Craig Sylvester Williams v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 30, 2024
• Docket: 01-23-00166-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued July 30, 2024

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00166-CR ——————————— CRAIG SYLVESTER WILLIAMS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 482nd District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1807566

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found appellant Craig Sylvester Williams guilty of the offense of

unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Appellant pleaded true to two

enhancement paragraphs, and the trial court assessed his punishment at twenty-five

years’ confinement. In one issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

each element of the alleged offense. We affirm.

Background

On Feb. 17, 2023, appellant was charged by indictment with unlawful

possession of a firearm by a felon. The indictment, which included two enhancement

paragraphs, read:

[I]n Harris County, Texas, CRAIG SYLVESTER WILLIAMS, hereafter styled the Defendant, heretofore on or about June 12, 2021, did then and there unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly possess a firearm at a location other than the premises at which the Defendant lived, after being convicted of the felony offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance in the District Court of the 177th Judicial District, Harris County, Texas, in Cause Number 1673312, on January 13, 2021.

Before the commission of the offense alleged above, (hereafter styled the primary offense), on September 30, 1996, in Cause Number 718655, in the 180th District Court of Harris County, Texas, the Defendant was convicted of the felony offense of Felon in Possession of a Weapon.

Before the commission of the primary offense, and after the conviction in Cause Number 718655 was final, the Defendant committed the felony offense of Felon in Possession of a Weapon and was finally convicted of that offense on August 23, 2007, in Cause Number 1122281, in the 176th District Court of Harris County, Texas.

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charged offense, and the case proceeded to trial.

After voir dire, appellant stipulated to the jurisdictional offense of felony

possession of a controlled substance. Following opening statements, the State called

2 the following witnesses: Houston Police Department (HPD) Sergeant G. Pulatie and

HPD Officers N. Davis, B. Real, J. Lopez, and B. Karlsen.

1. Sergeant Pulatie

Sergeant Pulatie worked with HPD’s Gang Division, Crime Reduction Unit.

On June 12, 2021, he responded to a call from dispatch about a shooting in progress

at a nearby location. When he arrived at the apartment complex, he saw someone

shot lying on the ground. Sergeant Pulatie testified that while he was at the scene an

individual told him that a vehicle had left the scene and gave him a description of

the vehicle. Afterwards, Sergeant Pulatie broadcast the vehicle description on the

radio so that other officers in the vicinity could be on the lookout.

Sergeant Pulatie testified that the vehicle was later found at the intersection of

the North Freeway and Glenburnie Drive, approximately one-quarter mile from the

apartment complex. He testified that the apartment complex and the location where

appellant’s vehicle was found are in Harris County. When Sergeant Pulatie arrived

at the location where appellant’s vehicle was located, appellant was standing next to

the vehicle and the front passenger door was open. Upon a search of the vehicle,

officers at the scene discovered a semiautomatic handgun. Sergeant Pulatie testified

that there were two bullet holes in the front of appellant’s vehicle.

3 2. Officer Davis

HPD Officer Davis was working the night shift at the North Patrol Division

on June 12, 2021. While responding to a call involving a shooting in progress at the

Beatrix apartment complex, Officer Davis came upon a black Range Rover stalled

in a moving lane of traffic at the intersection of the North Freeway and Glenburie.

Officer Davis testified that the stalled vehicle matched the description of the vehicle

involved in the shooting-in-progress call and was located a block from the scene of

the shooting. When Officer Davis arrived at the scene, appellant was standing

outside the vehicle, with the passenger door open, and digging around inside the

vehicle. When he asked appellant where he was coming from, appellant replied that

he was coming from Dago’s, a tattoo parlor adjacent to the apartment complex where

the shooting occurred. Believing that appellant might be the shooting suspect,

Officer Davis patted him down and put him in the back of his patrol car. Officer

Davis testified that appellant told him that the stalled vehicle belonged to him and

that it had run out of gas.

3. Officer Real

HPD Officer Real was assigned to the night shift patrol from 11:00 p.m. to

7:00 a.m. on June 12, 2021. Officer Real arrived at the location of the stalled vehicle

as Officer Davis was detaining appellant. Officer Real testified that he searched

appellant’s vehicle and discovered a gun with an empty magazine in the back

4 passenger seat. Officer Real testified that he also found a bullet casing in the pocket

of the driver’s side door which indicated that someone had fired a weapon from

inside the vehicle.

4. Officer Lopez

HPD Officer Lopez was working with the Gang Division, Crime Reduction

Unit on June 12, 2021. He testified that when he arrived at the location of the stalled

vehicle, appellant was in the back seat of a patrol car. Officer Lopez testified that he

spoke with appellant for about ten minutes to build a rapport with him. Appellant

and Officer Lopez talked about Spring, Texas, where appellant lived, and appellant

told him that his son had graduated from Spring High School. Officer Lopez told

appellant that he knew the area where appellant lived because he had also graduated

from Spring High School.

Officer Lopez testified that appellant initially told him that he had been

working at Dago’s and talking to a female who he planned to meet at the apartment

complex. Appellant stated that as soon as he pulled into the complex he heard

gunshots, so he backed out and left the complex. As appellant was driving up the

road he ran out of gas. Officer Lopez testified that when Officer Karlsen asked

appellant where he got the firearm, appellant told him that he bought it off the street

in Spring. Officer Lopez testified that when he asked appellant about the blood on

his hands, appellant changed his story. Appellant stated that when he pulled into the

5 complex to meet the woman, a man ran up to his car and appellant got out and fought

him. Appellant stated that he knocked the other man out and then returned to his car

and waited for the female for ten minutes. Appellant told him that he then heard

gunshots and drove away. Officer Lopez testified that appellant changed his story

again and told him that after he knocked the man out, he heard gunshots and returned

fire.

5. Officer Karlsen

Officer Karlsen testified that he was assigned to North Patrol night shift on

June 12, 2021. At 11:16 p.m., Officer Karlsen was dispatched to a shooting at an

apartment complex at 5135 North Freeway. Officer Karlsen testified that he spoke

to appellant after officers brought him back to the scene of the shooting. Officer

Karlsen testified that, during their exchange, appellant tilted his head toward the

parking lot of the apartment complex to indicate where the shooting had occurred.

Officers found three silver 9-millimeter bullet casings at the scene of the shooting—

two of them were found in the parking lot fifteen feet away from where the shooting

occurred and one was found in the driver’s side door panel of appellant’s vehicle.

Officer Karlsen testified that the weapon recovered from appellant’s vehicle was a

.9 mm gun.

Following this testimony, the State tendered Exhibit 10, a Judgment of

Conviction signed by appellant, which the trial court admitted into evidence. The

6 exhibit showed that appellant had been convicted of felony possession of a

controlled substance on January 13, 2021 and sentenced to 180 days’ confinement.

The judgment also included a written admonishment stating that appellant was

ineligible under Texas law to possess a firearm or ammunition.

After both sides rested, the jury found appellant guilty of the charged offense

of possession of a firearm by a felon. The trial court assessed his punishment at

twenty-five years’ confinement. This appeal followed.

Discussion

In one issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his

conviction because the State failed to prove each element of the offense of

possession of a firearm by a felon. The State responds that the evidence is sufficient

to support appellant’s conviction.

A. Standard of Review

We review appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the

standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See Brooks v. State,

323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Under that standard, we examine all

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a

reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19. Evidence is insufficient under this

standard in four circumstances: (1) the record contains no evidence probative of an

7 element of the offense; (2) the record contains a mere “modicum” of evidence

probative of an element of the offense; (3) the evidence conclusively establishes a

reasonable doubt; and (4) the acts alleged do not constitute the criminal offense

charged. See id. at 314, 318 n.11, 320; Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2009); Mottin v. State, 634 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d). The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and

the weight to give their testimony, and our role on appeal is simply to ensure that the

evidence reasonably supports the jury’s verdict. Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d

188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

B. Applicable Law

Texas Penal Code section 46.04 makes it an offense for a person who has been

convicted of a felony to possess a firearm. TEX. PENAL CODE § 46.04. Under the

statute, a convicted felon commits an offense by possessing a firearm anywhere

before the fifth anniversary of his release from confinement or supervision. Id. §

46.04(a)(1). After the fifth anniversary of his release from confinement or

supervision, a convicted felon commits an offense by possessing a firearm anywhere

other than his home. Id. § 46.04 (a)(2).

C. Analysis

Appellant argues that the State failed to present evidence proving the location

of his residence and therefore that he possessed a firearm at a place other than the

8 premises where he lived.1 He asserts that theoretically he could have (1) resided at

another apartment at the same complex as the woman he planned to meet, (2) had

no actual physical residence and was going to stay at the woman’s apartment, (3)

been homeless and resided in his vehicle, or (4) had a residence at another location.

The jury heard evidence that the Beatrix apartment complex where the

shooting occurred was located at 5135 North Freeway, and that appellant’s stalled

vehicle was discovered nearby at the intersection of the North Freeway and

Glenburnie Drive. Officer Lopez testified that he spoke with appellant for ten

minutes, and that appellant told him that he lived in Spring. Officer Lopez also

testified that appellant changed his story several times. When asked where he had

been coming from before his vehicle ran out of gas off the North Freeway, appellant

initially stated that he had left Dago’s where he worked to meet a woman at the

apartment complex. Appellant later stated that he entered the complex to meet the

woman, fought a man who he then knocked out, and drove off when he heard

gunshots. Appellant changed his story yet again and told Officer Lopez that after he

knocked the man out, he heard gunshots and returned fire. None of the places

identified—Dago’s, the apartment complex, or the road where he ran out of gas—

are in Spring where appellant lived.

1 Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support any of the other elements of the charged offense. 9 The jury also heard testimony about why appellant went to the Beatrix

apartment complex. Appellant told officers that he went to the apartment complex

to meet a woman, not because it was where he lived. However, even if he had been

a resident at the complex or staying with the woman he met, the evidence showed

that the shooting at the complex took place between the street and the parking lot.

Neither is considered a “premises” for a resident of an apartment complex. See, e.g.,

Shepperd v. State, 586 S.W.2d 500, 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (upholding jury

finding that appellant was guilty of unlawful possession of firearm by felon,

considering phrase “away from the premises where he lives,” and determining that

“adjacent parking lot is not part of the premises where one lives”); Bryant v. State,

508 S.W.2d 103, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (holding that tenant who had pistol in

his hand while standing in parking lot shared by other occupants of apartment

complex was not on “one’s own premises” within its meaning under unlawful

carrying of firearms statute); Wilson v. State, 418 S.W.2d 687, 688 (Tex. Crim. App.

1967) (holding that tenant who carries pistol upon grass, sidewalks, driveway, and

parking lot jointly used by all tenants of large apartment complex is not on “one’s

own premises” within meaning of statute relating to unlawful carrying of firearm);

see also Thomas v. State, No. 05-16-01103-CR, 2018 WL 3654908, at *4 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Aug. 2, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(concluding that appellant was in possession of firearm at location “other than the

10 premises at which [he] lived” where evidence showed he shot complainant in

apartment complex parking lot); Ervin v. State, No. 0-07-00207-CR, 2008 WL

5263635, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec 18, 2008, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (concluding there was no evidence to support finding

that appellant was on his own premises at time of shooting where evidence showed

appellant and complainant walked down apartment complex’s second story

breezeway toward common stairwell where appellant shot complainant).

The evidence further showed that appellant possessed a firearm at other places

which were not the premises where he lived. Appellant told officers that he was

coming from Dago’s—his workplace, not his residence—which was adjacent to the

apartment complex where the shooting occurred. The evidence also showed that

appellant possessed the firearm at the time police discovered his stalled vehicle at

the intersection of the North Freeway and Glenburnie Drive—a location that is also

not the premises where he lived.

Appellant’s argument that he could have been homeless and residing in his

vehicle at the time he possessed the firearm is unavailing. There was no evidence to

support such a finding; rather, the undisputed evidence showed that appellant lived

in Spring at the time he possessed the firearm that officers discovered in the back of

his stalled vehicle. See Sharif v. State, 640 S.W.3d 636, 643 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (finding sufficient evidence supported finding that

11 defendant was living at his mother’s residence, not in his vehicle, and therefore

possessed firearm at location where he did not live, as required for conviction of

being felon in possession of firearm; evidence was undisputed that defendant

possessed firearm in vehicle he was driving when stopped by police, there was no

evidence that defendant was homeless and living in his vehicle, and defendant

testified that he was living at his mother’s residence at time he was stopped); see

also Nesbit v. State, 720 S.W.2d 888, 891 (Tex. App.—Austin 1986, no pet.)

(“Failure to have a place to live cannot transform an ordinary pickup into a premises

for living simply because one may sleep in it.”). As the sole judge of the credibility

of witnesses and the weight to give their testimony, the jury was free to conclude

that the vehicle was not appellant’s residence. See Galvan-Cerna v. State, 509

S.W.3d 398, 403 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (citing Canfield v.

State, 429 S.W.3d 54, 65 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (noting

jury may reasonably infer facts from evidence presented, credit witnesses it chooses,

disbelieve any or all of evidence or testimony proffered, and weigh evidence as it

sees fit).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we

conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that appellant possessed a

firearm at a place other than the premises where he lived. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at

318–19. We therefore hold that the evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s

12 conviction for the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. We

overrule appellant’s sole issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Amparo Monique Guerra Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Farris and Guerra.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).