Crane v. Crane

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Crane v. Crane

49 A.D.2d 799, 373 N.Y.S.2d 237, 1975 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10851

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedSeptember 11, 1975

StatusPublished

This text of 49 A.D.2d 799 (Crane v. Crane) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Crane v. Crane, 49 A.D.2d 799, 373 N.Y.S.2d 237, 1975 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10851 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1975).

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Opinion

—Order unanimously affirmed, with costs. Memorandum: Although the divorce transformed the tenancy by the entirety in the family residence into a tenancy in common, Special Term’s interpretation of the divorce decree and the separation agreement incorporated therein as granting the wife possession and use of the home as part of her support is reasonable. This partition action, therefore, constitutes a collateral attack upon the divorce decree. We affirm without prejudice to appellant’s institution of proceedings, if so advised, for modification of the agreement and divorce decree to eliminate respondent’s apparent right to retain possession and use of the residence (Ripp v Ripp, 38 AD2d 65, affd on opn at App Div 32 NY2d 755; Schaerr v Schaerr, 38 AD2d 581; Davies v Davies, 65 Misc 2d 480). (Appeal from order of Monroe Special Term in partition action.) Present—Marsh, P. J., Mahoney, Goldman, Del Vecchio and Witmer, JJ.

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—Order unanimously affirmed, with costs. Memorandum: Although the divorce transformed the tenancy by the entirety in the family residence into a tenancy in common, Special Term’s interpretation of the divorce decree and the separation agreement incorporated therein as granting the wife possession and use of the home as part of her support is reasonable. This partition action, therefore, constitutes a collateral attack upon the divorce decree. We affirm without prejudice to appellant’s institution of proceedings, if so advised, for modification of the agreement and divorce decree to eliminate respondent’s apparent right to retain possession and use of the residence (Ripp v Ripp, 38 AD2d 65, affd on opn at App Div 32 NY2d 755; Schaerr v Schaerr, 38 AD2d 581; Davies v Davies, 65 Misc 2d 480). (Appeal from order of Monroe Special Term in partition action.) Present—Marsh, P. J., Mahoney, Goldman, Del Vecchio and Witmer, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

49 A.D.2d 799, 373 N.Y.S.2d 237, 1975 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10851, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crane-v-crane-nyappdiv-1975.

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