs (Creel v. N.C. Dhhs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Creel v. N.C. Dhhs, (N.C. Super. Ct. 2001).

Opinion

The parties agreed that the Deputy Commissioner would bifurcate the claim and enter a decision on the issue of liability without a ruling on damages.

Upon review of the competent evidence of record, and finding no good grounds to receive further evidence or rehear the parties or their representatives, the Full Commission, upon reconsideration of the evidence, affirms the Opinion and Award of the Deputy Commissioner.

The Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which were entered into by the parties at the hearing as:

STIPULATIONS
1. All parties are properly before the Industrial Commission, and the Commission has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter.

2. All parties have been correctly designated, and there is no question as to misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties.

3. Prior to 17 March 1999, the parental rights of plaintiffs natural mother were terminated by the Lenoir County District Court. Prior to and after 17 March 1997, legal custody of plaintiff was with the Lenoir County Department of Social Services by order of the District Court of Lenoir County. Ms. Cathy Skarbek is the Lenoir County DSS Social Worker assigned to this case. The parties agree that it would not be in the best interests of plaintiff if his natural mother learns of his current whereabouts.

4. Plaintiff appears by and through his guardian ad litem, Victor H. E. Morgan, Jr., Esquire.

5. On 17 March 1997, Burnest and Rita Gamble were foster parents as defined in G.S. 131D-10.2(9a).

6. Prior to 17 March 1997, plaintiff had been placed in the foster home of Burnest and Rita Gamble pursuant to G.S. 108A-14(12) by the Lenoir County Department of Social Services.

7. Plaintiff was diagnosed with microcephaly, an abnormally small head usually associated with mental retardation.

8. On 17 March 1997 at approximately 4:30 p.m., Mr. Gamble was using a riding lawn mower at his personal residence.

9. On 17 March 1997, Mr. Gamble allowed the then two year old plaintiff to ride with him on the lawn mower. At some point during the mowing, Mr. Gamble allowed plaintiff off the mower to play in his sand box. Mr. Gamble was mowing around a bush when plaintiff came back to the mower. Plaintiffs foot became caught under the mower and the blades, causing severe injuries to his feet and legs.

10. Plaintiffs injuries included a large avulsion of the right calf measuring 9 x 7 cm; a 10 cm flap type laceration of the right foot; a metatarsal fracture of the right foot; a 5 cm laceration of the left calf; a 14 cm flap type laceration of the left ankle with almost complete avulsion of the heel; and a 5 cm laceration over the dorsum of the left foot. Plaintiff required several surgical operations to repair his injuries including skin grafting from the right thigh, debridement of the wounds, nerve graft, and tendon suture.

11. As of the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner, plaintiff had not fully recovered from the injuries to his left foot. The bone in his left heel was not growing and would require a bone graft within the next five years.

12. The medical bills of plaintiff are in excess of $100,000.00. The medical bills have been paid by Medicaid, and the Division of Medical Services claims a lien in the amount of its payment. The Commission does not have jurisdiction to determine this issue.

In addition, the parties stipulated into evidence the following:

1. Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 through 23 which are contained in a notebook submitted by the parties along with an index. However, defendant did not agree that plaintiff had small head syndrome according to the current medical reports.

2. Order terminating parental rights, marked as Defendants Exhibit 1.

3. Sections from the statute regarding control over child placement, marked as Defendants Exhibit 2.

4. Statement regarding foster care funding, marked as Defendants Exhibit 3.

The Pre-Trial Order dated 14 June 2000 which was submitted by the parties is incorporated by reference.

***********
Based upon the competent evidence of record, the Full Commission makes the following additional:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff was born on 22 July 1994. His parents neglected him to the point that he did not know how to eat food by the time that he was two years old. The Lenoir County Department of Social Services investigated allegations of neglect and at some point took plaintiff from his parents after the department was granted custody of plaintiff by court order. Several attempts were made to place plaintiff with grandparents and foster homes but these attempts failed because the natural mother threatened family members and because plaintiff has severe behavioral difficulties. As no other options were located within the county, plaintiffs social worker sought assistance from adjacent counties.

2. In October 1996, the Craven County Department of Social Services called Rita Gamble and asked if she and her husband would be willing to take plaintiff. The Gambles had previous experience as foster parents when they lived in other states. They had recently moved to North Carolina and had completed the licensing process to become foster parents in this state. The social worker advised Mrs. Gamble that if she would not take plaintiff, he would probably be institutionalized. Mrs. Gamble expressed willingness to take plaintiff and care for him. Consequently, plaintiff moved in with the Gambles later that month.

3. When he arrived, plaintiff was difficult to control and hyperactive. Plaintiff had violent tendencies and would beat on himself. He did not know how to eat, bathe, play games, or sleep in a bed. He could only speak two words. Over the next four months, the Gambles worked with him to teach basic skills, and he began to bond with them, particularly with Mrs. Gamble. Social workers involved in the case were very pleased with plaintiffs progress.

4. The Gambles had a sizeable yard and had bought a used riding lawn mower to trim the grass. During warm weather in 1997, Mr. Gamble mowed the yard periodically. On a couple of occasions, Mr. Gamble allowed plaintiff to ride with him on the lawn mower. Plaintiff enjoyed the experience.

5. On the afternoon of 17 March 1997, Mr. Gamble was in the backyard putting gas in the mower when plaintiff indicated that he wanted to ride. Consequently, Mr. Gamble sat on the mower, put plaintiff in his lap, and began mowing the yard. At this time, Mrs. Gamble was inside the home meeting with the social worker about their other foster child. After riding with Mr. Gamble for a few minutes, plaintiff was ready to get off. Mr. Gamble stopped the mower, put plaintiff down and saw him head towards his sand box. Mr. Gamble then restarted the mower and resumed mowing the yard. Mr. Gamble checked periodically to see that plaintiff was playing in the sand box.

6. While mowing around a bush and watching where he was going, Mr. Gamble was suddenly aware that plaintiff was beside the mower and injured. Plaintiff apparently had wanted another ride, had approached the mower quickly from behind, and his feet were struck by the mower blades. As a result of the accident, plaintiff sustained serious injuries to his feet and his left calf. The Gambles immediately took plaintiff to the hospital for treatment and provided appropriate care for him as he underwent medical treatment and recuperated from his injuries.

7. Following the incident, a complaint was filed with the department of social services alleging that plaintiffs injuries resulted from the Gambles negligence.

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Bluebook (online)
Creel v. N.C. Dhhs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/creel-v-nc-dhhs-ncworkcompcom-2001.