Crawford v. Rohrer

59 Md. 599, 1883 Md. LEXIS 121
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland
DecidedMarch 8, 1883
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 59 Md. 599 (Crawford v. Rohrer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crawford v. Rohrer, 59 Md. 599, 1883 Md. LEXIS 121 (Md. 1883).

Opinion

Alvey, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

There is no dispute in regard to the existence of the-debts upon which the hills were filed in these cases. They are admitted to he due by the corporation. The only question made in this Court is that of the liability-[601]*601of the defendants as stockholders for such debts due from the corporation; that is to say, whether, under the provisions of the statute, there is any ground for holding them liable on account of the stock subscribed by them?

The Natural Guano and Chemical Company of Baltimore City was incorporated and organized, under the General Incorporation Law of the State, in May, 1880. The capital stock of the company was fixed at $20,000, divided into one thousand shares, of the par value of $20 each. The stock was subscribed for and allotted to the defendants, as follows: To Zell, 245 shares; to Burton, 245 shares; to Wetzler, 242 shares; to Rohrer, 243 shares;, and 25 shares to Kendig; making, in all, the one thousand shares. These shareholders were made directors, and Burton was made president, Zell general manager, and Wetzler treasurer of the company. They carried on the operations of the company hut for a brief period, before they suspended; and, at the instance of Wetzler and Rohrer, and upon the allegation that the company was-totally insolvent, the Court appointed a receiver to take charge of and wind up the affairs of the concern. The defendants admit that the corporation is utterly insolvent;. and they all, with the exception of Zell, aver and insist that the stock subscribed for by them has all been fully paid for, and that they hold the same as paid-up stock. But, however this may he, there is a strange confusion, and no little conflict, in the statements of the parties as to how payment was made.

It appears that two of the defendants, Zell and Burton, had been in business as partners, manufacturing fertilizers by some patent process; and they had a leasehold interest, in the premises on which the business was conducted, and they had machinery, certain patent rights, and also a stock of crude materials on hand to he manufactured. After the formation of the corporation, instead of paying the par value in money for the stock that was issued to [602]*602them, they had valued and turned over to the corporation, the leasehold interest, the machinery, patent rights, and also the stock of raw materials, that belonged to them in their character of partners, composing the firm of Zell and Burton. According to the statement and contention of the defendants, Burton and Wetzler, the valuation, including everything, amounted to $16,000, and for which Zell and Burton were to receive stock; but, according to the averment in the separate answer of Zell, and also according to his testimony, the valuation of the property turned over only amounted to $14,000, and the sum of $1646.95 was the separate valuation of the stock of unmanufactured materials, for which the company actually paid, not in stock, but in money. And if this latter statement be true, even upon the assumption that the entire property was valued at $16,000, the full capital stock has not been in reality paid, but there is still due thereon the .sum of $1646.95. Wetzler swears that the entire valuation of all the property turned over to the corporation was to be paid Zell and Burton in the stock of the company, and that the amount was $16,000; and that it was hy an arrangement with them that he and Rohrer were equalized in the division and issue of the stock—he and Rohrer paying four thousand dollars in cash, to make up the $20,000, the full capital stock of the company. It is not claimed that they paid more than $4000, and that is less than half the par value of the stock issued to them. There is a doubt raised upon the testimony, whether more than $3000 were in fact paid by them, but that fact becomes immaterial to the present plaintiffs, if the other allegation be established, namely, that the $1646.95 were paid to Zell and Burton for the crude materials in money, and not in the stock of the company; for upon that assumption the payments for the whole one thousand shares of stock would he $14,353.05 in property and $4000 in money, leaving the balance of $1646.95 still due to capital stock.

[603]*603"Was, then, the unmanufactured materials taken from Zell and Burton paid for in cask and not in stock? Tkis, ás we have already said, is positively sworn to ky Zell, and it lias not keen in any positive way controverted by Burton. Tke latter admits that the materials were separately valued at $1646.95, but ke says ke was not acquainted with that transaction; that it was settled and closed with Zell. He says, moreover, that Zell attended to all tke business of Zell and Burton. Wetzler admits that tke materials were separately valued, and further, that a very short time after tke company was organized, Zell and Burton obtained from the company tke amount of tke valuation, $1646.95, with which to pay off their old debts. That tke amount was paid to them without security; and that it was not regarded as a loan from- nor a debt due to tke company; but that it might be called a gift from tke company to Zell and Burton.

But it seems to us that tke evidence that is most reliable upon tkis subject is that furnished by the books of tke corporation. Among tke first entries that occur in tke journal is the entry of tke amount of the valuation of tke raw materials as a .credit to tke capital stock; hut that entry is afterwards corrected, and is, in a very explicit way, changed, with a memorandum to explain tke act, into an entry to tke credit of Zell and Burton, for tke amount of tke materials, and is carried through all tke books as suck credit to them. Wetzler says that tkis -entry in favor of Zell and Burton was made without authority, but ke does not and could not say that ke was not aware of tke fact of tke existence of tke corrected entry, and that it had been carried from tke journal to tke ledger. We cannot, therefore, do otherwise, under tke circumstances, than conclude that suck credit to Zell and Burton was made in accordance with tke fact as it existed to tke knowledge of all concerned. And that being so, it is clear, tke stock has not all been fully paid up in tke manner alleged by tke defendants.

[604]*604And hence it would seem to he clear, that the plaintiffs in these cases are entitled to he paid their undisputed claims to the extent that the stock subscribed for remains unpaid. This is required by the plain justice of the case, and is according to the terms of the statute (Code Art. 26, sec. 59, as amended and re-enacted by the Act of 1872, ch. 325), which expressly provides, that all stockholders of any corporation shall be severally and individually liable to the creditors of such corporation to an amount equal to the amount of stock held by them, respectively, for debts and contracts made by the corporation, until the whole amount of the capital stock shall have been paid in; “ but no stockholder shall be individually liable to the creditors, of such corporation, except to the amount of his or their unpaid subscription to the capital stock.” Strauss vs. Heiss, 48 Md., 292. It has been again and again decided, that the unpaid subscriptions to the capital stock of a corporation constitute a trust fund for the benefit of the general creditors of the corporation; and that this trust cannot be defeated or the fund impaired by a simulated or pretended payment for the stock taken, nor by any device short of actual payment in good faith.

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Bluebook (online)
59 Md. 599, 1883 Md. LEXIS 121, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crawford-v-rohrer-md-1883.