Crawford v. United States

291 F. 801, 1923 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1480
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedJuly 3, 1923
DocketNo. 11361
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 291 F. 801 (Crawford v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crawford v. United States, 291 F. 801, 1923 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1480 (N.D. Ohio 1923).

Opinion

WESTENHAVER, District Judge.

This action is brought by-plaintiff as beneficiary of Collins George Nadolleck on a certificate of insurance issued to him pursuant to the provisions of the War Risk Insurance Act of October 6, 1917 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 514a et seq.). The case turns on the question of whether or not this policy was in force at the time of the insured’s death, and involves the meaning of the word “pay” as used in that act, the regulations issued by the Director of the War Risk Insurance Bureau pursuant thereto, and in the certificate of insurance. It is the government’s contention, that the term “pay,” thus used, means the usual monthly pay for active duty service, and of the defendant that it means and includes “retainer pay,” so called, payable to members of the United States Naval Reserve.

Collins George Nadolleck, the insured, enlisted as a United States naval volunteer April 6, 1917, for a term of three years. On December 6, 1917, he made application for a $5,000 insurance certificate naming the plaintiff as his beneficiary, and a certificate for that amount was duly issued. ’ In his application he authorized “the necessary monthly deduction from my pay, or, if insufficient, from any deposit with the United States in payment of premiums, unless they be otherwise paid.” It further provides that the application is deemed made as of the date of his signature “with premiums commencing from that date and payable at the end of each calendar month.” He was then on active service, earning the pay provided by law for his rank arid class, which was payable monthly. On July 1, 1918, by operation of law, he became also a member of the United States Naval Reserve, and as a member thereof, he became entitled thereafter to a certain pay or allowance, called “retainer pay,” the amount of which was determined by his rank and class in the active service. On September 30, 1919, he was released from active service, remaining, however, a member of the naval reserve until the end of his three-year term. When thus released, he was fully paid all his active service pay, including a $60 bonus allowed alike to all members of the military and naval forces' when discharged or placed on inactive duty. He was also given a copy of war risk insurance form 2303, containing information relative to the continuance in force of his War Risk Insurance. He was honorably discharged from the naval reserve April 6, 1920, and met his death by drowning July 10, 1920, without having .made any payments of premiums after his release from active service. At the date of such release and continuously thereafter until his death, the government was in arrears to him on account of retainer pay in a sum sufficient to pay these premiums, and it is the contention of plaintiff that the War Risk Insurance Act and the terms and conditions of the insurance certificate authorized and required these premiums to be deducted therefrom, and that the legal effect is the same as if they had been so deducted.

The decision of this contention turns on the construction of cer[803]*803tain sections of the War Risk Insurance Act, the terms and conditions of the certificate of insurance, and the lawful regulations pertaining thereto made by the Director of 'the Bureau of War Risk Insurance. Section 22 of the'War Risk Insurance Act says:

“The term ‘pay’ means the pay for service in the United States according to the grade and length of service, excluding all allowances.”

Section 13 of the act empowers the Director, subject to the general direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, to make rules and regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of the act, necessary or appropriate to carry out its purposes. It also provides that the Director shall decide all questions, arising under the act, except as otherwise provided in sections 5 and 405. Section 402 requires him to determine upon and publish the full and exact terms and conditions of the contract of insurance. Pursuant thereto, bulletin No. 1 was published October 15, 1917, fixing the terms and conditions of the certificate. This bulletin declares that premiums shall be payable monthly on or before the last day of each calendar month. This is the purport also of section 404. The bulletin further provides that unless the insured otherwise elects in writing, premiums will be deducted from any pay due him from the United States or deposit by him with the United States; also, if so to be deducted, a premium when due will be treated as paid, whether or not such deduction is in fact made, if upon the due date the United States owes him on ac'count of pay or deposit an amount sufficient to provide the premium. A 31-day period of grace after the expiration of each month is allowed during which the insurance shall remain in force. It is finally provided that if the premium is not paid either in cash or by deduction when due or within the days of grace, it shall immediately terminate. All of these terms and conditions were carried into the insured’s application and the certificate issued, to him. No question is or can be made that the terms and conditions thus fixed were consistent with the act and within the power of the Director.

The court should place itself in the situation of the parties when the act was passed and when those terms and conditions were settled and the certificate issued.' Our duty primarily is to ascertain the intent of Congress and of the Director of the War Risk Insurance Bureau. This insurance was available only to men then in active service and not to members of the United States Naval Reserve on inactive service. The privilege of keeping the insurance in force after discharge from active service and converting it into ordinary life insurance was accorded only to men who had been in the active service. The privilege of taking this insurance was not accorded to men in the United States Naval Reserve, nor as an incident to enrollment in that service. What Congress intended to provide for and insure against were the war risks of active service in the military and naval forces of the United States. Naturally the language used must be construed in view of this general purpose and in connection with the risks and hazards of active military or naval duty.

Consequently when the Director of the War Risk Insurance Bureau, acting pursuant to the power conferred by section 402, determined and [804]*804published the full and exact terms of the insurance contract and provided that premiums should be paid monthly and would, unless the insured elected otherwise in writing, be deducted from any pay due him from the United States or any deposit made by him with the United States, he must have had in mind the usual pay accruing monthly for ■active service. He must also, in referring to the deposit by the insured with the United States, have had in mind only the deposits created by sections 202 and 203 of the act. Section 202 authorized the enlisted man to allot certain portions of his monthly pay. Section 203 requires that, in case one-half of an enlisted man’s monthly pay is not allotted, regulations to be made by the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, respectively, may require that any portion of such half as is not allotted shall be deposited to his credit, to be held during such period of his service as may be prescribed. This deposit Is evidently the deposit referred to in bulletin No. 1 and in the insured’s application and insurance certificate. No allotment could be required of any part of the so-called retainer pay, nor kept as a deposit.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
291 F. 801, 1923 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1480, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crawford-v-united-states-ohnd-1923.