Crawford v. FAHS

65 F. Supp. 13, 34 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1211, 1945 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1550
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedDecember 4, 1945
DocketCivil Action No. 831—J
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 65 F. Supp. 13 (Crawford v. FAHS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crawford v. FAHS, 65 F. Supp. 13, 34 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1211, 1945 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1550 (S.D. Fla. 1945).

Opinion

DE VANE, District Judge.

This case came on for trial, October 18, 1945, before a jury, upon the several issues raised by the pleadings in the case. Thereupon evidence was introduced and the Court being of the opinion that there was no issue of fact to be submitted to the jury and after argument upon the legal questions presented by the pleadings and evidence, instructed the jury to render a verdict for the plaintiffs and thereupon the jury rendered a verdict in the words and figures as follows:

“Verdict

“We, the Jury, find for the plaintiffs and assess their damages on Counts I and II of the Complaint at the sum of Five Hundred Eighty-five and 05/100 Dollars ($585.-05), with lawful interest thereon from August 24, 1944, and on Counts III and IV of the Complaint at the sum of Fifteen Hundred an 89/100 Dollars ($1500.89), with lawful interest thereon from August 24, 1944.

“So say we all.

“E. L. Patton “Foreman

“Jacksonville, Florida, October 19, 1945.” Findings of Fact

1. The undisputed facts upon which the foregoing verdict was directed discloses that plaintiffs filed a joint income tax return, on Form 1040, with the defendant, as Collector of Internal Revenue for the State of Florida, on or before March 15, 1941, showing, among other things, that in the calendar year, 1940 (which is plaintiffs’ tax year), they disposed of a capital asset held for more than eighteen months, but not more than twenty-four months, from which they realized a long-term capital gain in the sum of $9241.12, of which two-thirds was included in plaintiffs’ net income for that year and all lawful taxes thereon were duly paid.

Also plaintiffs filed an income tax return, on Form 1040, on or before March 15, 1942, showing, among other things, that in the calendar year of 1941 they disposed of a capital asset held for more than twenty-four months, from which they real[14]*14ized a long-term capital gain in the sum of $9427.46, of which fifty per cent was included in the plaintiffs’ net income for said year and all lawful taxes thereon were duly paid.

2. The Collector of Internal Revenue subsequently ruled that the above income was not capital gains, but resulted from the disposal of property held by plaintiff, J. T. G. Crawford, primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business. The Collector imposed an additional tax of $486.81 and interest in the sum of $98.24, or a total of $585.05 as an additional assessment for the tax year 1940, and an additional tax of $1314.-49 and $186.40 interest, or a total of $1500.-89 as an additional assessment for the tax year, 1941.

3. These taxes were paid under protest and claims for refund were duly filed with the Collector of Internal Revenue. The Collector not- having paid the same and six months having expired, this suit was brought to recover the additional assessments made by the Collector and paid, under protest, by the plaintiffs.

4. The undisputed evidence in the case shows that in 1915 San Jose Company, a corporation, owned and subdivided into lots, a ninety acre tract of land lying South of South Jacksonville, Florida. Fifteen of the lots were shortly thereafter sold and conveyed. No other lots in this subdivision were sold until 1925, when all the remaining lots were sold in a block.

5. In August, 1925, J. T. G. Crawford, hereinafter referred to as “taxpayer,” purchased an undivided, one-sixth interest in the remaining lots. The other interests were, at the same time, purchased by City Realty Company, a corporation, one-third. T. J. Mason, one-third, and Arthur Fin-berg, one-sixth. Legal title to all the lots purchased was conveyed by lot and block numbers to said City Realty Company, which gave to San Jose Company a purchase money mortgage for $72,000, payable in four equal semi-annual instalments. The purchase price was $90,000. The agreement between the purchasers then was that the property be sold as a whole. City Realty Company held the legal title for the benefit of it-self and the other purchasers.

6. Late in 1925 all the property so purchased was contracted to be sold to Acreage Investment Company, a corporation, but the sale was not consummated. Early in 1926 a contract was entered into with O. C. Griner, a real estate broker, under which the lots were offered for sale at retail on instalment contracts. In the following few months fifty-two lots were sold and conveyed.

7. In July, 1926, the taxpayer acquired from City Realty Company an additional one-ninth interest. City Realty Company became involved, and could not contribute its share of the payments accruing under the purchase money mortgage. To avoid difficulties with its creditors City Realty Company, in October, 1928, conveyed the legal title to Hammond Land Company, a corporation. The latter company never had any transactions concerning the lots, merely holding the legal title for the benefit of its owners.

8. In 1929 the taxpayer acquired an additional one-sixth interest from Mason.

9. In acquiring the additional interest from City Realty Company the taxpayer acted to protect his original investment. Payments accrued on the underlying mortgage and the purchase from City Realty Company enabled it to contribute its share of mortgage maturities which prevented foreclosure and consequent total loss.

In 1929 San Jose Company demanded payment of the balance then due on its mortgage. The taxpayer arranged for a loan, on the security of the mortgage, with which San Jose Company was paid, and in that manner the mortgage was extended.

10. When the mortgage was again called, all the owners, except the City Realty Company, were able and willing to pay off the balance of the mortgage. City Realty Company had then gone out of business and its interest had passed to The Florida National Bank of Jacksonville. The bank refused to contribute its share. The taxpayer and other owners were unwilling to carry the bank’s interest and agreed among themselves that they would let the mortgage be foreclosed and undertake to bid the property in at the foreclosure sale. This was accomplished and title taken in the name of a corporation (Miramar Terrace Company) organized for the purpose. Miramar Terrace Company never held any other asset, and it was liquidated and dissolved as of December 31, 1938, when the legal title was conveyed to the owners.

11. Throughout the period from 1927 to 1937, inclusive, the property was held for sale as a whole with no thought of selling lots at retail. Late in 1938 Mr. Charles E. Commander, Jr., a building contractor and [15]*15real estate broker and developer, proposed to the owners that he would bear all the expense and perform all the work necessary to get the location approved for F.H. A. insured mortgages if the owners would grant him the exclusive right to buy, or to sell to others, all or any of the lots, at a 10% discount if he purchased for his own account, or 10% commission if he sold to others, according to a price schedule then agreed upon. On that basis he prepared the application and all required exhibits, paid ail the expenses an°d performed all the work incident to the application. The application was eventually approved, subject to the conditions: (1) That water be made accessible to all lots on which applications for insured mortgages were to be made, and (2) that the streets must be hard surfaced in front of all such lots.

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Related

Meyers v. Commissioner
1971 T.C. Memo. 268 (U.S. Tax Court, 1971)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
65 F. Supp. 13, 34 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1211, 1945 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1550, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crawford-v-fahs-flsd-1945.