Creamer v. Rush County Sheriff Department

Opinion

In the United States District Court for the District of Kansas _____________

Case No. 24-cv-04101-TC-GEB _____________

MARJORIE A. CREAMER,

Plaintiff

v.

RUSH COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT, ET AL.,

Defendants _____________

ORDER

Plaintiff Marjorie Creamer filed this action alleging excessive force by the Rush County Sheriff. Docs. 1 & 5. Because Creamer submitted a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Doc. 3, Magistrate Judge Birzer screened her Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Judge Birzer granted Creamer’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis but recommended that her Complaint be dismissed for lack of subject mat- ter jurisdiction in light of Younger abstention. Doc. 7; see generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Creamer filed a timely objection. Doc. 8. When a magistrate judge has issued a report and recommendation on a dispositive pretrial matter, a party objecting to the recommenda- tion must “serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The district judge must then determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to. The dis- trict judge may accept, reject, or modify the recom- mended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This means that objections to a magistrate judge’s recommended disposition must be “both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court . . ..” United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). To be timely, the objection must be made within 14 days after service of a copy of the recommended disposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Objections are sufficiently specific if they “fo- cus the district court’s attention on the factual and legal issues that are truly in dispute.” One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d at 1060. Where a party fails to make a proper objection, a district court may review the rec- ommendation under any standard it deems appropriate, even for clear error. Summers v. Utah, 927 F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted); Gilbert v. United States Olympic Comm., 423 F. Supp. 3d 1112, 1125 (D. Colo. 2019). The Younger doctrine is based “on notions of comity and federal- ism, which require that federal courts respect state functions and the independent operation of state legal systems.” Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 885, 889 (10th Cir. 1997). Generally speaking, it prevents federal courts from entertaining suits that could interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings. Younger, 401 U.S. at 45. In such a case, a federal court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction where there is an on- going state, civil, or administrative proceeding, the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the federal complaint, and the state proceedings involve important state interests. Winn v. Cook, 945 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2019) (citing Chapman v. Okla- homa, 472 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir. 2006)). All three requirements are met here. There is an ongoing state criminal proceeding against Creamer. Doc. 8-1. The basis of Creamer’s suit is that she suffered excessive force while being arrested for the ongoing state criminal prosecution concerning battery, disorderly con- duct, driving under the influence, and transporting an open container. See id. at 3–5; see also Doc. 8 at 1. As to the second prong, “a federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate rem- edy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987). Creamer has not met her bur- den of “proving that state procedural law barred presentation of [her claim].” J.B. ex rel. Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1292 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 14 (noting that the burden “rests on the federal plaintiff to show that state procedural law barred presentation of [her] claims”). And the District of Kansas has repeatedly found that Kansas courts are an adequate forum to address constitutional claims. McCollum v. Kansas, No. 14-1049, 2014 WL 3341139, at *5 (D. Kan. July 8, 2014); Tinner v. Foster, No. 11-2695, 2012 WL 1473417, at *4 (D. Kan. Apr. 27, 2012); see also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460 (1974) (“[A] pending state proceeding, in all but unusual cases, would provide the federal plaintiff with the necessary vehicle for vindicating his con- stitutional rights.”). Finally, state criminal proceedings are viewed un- der Younger as “a traditional area of state concern.” Winn, 945 F.3d at 1258 (quoting Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma v. State of Okl. ex rel. Thompson, 874 F.2d 709, 713 (10th Cir. 1989)). Saying Younger applies only raises the question of what to do. The Magistrate Judge concluded that dismissal was appropriate. Doc. 7 at 5–7. The Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit suggest that “claims for declaratory relief and injunctive relief are subject to outright dis- missal,” but staying proceedings seeking damages—instead of dismiss- ing the case—is the better course “as to claims for money damages.” Graff v. Aberdeen Enterprises, II, Inc., 65 F.4th 500, 523 (10th Cir. 2023); see Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 730 (1996). Creamer’s pleadings are not entirely clear, but it appears that she seeks injunctive relief relative to the ongoing criminal proceedings. See Doc. 8 at 2, 5; accord Doc. 1 (failing to request money damages); Doc. 5 (same). There is certainly nothing to suggest in any of the pleadings Creamer has filed that these ongoing state proceedings will not adequately remedy what- ever claims she intends to present in this suit. Accordingly, the Magis- trate Judge’s decision suggesting dismissal is appropriate. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the Report and Rec- ommendation, Doc. 7, is adopted in full. The case is DISMISSED without prejudice. It is so ordered.

Date: April 9, 2025 s/ Toby Crouse Toby Crouse United States District Judge