Cranford, II v. United States Department of the Interior

Opinion

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DUEWARD W. CRANFORD, II, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, et Civil Action No. 25-1116 (EGS)

al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction Dueward W. Cranford, II; Jon Colburn; William Braun; and

the Citizens for Equal Rights Alliance (“CERA”) (collectively

“Plaintiffs”) sue the U.S. Department of the Interior

(“Interior”); U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs; the National Indian

Gaming Commission; the U.S. Department of Justice; Dough Burgum,

Secretary of the Interior; William Doffermyre, Solicitor, U.S.

Department of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor; Eric

Shepard, Associate Solicitor, Indian Affairs, U.S. Department of

the Interior; Bryan Mercier, Director, U.S. Bureau of Indian

Affairs, Office of the Solicitor; Ryan Hunter, Acting Regional

Director, Pacific Southwest Regional Office, U.S. Bureau of

Indian Affairs, and Head of the California Fee to Trust

Consortium; Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General; Adam R.F.

Gustafson, Acting Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice

1 Environment and Natural Resources Division; Gina Allery,

Director, Office of Tribal Justice, U.S. Department of Justice;

and the Acting Director, Tribal Resources Section, U.S.

Department of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources

Division (collectively, “Defendants”). 1 See Compl., ECF No. 1. 2

Plaintiffs sue the individual Defendants in both their official

and individual capacities. See id. Plaintiffs state the

following claims for relief: (1) violations of the Federal

Recognition Tribal List Act, see id. at 34; (2) the Ione Band is

not eligible under the Indian Reorganization Act and/or the

Indian Consolidation Act to acquire land; (3) violations of the

“property/territory” clause of the U.S. Constitution and the

Tenth Amendment, see id. at 55; and (4) Conspiracy under 42

U.S.C. § 1985, see id. at 67.

Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on September

15, 2025, see Mot. for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 17; Mem. of Law in

Support (collectively “MPI”), ECF No. 17-1; which the Court

denied on February 10, 2026, see Mem. Op., ECF No. 55. The Court

1 William Doffermyre was confirmed as the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior on September 18, 2025. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 25(d), he is automatically substituted for Acting Solicitor Gregory Zerzan. Acting Regional Director Ryan Hunter is substituted for his predecessor, Amy Dutschke pursuant to Rule 25(d). 2 When citing electronic filings throughout this opinion, the

Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the original page number of the filed document. 2 incorporates the detailed factual background of this matter from

its prior Memorandum Opinion denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Preliminary Injunction. See id.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Limited

Expedited Jurisdictional Discovery. See Pls.’ Mot. for Limited

Expedited Jurisdictional Disc., ECF No. 60; Mem. of Law Supp.

Pls.’ Mot. for Limited Expedited Jurisdictional Disc.,

(collectively, “Pls.’ Mot.”) ECF No. 60-1. Plaintiffs argue that

the written and oral discovery sought is “proportional and

narrowly tailored to support their forthcoming Opposition to

Defendants’ forthcoming Motions to Dismiss.” Id. at 7. Upon

careful consideration of Plaintiffs’ motion, the Defendants’

oppositions, the reply, and sur-reply 3 thereto; the applicable

law; and for the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES

Plaintiffs’ motion.

II. Legal Standard Plaintiffs ask the Court to grant them expedited

jurisdictional discovery to obtain information to support their

opposition to the Defendants’ anticipated Motion to Dismiss. See

Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 60-1 at 11. In doing so, however, Plaintiffs

3 Defendants request leave to file a sur-reply to address new matters raised in Plaintiff’s Reply. Mot. for Leave to File Sur- Reply, ECF No. 66. The Court therefore GRANTS the motion over Plaintiffs’ objection. As discussed in this Memorandum Opinion, Plaintiffs raise new arguments in support of their motion for jurisdictional discovery in their Reply briefing. 3 ask the Court to apply the incorrect legal standard for

jurisdictional discovery.

Plaintiffs do not seek expedited general discovery,

requests for which courts in this District evaluate under a

five-factor reasonableness test. See Attkisson v. Holder, 113 F.

Supp. 3d 156, 162 (D.D.C. 2015) (explaining reasonableness, or

“good-cause” standard for expedited discovery). However, in

cases “where issues arise as to jurisdiction ... discovery is

available to ascertain the facts bearing on such issues.”

Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, n. 13

(1978). “[I]f a party demonstrates that it can supplement its

jurisdictional allegations through discovery, then

jurisdictional discovery is justified.” GTE New Media Servs.

Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

“Whether to permit jurisdictional discovery rests in the

discretion of the district court.” In re Papst Licensing GMBH &

Co. KG Litig., 590 F.Supp.2d 94, 101 (D.D.C. 2008); see also FC

Inv. Grp. v. IFX Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1093 (D.C. Cir.

2008). As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) has made clear, “in order to

get jurisdictional discovery a plaintiff must have at least a

good faith belief that such discovery will enable it to show

that the court has personal jurisdiction over the

defendant.” Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless

4 P.L.C., 148 F.3d 1080, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing cases). The

D.C. Circuit “allow[s] jurisdictional discovery and factfinding

if allegations indicate its likely utility.” Nat. Res. Def.

Council v. Pena, 147 F.3d 1012, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

Furthermore, when requesting jurisdictional discovery, “a

plaintiff must make a ‘detailed showing’ of what discovery it

wishes to conduct or what results it thinks such discovery would

produce.’” Atlantigas Corp. v. Nisource, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d

34, 53 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting United States v. Philip Morris

Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 116, 130 (D.D.C. 2000)). Discovery is not

warranted “where a plaintiff ‘simply wants to conduct a fishing

expedition in the hopes of discovering some basis

of jurisdiction.’” In re Papst, 590 F. Supp. 2d at

101 (quoting Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC Novokuznetsky

Aluminum Factory, 283 F.3d 208, 215 n. 3 (4th Cir. 2002)).

As with any type of discovery, the district court's

discretion is “cabined by Rule 26(b)’s general limitations.”

Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, 964 F.3d 1203, 1207 (D.C. Cir.

2020). Pursuant to Rule 26(b), discovery must be relevant and

proportional to the needs of the case. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).

III. Analysis

A. Jurisdictional Discovery is Premature

“To obtain jurisdictional discovery a plaintiff must

request discovery in a detailed manner ‘at an appropriate stage

5 in the course of litigation.’” Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for

President, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 158, 187 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting

City of Moundridge v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 244 F.R.D. 10, 14

(D.D.C. 2007)). The “appropriate time to request jurisdictional

discovery is in opposition to the defendant's motion—whether a

plaintiff files a separate motion for jurisdictional discovery

or puts the Court on notice by requesting jurisdictional

discovery in a detailed manner in the opposition to the motion

to dismiss.” Id. at 187; City of Moundridge, 244 F.R.D. at 14

and n.8 (finding discovery not warranted where party only sought

it after an adverse result on a motion to dismiss and requested

it a year and a half after the opposition was filed); Second

Amend. Found. v. U.S. Conf. of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 525 (D.C.

Cir. 2001) (finding no error where district court dismissed

request for jurisdictional discovery where plaintiff failed to

request discovery in opposition to the motion to dismiss).

As the docket in this case reflects, there are no pending

motions to dismiss. See generally Dkt. in Case No. 1: :25-cv-

01116. Therefore, the proper time for Plaintiffs to seek

jurisdictional discovery is after Defendants move to dismiss.

B. Even if it is Timely, Plaintiffs’ Request is Speculative and Does not Hinge on Jurisdictional Issues Plaintiffs argue that jurisdictional discovery is necessary

to rebut Defendants’ “likely motions to dismiss on subject

6 matter jurisdiction grounds on the basis of claim and issue

preclusion” and the applicable statute of limitations. Pls.

Mot., ECF No. 60-1 at 8, 12-15.

To obtain jurisdictional discovery, “a plaintiff must have

at least a good faith belief that such discovery will enable it

to show that the court has [] jurisdiction over the defendant.”

Caribbean Broad. Sys., 148 F.3d at 1090. A request for

jurisdictional discovery cannot be based on “speculation.”

Bastin v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 104 F.3d 1392, 1396 (D.C.

Cir. 1997).

At this juncture, Plaintiffs can only speculate that

Defendants will raise certain arguments in a motion to dismiss—

they claim that such reasons for dismissal are “likely” claims

based on prior preliminary injunction briefing. Pls.’ Mot., ECF

No. 60-1 at 8, 12-15. However, only one of the Plaintiffs’

anticipated reasons for dismissal—sovereign immunity—is a

jurisdictional defense.

First, the defense of res judicata, or claim preclusion,

while having a “somewhat jurisdictional character,” SBC Commc'ns

Inc. v. FCC, 407 F.3d 1223, 1229–30 (D.C. Cir. 2005), does not

affect the jurisdiction of the district court. See Exxon Mobil

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005)

(“Preclusion, of course, is not a jurisdictional matter”)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)); N.Y. Shipping Ass'n v. Fed. Mar.

7 Comm'n, 854 F.2d 1338, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that claim

and issue preclusion are a defense to prevent fragmented

litigation but are not a “jurisdictional bar”). And while

“[s]tatute of limitations defenses may affect the success of a

plaintiff's claim for relief, [] they do not deprive a court of

subject matter jurisdiction.” Reynolds v. Sheet Metal Workers,

Loc. 102, 702 F.2d 221, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

In addition to arguing that claim preclusion, issue

preclusion, and the statute of limitations bar Plaintiffs’

claims, Defendants previously argued in their Opposition to

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction that “the

Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to federal action under color

of federal law, that Plaintiffs failed to allege violations

under the Fifth and Tenth Amendments and Property Clause, that

the Thirteenth Amendment did not provide a private right of

action and that Plaintiffs failed to allege an ultra vires

claim.” Defs.’ Sur-Reply, ECF No. 66-1 at 5. In their Reply,

Plaintiffs raise, for the first time, the argument that

jurisdictional discovery is needed to defend against Defendant’s

anticipated dismissal arguments regarding sovereign immunity,

the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Thirteenth Amendment. Pls.’

Reply, ECF No. 64 at 6. Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants

“impliedly argued” in their Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Preliminary Injunction that the Court lacks subject matter

8 jurisdiction by arguing that Plaintiffs failed to allege

violations of the Tenth Amendment, the Property Clause, the

Fifth Amendment, or to state an ultra vires claim. Pls.’ Reply,

ECF No. 64 at 8.

These potential defenses, as Defendants point out in their

sur-reply, concern merits issues and whether Plaintiffs can

state a claim, not whether the Court has jurisdiction to hear

them. Defs.’ Sur-Reply, ECF No. 66-1 at 5. In arguing that the

Fourteenth and Thirteenth Amendments do not apply to the federal

government, Defendants did not assert that the Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction with respect to these claims;

rather, they argued that neither of these amendments apply to

the federal government. See Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim.

Inj., ECF No. 32 at 25, 28-29; see Chang v. United States, No.

22-352, 2023 WL 8697831, at *20 n. 16 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2023),

aff'd, No. 24-5005, 2024 WL 3299620 (D.C. Cir. July 2, 2024)

(dismissing Fourteenth Amendment claim via 12(b)(6) motion)).

Defendants more explicitly argued that plaintiffs fail to allege

violations of the Tenth Amendment, Property Clause, Fifth

Amendment, and ultra vires claims—not that the Court lacks

jurisdiction to hear them. See generally Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for

Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 32.

Jurisdictional discovery is justified if “a party

demonstrates that it can supplement its jurisdictional

9 allegations through discovery.” App Dynamic ehf v. Vignisson, 87

F. Supp. 3d 322, 329 (D.D.C. 2015). Preclusion and statute of

limitations are not “jurisdictional allegations” and thus do not

affect the Court’s jurisdictional analysis. Id. Nor did

Defendants indicate in their Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion

for Preliminary Injunction that they seek to frame their

constitutional arguments as jurisdictional. See Opp’n to Pls.’

Mot. for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 32 at 25, 28-29. Thus, discovery

sought on the basis of the above justifications would not have a

“likely utility” to the Court in resolving a factual dispute

that impacts the Court’s jurisdiction over this matter. Pena,

147 F.3d at 1024.

C. Plaintiffs Fail to Show how Jurisdictional Discovery Regarding Sovereign Immunity Would Impact the Court’s Jurisdictional Analysis Sovereign immunity is thus the only remaining potential

defense that Defendants could raise on a Motion to Dismiss that

would impact the Court’s jurisdiction over the Defendants. See

Hulley Enters. Ltd. v. Russian Fed'n, 149 F.4th 682, 691 (D.C.

Cir. 2025) (stating that “sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional

issue”); Howard v. United States, 949 F. Supp. 2d 54, 56 (D.D.C.

2013), aff'd sub nom. In re Howard, No. 13-5261, 2014 WL 4628254

(D.C. Cir. July 14, 2014) (“sovereign immunity…is a

jurisdictional basis for dismissal”). Because sovereign immunity

is only available to the “government itself and to any federal

10 official sued in his or her official capacity,” jurisdictional

discovery would not be available with respect to Defendants sued

in their individual capacities. Smith v. Scalia, 44 F. Supp. 3d

28, 38 (D.D.C. 2014), aff'd, No. 14-5180, 2015 WL 13710107 (D.C.

Cir. Jan. 14, 2015). Courts have also recognized that

“‘jurisdictional discovery should be carefully controlled and

limited’ to avoid burdening a sovereign who may be immune from

suit.” See Davis v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 3d 106, 121

(D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Phoenix Consulting Inc. v. Republic of

Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).

In the instant motion, Plaintiffs do not dispute that

sovereign immunity applies to the federal government or federal

government officials sued in their official capacity. See

generally Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 64. Plaintiffs argue in their

Reply that the federal Defendants’ “arguments supported by

extrinsic caselaw evidence expressly asserting the court’s lack

of subject matter jurisdiction qualify as a ‘factual attack’ on

the truth of the jurisdictional facts alleged in the Complaint.”

Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 64 at 6. But it is unclear, and Plaintiffs

do not explain, how this is a factual issue. Nor do Plaintiffs

explain how the requested discovery would impact the Court’s

jurisdictional analysis as it relates to sovereign immunity.

Defendants simply argued in their Opposition to Plaintiffs’

Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and this Court found in its

11 Memorandum Opinion, that Section 1981, Section 1983, and Section

1985 do not waive the sovereign immunity of the United States,

and therefore the Court would not have jurisdiction over claims

brought under those statutes. See Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for

Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 32 at 15-17; Mem. Op., ECF No. 55 at 22-

24.

The applicability of sovereign immunity here is a question

of law, not fact. See Hawkins v. Washington Metro. Area Transit

Auth., 311 F. Supp. 3d 94, 103 (D.D.C. 2018) (rejecting

plaintiffs’ suggestion that “sovereign immunity is a question of

fact…when it is a quintessential question of law”). Indeed,

there are no additional facts that could affect the Court’s

analysis of sovereign immunity, and “[w]here there is no showing

of how jurisdictional discovery would help plaintiff discover

anything new, ‘it [is] inappropriate to subject [defendants] to

the burden and expense of discovery.’” Vignisson, 87 F. Supp. 3d

at 329 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Atlantigas Corp., 290 F. Supp. 2d

at 53). The Court will thus not grant requests “irrelevant to

the threshold jurisdictional question at issue.” Davis, 196 F.

Supp. 3d at 122.

12 IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Expedited Jurisdictional Discovery, ECF No. 60, is DENIED. An

appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge May 4, 2026