NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0765-24
CRAIG MOTT,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JANAEA SHEPHERD,
Defendant-Appellant. _________________________
Argued November 6, 2025 ‒ Decided February 4, 2026
Before Judges Marczyck, Bishop-Thompson, and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. LT-003103-21.
Garrett Treer argued the cause for appellant (South Jersey Legal Services, Inc., attorneys; Garrett Treer, John Pendergast, and Kenneth Goldman, on the brief).
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM In this landlord-tenant matter, defendant Janaea Shepherd appeals from
the October 31, 2024 order of the Law Division, Special Civil Part, denying her
motion to seal the record of a Consent to Enter Judgment (Tenant Stays in
Premises). Defendant contends the trial court erred by relying exclusively on
Rule 1:38-3(f)(11) without considering whether good cause existed under Rule
1:38-11(b) to seal the record in light of the injury and stigma associated with her
eviction history. We affirm.
We rely on the sparse record from defendant's motion to seal. In her
certification filed in support of her application, defendant stated she relied on
financial assistance provided through the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher
Program managed by the Department of Community Affairs (DCA).1 She
asserted plaintiff Craig Mott did not receive rent payments from September 2021
through January 2022 as a result of delays in the DCA's recertification of her
voucher and other administrative issues.
1 The Section 8 Housing Voucher Program is funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and assists in making safe and quality housing in the private rental market affordable to low- and very low-income households by reducing housing costs through direct rent subsidy payments to landlords. Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher, Dep't of Community Affairs, https://www.nj.gov/dca/dhcr/offices/section8hcv/ (last visited January 15, 2026). A-0765-24 2 Plaintiff commenced a summary landlord-tenant action in December
2021, seeking defendant's eviction based on nonpayment of rent. The action
was resolved in June 2022 by a consent judgment with defendant staying in the
premises. The judgment states: "Tenant . . . AGREE[D] TO THE
IMMEDIATE ENTRY OF A JUDGMENT FOR POSSESSION." Defendant
satisfied the outstanding rent and subsequently vacated the apartment.
Defendant moved to vacate the judgment for possession, dismiss the
action, and seal the court record. She admitted she entered into a consent
judgment for possession without the benefit of counsel, but argued she did not
understand the consequences arising from that judgment. Defendant, however,
has not provided us with the transcript of the June 2022 proceedings to show
her consent was not knowing and informed. Nevertheless, she contended she
has experienced—and will likely continue to experience—"pronounced
hardship" and discrimination in securing future housing. Defendant's
application was further supported by the certification of a law professor
detailing the impact of her eviction record, including denial of housing and the
risk of homelessness, due to tenant "blacklisting."
The October 31, 2024 order vacated the judgment and dismissed the
matter but denied her request to seal the record. The court explained Rule 1:38-
A-0765-24 3 3(f)(11) did not permit sealing the record because a judgment of possession had
been entered, and seven years had not elapsed since the entry of judgment.
A court's determination as to the applicability, or interpretation, of court
rules is reviewed de novo. State v. Dickerson, 232 N.J. 2, 17 (2018). The trial
court's interpretation of court rules is a legal issue and is subject to de novo
review. State v. Anthony, 443 N.J. Super. 553, 564 (App. Div. 2016) (citation
omitted); see also Wash. Commons, LLC v. City of Jersey City, 416 N.J. Super.
555, 560 (App. Div. 2010). "The approach taken in respect of the construction
of court rules is the same as that for the construction of statutes." Anthony, 443
N.J. Super. at 564 (quoting State v. Clark, 191 N.J. 503, 508 (2007)). However,
"[w]e accord no special deference to the trial court's legal conclusions."
Birmingham v. Travelers N.J. Ins. Co., 475 N.J. Super. 246, 255 (App. Div.
2023).
We review the validity of a judgment of possession for abuse of discretion.
Cmty. Realty Mgmt., Inc. v. Harris, 155 N.J. 212, 236 (1998). We likewise
review orders denying motions to seal judicial records for abuse of discretion.
Hammock by Hammock v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 142 N.J. 356, 380 (1995).
"A court abuses its discretion when its 'decision is "made without rational
explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an
A-0765-24 4 impermissible basis."'" State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245, 257 (2021) (quoting
State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020)). The abuse of discretion standard requires
us to "generously sustain [the trial court's] decision, provided it is supported by
credible evidence in the record." Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
202 N.J. 369, 384 (2010). Thus, "[w]e will 'decline[] to interfere with [such]
matter of discretion unless it appears that an injustice has been done.'" St. James
AME Dev. Corp. v. City of Jersey City, 403 N.J. Super. 480, 484 (App. Div.
2008) (alterations in original) (quoting Cooper v. Consol. Rail Corp., 391 N.J.
Super. 17, 23 (App. Div. 2007)).
Defendant raises two arguments on appeal. She first argues the landlord -
tenant record should be sealed under Rule 1:38-11 because it will likely cause
her serious harm. She also asserts she had an "overwhelming" interest in
privacy. Defendant next contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to
seal under Rule 1:38-3(f)(11) because it should have weighed the evidence under
Rule 1:38-11, which allows sealing upon a showing of "good cause"—that is,
by balancing the need for public access to court records against the potential
harm or injury that public disclosure may cause.
"The Court Rules establish a general rule in favor of open judicial
proceedings, except upon a showing of good cause." In re T.I.C.-C., 470 N.J.
A-0765-24 5 Super. 596, 607 (App. Div. 2022) (citing R. 1:2-1; R. 1:38-1; Hammock, 142
N.J. at 367-69, 375, 380-82). "Exceptions enumerated [in Rule 1:38-1] shall be
narrowly construed in order to implement the policy of open access to records
of the judiciary." Ibid. Rule 1:38-3(f)(11) sets forth two circumstances where
landlord-tenant records may be sealed: (1) where no judgment of possession has
been entered; and (2) where a judgment of possession was entered seven years
ago or longer. Where the rules speak directly to the context presented, as here,
the more specific provision governs. See State v. Gomes, 253 N.J. 6, 28-29
(2023).
We are unpersuaded by defendant's arguments. The consent judgment was
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0765-24
CRAIG MOTT,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JANAEA SHEPHERD,
Defendant-Appellant. _________________________
Argued November 6, 2025 ‒ Decided February 4, 2026
Before Judges Marczyck, Bishop-Thompson, and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. LT-003103-21.
Garrett Treer argued the cause for appellant (South Jersey Legal Services, Inc., attorneys; Garrett Treer, John Pendergast, and Kenneth Goldman, on the brief).
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM In this landlord-tenant matter, defendant Janaea Shepherd appeals from
the October 31, 2024 order of the Law Division, Special Civil Part, denying her
motion to seal the record of a Consent to Enter Judgment (Tenant Stays in
Premises). Defendant contends the trial court erred by relying exclusively on
Rule 1:38-3(f)(11) without considering whether good cause existed under Rule
1:38-11(b) to seal the record in light of the injury and stigma associated with her
eviction history. We affirm.
We rely on the sparse record from defendant's motion to seal. In her
certification filed in support of her application, defendant stated she relied on
financial assistance provided through the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher
Program managed by the Department of Community Affairs (DCA).1 She
asserted plaintiff Craig Mott did not receive rent payments from September 2021
through January 2022 as a result of delays in the DCA's recertification of her
voucher and other administrative issues.
1 The Section 8 Housing Voucher Program is funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and assists in making safe and quality housing in the private rental market affordable to low- and very low-income households by reducing housing costs through direct rent subsidy payments to landlords. Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher, Dep't of Community Affairs, https://www.nj.gov/dca/dhcr/offices/section8hcv/ (last visited January 15, 2026). A-0765-24 2 Plaintiff commenced a summary landlord-tenant action in December
2021, seeking defendant's eviction based on nonpayment of rent. The action
was resolved in June 2022 by a consent judgment with defendant staying in the
premises. The judgment states: "Tenant . . . AGREE[D] TO THE
IMMEDIATE ENTRY OF A JUDGMENT FOR POSSESSION." Defendant
satisfied the outstanding rent and subsequently vacated the apartment.
Defendant moved to vacate the judgment for possession, dismiss the
action, and seal the court record. She admitted she entered into a consent
judgment for possession without the benefit of counsel, but argued she did not
understand the consequences arising from that judgment. Defendant, however,
has not provided us with the transcript of the June 2022 proceedings to show
her consent was not knowing and informed. Nevertheless, she contended she
has experienced—and will likely continue to experience—"pronounced
hardship" and discrimination in securing future housing. Defendant's
application was further supported by the certification of a law professor
detailing the impact of her eviction record, including denial of housing and the
risk of homelessness, due to tenant "blacklisting."
The October 31, 2024 order vacated the judgment and dismissed the
matter but denied her request to seal the record. The court explained Rule 1:38-
A-0765-24 3 3(f)(11) did not permit sealing the record because a judgment of possession had
been entered, and seven years had not elapsed since the entry of judgment.
A court's determination as to the applicability, or interpretation, of court
rules is reviewed de novo. State v. Dickerson, 232 N.J. 2, 17 (2018). The trial
court's interpretation of court rules is a legal issue and is subject to de novo
review. State v. Anthony, 443 N.J. Super. 553, 564 (App. Div. 2016) (citation
omitted); see also Wash. Commons, LLC v. City of Jersey City, 416 N.J. Super.
555, 560 (App. Div. 2010). "The approach taken in respect of the construction
of court rules is the same as that for the construction of statutes." Anthony, 443
N.J. Super. at 564 (quoting State v. Clark, 191 N.J. 503, 508 (2007)). However,
"[w]e accord no special deference to the trial court's legal conclusions."
Birmingham v. Travelers N.J. Ins. Co., 475 N.J. Super. 246, 255 (App. Div.
2023).
We review the validity of a judgment of possession for abuse of discretion.
Cmty. Realty Mgmt., Inc. v. Harris, 155 N.J. 212, 236 (1998). We likewise
review orders denying motions to seal judicial records for abuse of discretion.
Hammock by Hammock v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 142 N.J. 356, 380 (1995).
"A court abuses its discretion when its 'decision is "made without rational
explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an
A-0765-24 4 impermissible basis."'" State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245, 257 (2021) (quoting
State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020)). The abuse of discretion standard requires
us to "generously sustain [the trial court's] decision, provided it is supported by
credible evidence in the record." Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
202 N.J. 369, 384 (2010). Thus, "[w]e will 'decline[] to interfere with [such]
matter of discretion unless it appears that an injustice has been done.'" St. James
AME Dev. Corp. v. City of Jersey City, 403 N.J. Super. 480, 484 (App. Div.
2008) (alterations in original) (quoting Cooper v. Consol. Rail Corp., 391 N.J.
Super. 17, 23 (App. Div. 2007)).
Defendant raises two arguments on appeal. She first argues the landlord -
tenant record should be sealed under Rule 1:38-11 because it will likely cause
her serious harm. She also asserts she had an "overwhelming" interest in
privacy. Defendant next contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to
seal under Rule 1:38-3(f)(11) because it should have weighed the evidence under
Rule 1:38-11, which allows sealing upon a showing of "good cause"—that is,
by balancing the need for public access to court records against the potential
harm or injury that public disclosure may cause.
"The Court Rules establish a general rule in favor of open judicial
proceedings, except upon a showing of good cause." In re T.I.C.-C., 470 N.J.
A-0765-24 5 Super. 596, 607 (App. Div. 2022) (citing R. 1:2-1; R. 1:38-1; Hammock, 142
N.J. at 367-69, 375, 380-82). "Exceptions enumerated [in Rule 1:38-1] shall be
narrowly construed in order to implement the policy of open access to records
of the judiciary." Ibid. Rule 1:38-3(f)(11) sets forth two circumstances where
landlord-tenant records may be sealed: (1) where no judgment of possession has
been entered; and (2) where a judgment of possession was entered seven years
ago or longer. Where the rules speak directly to the context presented, as here,
the more specific provision governs. See State v. Gomes, 253 N.J. 6, 28-29
(2023).
We are unpersuaded by defendant's arguments. The consent judgment was
entered pursuant to Rule 6:6-4 and constitutes "an agreement of the parties under
the sanction of the court as to what the decision shall be." Cmty. Realty Mgmt.,
155 N.J. at 226. Additionally, it contains the operative "recital that all parties
have consented to both the entry and the form of the judgment." Id. at 228.
Simply put, the judgment functioned both as a contract and as a judicial decree.
Id. at 226.
We are satisfied the trial court properly considered and determined Rule
1:38-3(f)(11) was dispositive because it expressly limits a court's discretion in
landlord-tenant actions where there has been a judgment of possession entered
A-0765-24 6 within seven years, establishing an unequivocal bar. The Rule does not provide
judicial discretion to seal the record based on equitable factors or compelling
circumstances when the judgment is less than seven years old. Thus, even if
compelling equities favor confidentiality, the court is constrained by the
governing judicial rule and cannot order sealing under these circumstances.
Accordingly, our de novo review of the record affirms the trial court's
ruling, which is supported by its findings of fact and conclusions of law. We
discern no abuse of discretion. To the extent we have not addressed defendant's
remaining arguments, we are satisfied they are without sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-0765-24 7