[Cite as Crapnell v. Dir., Ohio Dept. Job & Family Servs., 2016-Ohio-1145.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT LOGAN COUNTY
LARRY E. CRAPNELL,
APPELLEE, CASE NO. 8-15-10
v.
DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPT. OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES, OPINION
APPELLANT.
Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. CV 15 04 0122
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: March 21, 2016
APPEARANCES:
Patria v. Hoskins for Appellant Case No. 8-15-10
ROGERS, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Director of the Ohio Department of Job & Family Services
(“ODJFS”), appeals the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Logan County
reversing the determination of the Unemployment Compensation Review
Commission (“the Commission”). On appeal, ODJFS argues that the trial court
erred in finding that the Commission’s determination that Appellee, Larry
Crapnell, did not file a valid application for unemployment benefits was
unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the trial
court.
{¶2} On November 23, 2014, Crapnell filed an application for
unemployment benefits with ODJFS.
{¶3} On December 5, 2014, ODJFS disallowed Crapnell’s application due
to an insufficient number of qualifying weeks of employment. Crapnell requested
reconsideration, but ODJFS affirmed its initial determination.
{¶4} Crapnell appealed the redetermination to the Commission, and on
January 29, 2015, a hearing was held.
{¶5} The hearing officer stated that its records showed that Crapnell had 11
qualifying weeks of employment, with earnings totaling $8,976, during the third
quarter of 2013 (June 30, 2013 to September 28, 2013). Crapnell testified that his
-2- Case No. 8-15-10
records showed earnings of $6,664.54. He added, however, that he was
“definitely missing a few pay stubs in there.” (Docket No. 9, p. 60).
{¶6} The hearing officer stated that its records showed that Crapnell had
one week of qualifying employment, with earnings totaling $1,068, during the
fourth quarter of 2013 (September 29, 2013 through December 28, 2013).
Crapnell testified that he did not have records from this period and did not know
what days he worked.
{¶7} The hearing officer stated that its records showed that Crapnell had no
qualifying employment during the first quarter of 2014 (December 29, 2013
through March 29, 2014). Crapnell agreed.
{¶8} The hearing officer stated that its records showed that Crapnell had
seven weeks of qualifying employment, with earnings totaling $4,998, during the
second quarter of 2014 (March 30, 2014 through June 28, 2014). Crapnell agreed.
{¶9} Finally, the hearing officer stated that its records showed that Crapnell
had eight weeks of qualifying employment, with earnings totaling $6,958, during
the third quarter of 2014 (June 29, 2014 through September 27, 2014). Crapnell
agreed.
{¶10} On January 30, 2015, the Commission issued its decision and made
the following findings of fact:
[Crapnell] worked with one employer in his base and alternate base periods. [Crapnell] worked with Larry E. Crapnell/Crapnell
-3- Case No. 8-15-10
Masonry on an off an [sic] on basis from April 21, 2014 through November 1, 2014. [Crapnell] also worked in 2013 with this employer, but was not sure of the particular dates.
During the third quarter of 2013 [Crapnell] worked in 11 weeks of work, with earnings of $8976.00. During the fourth quarter of 2013, he worked in 1 week of work, with earnings of $1068.00. [Crapnell] did not work, and had no earnings, during the first quarter of 2014. During the second quarter of 2014, [Crapnell] worked in 7 weeks of work, with earnings of $4998.00. During the third quarter of 2014, [Crapnell] worked in 8 weeks of work with earnings of $6958.00.
(Id. at p. 65).
{¶11} Based on these facts, the Commission concluded that Crapnell failed
to establish a valid application because he did not have at least 20 qualifying
weeks of employment during his base period or alternate base period, as required
under R.C. 4141.01(R).
{¶12} Thereafter, Crapnell requested reconsideration, claiming that he had
found an additional qualifying week of employment in the third quarter of 2013
but offering no evidentiary support. The Commission disallowed Crapnell’s
request, and he appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Logan County.
{¶13} By entry dated September 15, 2015, the trial court reversed the
determination of the Commission. In doing so, it stated:
[Crapnell] now argues that the employer’s accountant has found an additional payroll record for the week ending August 14, 2013 which would give him twelve weeks in that quarter and twenty weeks in total. Given the amount of pay during that quarter, almost $9,000 it is not unreasonable to find that [Crapnell] had worked full-time,
-4- Case No. 8-15-10
thirteen weeks[,] and certainly that [sic] his claim that he worked twelve weeks is not unreasonable.
(Docket No. 17, p. 2).
{¶14} It is from this judgment that ODJFS appeals, presenting the
following assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
THE COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION REVIEW COMMISSION AS THAT DECISION WAS NOT UNLAWFUL, UNREASONABLE, OR AGAISNT THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶15} In its sole assignment of error, ODJFS argues that the Commission’s
determination was not unreasonable. Specifically, it argues that the evidence in
the record shows that Crapnell did not have 20 qualifying weeks of employment to
establish a valid application for unemployment benefits. We agree.
{¶16} R.C. Chapter 4141 sets forth the statutory framework for
unemployment benefits. Under that chapter, a court of common pleas shall
reverse the Commission’s decision only if it finds “that the decision of the
commission was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the
evidence.” R.C. 4141.282(H). An appellate court must apply the same standard
of review. Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv., 73 Ohio St.3d
694 (1995), paragraph one of the syllabus.
-5- Case No. 8-15-10
{¶17} R.C. 4141.01(R)(1) provides that in order to qualify for
unemployment compensation benefits, a claimant must have at least 20 qualifying
weeks of employment in his base period. A claimant’s base period is defined as
the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters immediately preceding
the first day of his ben efit year. R.C. 4141.01(Q)(1). If a claimant does not have
sufficient qualifying weeks in his base period, then an alternate base period is
used. The alternate base period is the first four most recently completed calendar
quarters preceding the first day of his benefit year. R.C. 4141.01(Q)(2).
{¶18} Here, Crapnell’s application for unemployment benefits established a
base period of June 30, 2013 through June 28, 2014 and an alternate base period of
September 29, 2013 through September 27, 2014. R.C. 4141.01(Q)-(R)(1). In
order to establish a valid application, Crapnell needed 20 qualifying weeks of
employment in either period.
{¶19} The evidence before the Commission is undisputed. The hearing
officer stated that its records showed that Crapnell had 11 qualifying weeks of
employment in the third quarter of 2013 (June 30, 2013 to September 28, 2013).
Crapnell provided no evidence to the contrary.
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[Cite as Crapnell v. Dir., Ohio Dept. Job & Family Servs., 2016-Ohio-1145.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT LOGAN COUNTY
LARRY E. CRAPNELL,
APPELLEE, CASE NO. 8-15-10
v.
DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPT. OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES, OPINION
APPELLANT.
Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. CV 15 04 0122
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: March 21, 2016
APPEARANCES:
Patria v. Hoskins for Appellant Case No. 8-15-10
ROGERS, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Director of the Ohio Department of Job & Family Services
(“ODJFS”), appeals the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Logan County
reversing the determination of the Unemployment Compensation Review
Commission (“the Commission”). On appeal, ODJFS argues that the trial court
erred in finding that the Commission’s determination that Appellee, Larry
Crapnell, did not file a valid application for unemployment benefits was
unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the trial
court.
{¶2} On November 23, 2014, Crapnell filed an application for
unemployment benefits with ODJFS.
{¶3} On December 5, 2014, ODJFS disallowed Crapnell’s application due
to an insufficient number of qualifying weeks of employment. Crapnell requested
reconsideration, but ODJFS affirmed its initial determination.
{¶4} Crapnell appealed the redetermination to the Commission, and on
January 29, 2015, a hearing was held.
{¶5} The hearing officer stated that its records showed that Crapnell had 11
qualifying weeks of employment, with earnings totaling $8,976, during the third
quarter of 2013 (June 30, 2013 to September 28, 2013). Crapnell testified that his
-2- Case No. 8-15-10
records showed earnings of $6,664.54. He added, however, that he was
“definitely missing a few pay stubs in there.” (Docket No. 9, p. 60).
{¶6} The hearing officer stated that its records showed that Crapnell had
one week of qualifying employment, with earnings totaling $1,068, during the
fourth quarter of 2013 (September 29, 2013 through December 28, 2013).
Crapnell testified that he did not have records from this period and did not know
what days he worked.
{¶7} The hearing officer stated that its records showed that Crapnell had no
qualifying employment during the first quarter of 2014 (December 29, 2013
through March 29, 2014). Crapnell agreed.
{¶8} The hearing officer stated that its records showed that Crapnell had
seven weeks of qualifying employment, with earnings totaling $4,998, during the
second quarter of 2014 (March 30, 2014 through June 28, 2014). Crapnell agreed.
{¶9} Finally, the hearing officer stated that its records showed that Crapnell
had eight weeks of qualifying employment, with earnings totaling $6,958, during
the third quarter of 2014 (June 29, 2014 through September 27, 2014). Crapnell
agreed.
{¶10} On January 30, 2015, the Commission issued its decision and made
the following findings of fact:
[Crapnell] worked with one employer in his base and alternate base periods. [Crapnell] worked with Larry E. Crapnell/Crapnell
-3- Case No. 8-15-10
Masonry on an off an [sic] on basis from April 21, 2014 through November 1, 2014. [Crapnell] also worked in 2013 with this employer, but was not sure of the particular dates.
During the third quarter of 2013 [Crapnell] worked in 11 weeks of work, with earnings of $8976.00. During the fourth quarter of 2013, he worked in 1 week of work, with earnings of $1068.00. [Crapnell] did not work, and had no earnings, during the first quarter of 2014. During the second quarter of 2014, [Crapnell] worked in 7 weeks of work, with earnings of $4998.00. During the third quarter of 2014, [Crapnell] worked in 8 weeks of work with earnings of $6958.00.
(Id. at p. 65).
{¶11} Based on these facts, the Commission concluded that Crapnell failed
to establish a valid application because he did not have at least 20 qualifying
weeks of employment during his base period or alternate base period, as required
under R.C. 4141.01(R).
{¶12} Thereafter, Crapnell requested reconsideration, claiming that he had
found an additional qualifying week of employment in the third quarter of 2013
but offering no evidentiary support. The Commission disallowed Crapnell’s
request, and he appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Logan County.
{¶13} By entry dated September 15, 2015, the trial court reversed the
determination of the Commission. In doing so, it stated:
[Crapnell] now argues that the employer’s accountant has found an additional payroll record for the week ending August 14, 2013 which would give him twelve weeks in that quarter and twenty weeks in total. Given the amount of pay during that quarter, almost $9,000 it is not unreasonable to find that [Crapnell] had worked full-time,
-4- Case No. 8-15-10
thirteen weeks[,] and certainly that [sic] his claim that he worked twelve weeks is not unreasonable.
(Docket No. 17, p. 2).
{¶14} It is from this judgment that ODJFS appeals, presenting the
following assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
THE COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION REVIEW COMMISSION AS THAT DECISION WAS NOT UNLAWFUL, UNREASONABLE, OR AGAISNT THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶15} In its sole assignment of error, ODJFS argues that the Commission’s
determination was not unreasonable. Specifically, it argues that the evidence in
the record shows that Crapnell did not have 20 qualifying weeks of employment to
establish a valid application for unemployment benefits. We agree.
{¶16} R.C. Chapter 4141 sets forth the statutory framework for
unemployment benefits. Under that chapter, a court of common pleas shall
reverse the Commission’s decision only if it finds “that the decision of the
commission was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the
evidence.” R.C. 4141.282(H). An appellate court must apply the same standard
of review. Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv., 73 Ohio St.3d
694 (1995), paragraph one of the syllabus.
-5- Case No. 8-15-10
{¶17} R.C. 4141.01(R)(1) provides that in order to qualify for
unemployment compensation benefits, a claimant must have at least 20 qualifying
weeks of employment in his base period. A claimant’s base period is defined as
the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters immediately preceding
the first day of his ben efit year. R.C. 4141.01(Q)(1). If a claimant does not have
sufficient qualifying weeks in his base period, then an alternate base period is
used. The alternate base period is the first four most recently completed calendar
quarters preceding the first day of his benefit year. R.C. 4141.01(Q)(2).
{¶18} Here, Crapnell’s application for unemployment benefits established a
base period of June 30, 2013 through June 28, 2014 and an alternate base period of
September 29, 2013 through September 27, 2014. R.C. 4141.01(Q)-(R)(1). In
order to establish a valid application, Crapnell needed 20 qualifying weeks of
employment in either period.
{¶19} The evidence before the Commission is undisputed. The hearing
officer stated that its records showed that Crapnell had 11 qualifying weeks of
employment in the third quarter of 2013 (June 30, 2013 to September 28, 2013).
Crapnell provided no evidence to the contrary.
{¶20} The hearing officer stated that its records showed that Crapnell had
one qualifying week of employment in the fourth quarter of 2013 (September 29,
2013 through December 28, 2013). Crapnell provided no evidence to the contrary.
-6- Case No. 8-15-10
{¶21} The hearing officer stated that its records showed that Crapnell had
no qualifying employment in the first quarter of 2014 (December 29, 2013 through
March 29, 2014). Crapnell provided no evidence to the contrary.
{¶22} The hearing officer stated its records showed that Crapnell had seven
qualifying weeks of employment in the second quarter of 2014 (March 30, 2014
through June 28, 2014). Crapnell provided no evidence to the contrary.
{¶23} Finally, the hearing officer stated that its records showed that
Crapnell had eight qualifying weeks of employment in the third quarter of 2014
(June 29, 2014 through September 27, 2014). Crapnell provided no evidence to
the contrary.
{¶24} Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the Commission
concluded that Crapnell had an insufficient number of qualifying weeks of
employment to establish a valid application for unemployment benefits—Crapnell
had only 19 qualifying weeks of employment in his base period and 16 weeks of
qualifying employment in his alternate base period. Neither period satisfied the
statutory requirement. Nonetheless, the trial court reversed the Commission’s
determination. It concluded that given Crapnell’s earnings of $8,976 in the third
quarter of 2013, “it is not unreasonable to find that [he] had worked full-time,
thirteen weeks[,] and certainly * * * his claim that he worked twelve weeks is not
unreasonable.” (Docket No. 17, p. 2).
-7- Case No. 8-15-10
{¶25} Although the trial court correctly stated in its entry that it was limited
to the facts presented to the Commission, the trial court proceeded to consider the
new allegation by Crapnell that another week of employment had been discovered.
Because the new allegation of fact was not presented to the Commission, it was
error for the trial court to consider it.
{¶26} The relevant inquiry is not whether Crapnell’s later claim that he
worked an additional week of qualifying employment in the third quarter of 2013
is reasonable, or as the trial court put it, “not unreasonable.” (Id.) The correct
standard is whether the Commission’s determination that Crapnell had an
insufficient number of qualifying weeks of employment to establish a valid
application for unemployment benefits is unreasonable. As the Ohio Supreme
Court has repeatedly noted, “the [Commission’s] role as factfinder is intact; a
reviewing court may reverse the [Commission’s] determination only if it is
unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Tzangas,
73 Ohio St.3d at 697.
{¶27} Here, there was no evidence presented at the hearing that Crapnell
had more than 11 qualifying weeks of employment in the third quarter of 2013.
Crapnell also failed to provide the Commission with any evidence to support his
later claim that he had an additional qualifying week of employment in this
quarter. The Commission’s determination was not unreasonable simply because it
-8- Case No. 8-15-10
failed to consider Crapnell’s unsupported claim. For these reasons, the
Commission’s determination that Crapnell had an insufficient number of
qualifying weeks of employment to establish a valid application for
unemployment benefits was not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest
weight of the evidence, and the trial court erred in reversing it.
{¶28} Accordingly, ODJFS’s sole assignment of error is sustained.
{¶29} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant, in the particulars
assigned and argued, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the
matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SHAW, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
/jlr
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