1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 DARRYL PIERRE CRAWFORD, Case No. 20-cv-06286-JST
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF SERVICE v. 9
10 S. BANGAR, et al., Defendants. 11
12 13 Plaintiff, an inmate at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), has filed a pro se action 14 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint (ECF No. 1) is now before the Court for review 15 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a 16 separate order. 17 DISCUSSION 18 A. Standard of Review 19 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 20 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 22 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 23 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 24 (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 25 Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 27 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 1 grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 2 Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a 3 plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than 4 labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . 5 . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 6 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must 7 proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 8 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 9 (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 10 the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 11 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 12 B. Complaint 13 The complaint alleges that SVSP correctional officials Cortes-Garcia, Machua, and Bangar 14 were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs when, in November 2019, they 15 failed to ensure that plaintiff was released to eat immediately after receiving his insulin shots, as 16 required by his doctor. ECF No. 1 at 3. The complaint also alleges that defendant Cortes-Garcia 17 retaliated against plaintiff for filing grievances regarding this failure by having him moved against 18 his will. ECF No. 1 at 3. Liberally construed, these allegations state a cognizable Eighth 19 Amendment claim against defendants Cortes-Garcia, Machua, and Bangar, and a cognizable First 20 Amendment retaliation claim against defendant Cortes-Garcia. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 21 97, 104 (1976) (Eighth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious 22 medical needs); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Within the prison 23 context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An 24 assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that 25 prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First 26 Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.”) 27 (footnote omitted). 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows. 3 1. Liberally construed, the complaint states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim 4 against defendants Cortes-Garcia, Machua, and Bangar, and a cognizable First Amendment 5 retaliation claim against defendant Cortes-Garcia. 6 2. The Clerk shall issue summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, without 7 prepayment of fees, a copy of the complaint (Dkt. No. 1), with all attachments thereto, and a copy 8 of this order upon defendants Cortes-Garcia, Machua, and Bangar at Salinas Valley State 9 Prison, at 31265 Highway 101, Soledad, California 93960. A courtesy copy of the complaint 10 with attachments and this order shall also be mailed to the California Attorney General’s Office. 11 3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows: 12 a. No later than 91 days from the date this order is filed, defendant must file 13 and serve a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If defendant is of the 14 opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, defendant must so inform the 15 Court prior to the date the motion is due. A motion for summary judgment also must be 16 accompanied by a Rand notice so that plaintiff will have fair, timely, and adequate notice of what 17 is required of him in order to oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 18 2012) (notice requirement set out in Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998), must be 19 served concurrently with motion for summary judgment).1 20 b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion 21 must be filed with the Court and served upon defendant no later than 28 days from the date the 22 motion is filed. Plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment 23 provided later in this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment. 24 25 1 If defendant asserts that plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as 26 required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), defendant must raise such argument in a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) 27 (en banc) (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which held that 1 c. Defendant shall file a reply brief no later than 14 days after the date the 2 opposition is filed. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No 3 hearing will be held on the motion. 4 4.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 DARRYL PIERRE CRAWFORD, Case No. 20-cv-06286-JST
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF SERVICE v. 9
10 S. BANGAR, et al., Defendants. 11
12 13 Plaintiff, an inmate at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), has filed a pro se action 14 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint (ECF No. 1) is now before the Court for review 15 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a 16 separate order. 17 DISCUSSION 18 A. Standard of Review 19 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 20 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 22 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 23 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 24 (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 25 Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 27 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 1 grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 2 Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a 3 plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than 4 labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . 5 . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 6 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must 7 proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 8 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 9 (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 10 the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 11 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 12 B. Complaint 13 The complaint alleges that SVSP correctional officials Cortes-Garcia, Machua, and Bangar 14 were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs when, in November 2019, they 15 failed to ensure that plaintiff was released to eat immediately after receiving his insulin shots, as 16 required by his doctor. ECF No. 1 at 3. The complaint also alleges that defendant Cortes-Garcia 17 retaliated against plaintiff for filing grievances regarding this failure by having him moved against 18 his will. ECF No. 1 at 3. Liberally construed, these allegations state a cognizable Eighth 19 Amendment claim against defendants Cortes-Garcia, Machua, and Bangar, and a cognizable First 20 Amendment retaliation claim against defendant Cortes-Garcia. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 21 97, 104 (1976) (Eighth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious 22 medical needs); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Within the prison 23 context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An 24 assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that 25 prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First 26 Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.”) 27 (footnote omitted). 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows. 3 1. Liberally construed, the complaint states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim 4 against defendants Cortes-Garcia, Machua, and Bangar, and a cognizable First Amendment 5 retaliation claim against defendant Cortes-Garcia. 6 2. The Clerk shall issue summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, without 7 prepayment of fees, a copy of the complaint (Dkt. No. 1), with all attachments thereto, and a copy 8 of this order upon defendants Cortes-Garcia, Machua, and Bangar at Salinas Valley State 9 Prison, at 31265 Highway 101, Soledad, California 93960. A courtesy copy of the complaint 10 with attachments and this order shall also be mailed to the California Attorney General’s Office. 11 3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows: 12 a. No later than 91 days from the date this order is filed, defendant must file 13 and serve a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If defendant is of the 14 opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, defendant must so inform the 15 Court prior to the date the motion is due. A motion for summary judgment also must be 16 accompanied by a Rand notice so that plaintiff will have fair, timely, and adequate notice of what 17 is required of him in order to oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 18 2012) (notice requirement set out in Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998), must be 19 served concurrently with motion for summary judgment).1 20 b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion 21 must be filed with the Court and served upon defendant no later than 28 days from the date the 22 motion is filed. Plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment 23 provided later in this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment. 24 25 1 If defendant asserts that plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as 26 required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), defendant must raise such argument in a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) 27 (en banc) (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which held that 1 c. Defendant shall file a reply brief no later than 14 days after the date the 2 opposition is filed. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No 3 hearing will be held on the motion. 4 4. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the 5 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you must 6 do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be 7 granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact – that is, if there is no real dispute about 8 any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is 9 entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 10 makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 11 testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out 12 specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, 13 as provided in Rule 56(c), that contradict the facts shown in the defendants’ declarations and 14 documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit 15 your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 16 If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand v. 17 Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962–63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (App. A). (The Rand notice above does 18 not excuse defendant’s obligation to serve said notice again concurrently with a motion for 19 summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 939). 20 5. All communications by plaintiff with the Court must be served on defendant’s 21 counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to defendant’s counsel. The Court may disregard 22 any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. Until defendant’s 23 counsel has been designated, plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document directly to defendant, 24 but once defendant is represented by counsel, all documents must be mailed to counsel rather than 25 directly to defendant. 26 6. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 27 No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is required 1 7. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep the 2 || Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely 3 fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant 4 || to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of change of address in every 5 pending case every time he is moved to a new facility. 6 8. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought 7 to be extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause. 8 9. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for this 9 case on any document he submits to the Court for consideration in this case. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED.
11 Dated: November 30, 2020 2 JON S. TIGA 13 nited States District Judge («14
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