Credit Bureau of Hopkinsville, Inc. v. Richardson (In Re Richardson)

52 B.R. 237, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 5529
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Tennessee
DecidedAugust 13, 1985
DocketBankruptcy 382-01101
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 52 B.R. 237 (Credit Bureau of Hopkinsville, Inc. v. Richardson (In Re Richardson)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Credit Bureau of Hopkinsville, Inc. v. Richardson (In Re Richardson), 52 B.R. 237, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 5529 (Tenn. 1985).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

KEITH M. LUNDIN, Bankruptcy Judge.

The question presented is whether a Chapter 7 debtor can exempt and recover funds garnished from the debtor three years before bankruptcy, but still held by the clerk of the state court at the time of the petition. Based on our interpretation of the Kentucky law of garnishment and guided by this court’s decision in In re Perry, 48 B.R. 591, 12 COLLIER BANKR. CAS.2d 927 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1985), we hold that the debtor can recover and exempt the funds.

I.

On April 12, 1979, Credit Bureau of Hop-kinsville, Kentucky (“Credit Bureau”) secured a judgment in the Circuit Court for *238 Christian County, Kentucky against Ursula M. Richardson (“debtor”) in the amount of $4,000. A post-judgment order for garnishment was served on May 3, 1979 against United Peoples Bank of Pembroke, Kentucky. The sum of $1,618 was garnished from the debtor’s account at United Peoples Bank and forwarded to the Clérk of the Christian County Circuit Court. Credit Bureau has never claimed the money and the funds have remained with the clerk to this time. 1

On April 8, 1982 the debtor filed a Chapter 7 petition. The trustee filed a no-asset report and on June 22, 1982 the debtor received a discharge of her debts including the April 12, 1979 judgment.

On March 8, 1985, the debtor filed a motion to reopen her case and claim the garnished funds as exempt. She stated that at the time of her bankruptcy filing, she believed the garnished funds had already been paid over to Credit Bureau and thus were not available for administration in her case. When she discovered that the state court clerk still held the funds, she filed the motion to reopen.

This court entered an order on May 2, 1985 allowing the case to be reopened but reserving the question of entitlement to the funds. Both Credit Bureau and the debtor have filed motions for summary judgment claiming the funds.

II.

Credit Bureau relies chiefly on In re Gibbs, 39 B.R. 214 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1984). In Gibbs, Judge Deitz held that under Kentucky law the debtor retained no interest in funds garnished eight months before a bankruptcy filing. Focusing on 11 U.S.C. § 541, the court explained, “we are unable to find in this section any safe haven for funds attached to a state court order which was not only final but fully complied with.” In Gibbs the garnished funds were actually paid to the creditor long prior to bankruptcy. In the present case the funds were held by the court clerk and have never been paid to the garnishing creditor. The debtor argues this distinction is controlling. 2

In many instances, a debtor retains an interest in property for bankruptcy purposes notwithstanding levy or seizure by a creditor prior to the filing. This is the lesson of United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 103 S.Ct. 2309, 76 L.Ed.2d 515 (1983). However, Whiting Pools recognized that a levy or seizure may divest the debtor of all property interests and transfer ownership to the creditor. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 209-12, 103 S.Ct. at 2315-17, 76 L.Ed.2d at 525-26. In the context of the Tennessee garnishment law and an action to recover a preference, this court has recently examined the interplay of state and federal law where the existence of a property interest is important for bankruptcy purposes. See In re Perry, 48 B.R. 591, 12 COLLIER BANKR. CAS.2d 927 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1985). We must examine Kentucky law to determine whether this debtor retained an interest in the garnished funds held by the state court clerk sufficient to support a claim for exemption.

The Kentucky garnishment statute in effect in 1977 provided in relevant part as follows:

(1) Any person in whose favor a final judgment in personam has been entered in any court of record of this state may, upon the filing of an affidavit by him or his agent or attorney in the office of the clerk of the court in which the judgment was entered, and in the same cause in which said judgment was obtained showing the date of the judgment and the amount due thereon, and that one or more named persons hold property belonging to, or are indebted to, the judg *239 ment debtor, obtain an order of garnishment directed to the sheriff, with as many copies as the plaintiff may direct, requiring him to summon the garnishees named in the affidavit to answer in the manner and at the time required for an answer by the Rules of Civil Procedure, and to make due return thereof. The order shall be made returnable as an order of arrest is directed to be returned.
(4) The judgment debtor may, on the return day, appear and claim the exemption of any property or debt that is exempt from execution, and on proof of exemption the garnishment shall be discharged as to the exempt property or debt.
(5) If the court finds that the garnishee was, at the time of service of the order upon him, possessed of any property of the judgment debtor, or was indebted to him, and the property or debt is not exempt from execution, the court shall order the property or the proceeds of the debt applied upon the judgment.
(8) The order of garnishment shall be directed and delivered to the sheriff, with as many copies thereof as the plaintiff may direct. It shall require the sheriff to summon the garnishees to answer in the action in the manner and at the time required for an answer by the Rules of Civil Procedure, and to make due return thereof.

KY.REY.STAT.ANN. § 425.501 (Baldwin 1979). 3

The garnishee was required to pay according to the provisions of KY.REV. STAT. § 425.516:

The garnishee may pay the money owing to the defendant by him, not exceeding the plaintiffs claim and costs, to the sheriff having in his hands the order of attachment, or into the court; and to that extent he shall be discharged from liability to the defendant. He shall not be subjected to costs beyond those caused by his resistance of the claim against him; and, if he discloses the property of the defendant in his hands, or the true sum owing by him and delivers or pays the same to the sheriff, or according to the order of the court, he shall be allowed his costs.

KY.REV.STAT.ANN. § 425.516 (Baldwin 1979). 4

The Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure also provide directions to the parties to a garnishment. Rule 69.02 reads as follows:

*240

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
52 B.R. 237, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 5529, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/credit-bureau-of-hopkinsville-inc-v-richardson-in-re-richardson-tnmb-1985.