Craig Field v. FERC
Opinion
F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 4 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CRAIG FIELD LANDOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 99-9510 FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY No. CP98-280-000 COMMISSION,
Respondent-Appellee.
WILLIAMS GAS PIPELINES CENTRAL, INC.,
Intervenor.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges, and ROGERS, Senior District Judge. **
Craig Field Landowners’ Association (the Association) appeals the Federal
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable Richard D. Rogers, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) denial of its motion for rehearing on FERC’s order authorizing Williams Gas Pipelines Central, Inc. (Williams Gas) to abandon Craig Field, a natural gas storage field. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) and affirm.
I.
Williams Gas owned and operated the Craig Field natural gas storage field in Johnson County, Kansas. Storage leases required Williams Gas to furnish gas free or at reduced prices to domestic customers within the storage field boundaries. Williams Gas filed an Abbreviated Application for Authorization to Abandon Storage Facility with FERC, asserting that abandonment of Craig Field was necessary because of safety concerns, namely well deterioration and encroaching residential development.
The Association, comprised of residents who lived within the storage field boundaries, filed a Motion to Intervene and Protest, asserting Williams Gas failed to show that the affected properties would be satisfactorily restored after abandonment (an issue not raised on appeal), that Craig Field could not continue to serve customers, that there was any basis for the asserted safety concerns, or that Craig Field was in a state of disrepair. Williams Gas responded to the Association’s protest by filing an answer emphasizing that Craig Field was Williams Gas’ oldest currently operating storage field, that casings in many of the
wells were not cemented properly to their full depth, and that a significant maintenance investment would be required to prevent gas leaks between the casing and the well bore. After a public hearing, FERC issued an order granting abandonment. The Association filed a request for rehearing and for a stay pending appeal, both of which FERC denied.
II.
FERC’s compliance with 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b)
The Association first contends FERC failed to comply with the hearing requirement of 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b). That provision states:
No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities, without the permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after due hearing , and a finding by the Commission that the available supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the continuance of service is unwarranted, or that the present or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment.
15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (emphasis added). FERC considered the request for abandonment, and the Association’s objections to it, after a public hearing.
The Association asserts it was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. We review FERC’s decision to deny an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC , 184 F.3d 892, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The purpose of the § 717f(b) hearing requirement is to “‘permit[] all interested parties to be heard and therefore facilitate[] full presentation of the facts
necessary’ to the Commission’s determination.” Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. FERC , 955 F.2d 1412, 1425 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. McCombs , 442 U.S. 529, 538 (1979)). FERC is not always required to conduct a trial-type evidentiary hearing to achieve this purpose. The Association must meet at least three conditions before FERC will consider conducting a formal evidentiary hearing. First, it must make allegations of fact material to FERC’s determination. Second, it must make an adequate proffer of evidence to support those allegations of fact. Third, the material facts alleged by the Association must be in dispute. Id. at 1425-26. Even if these conditions are met, there is no guarantee that the Association will be allowed to present evidence orally or to cross-examine witnesses. “Depending on the nature of the inquiry and the evidence, the ‘full presentation of facts’ necessary for the Commission’s determination may be achieved by the written submission of evidence.” Id. at 1426. We conclude that the Association has established the first two conditions, but has failed to establish the third. As a result, we cannot conclude that FERC abused its discretion in denying the Association’s request for an evidentiary hearing.
The Association made allegations of fact material to FERC’s determination of the abandonment issue by raising the factual issues of whether abandonment was required for safety reasons and whether Craig Field was necessary to
adequately serve the public. The Association then made an adequate proffer of evidence to support the alleged material facts. It asserted the clean safety record on Craig Field belied any current safety concerns. The Association also alleged an inconsistency between Williams Gas’ assertion of unsafe wells and its reports filed with the Kansas Corporation Commission stating the wells were in good condition.
Although the Association proffered evidence of material facts, it failed to show those facts were in dispute. “There is simply no justification for ‘an evidentiary hearing when the opposing presentations reveal that no dispute of fact is involved.’” Cascade , 955 F.2d at 1426 (quoting Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. FERC , 806 F.2d 275, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). The Association does not dispute the material facts stated in Williams Gas’ application for abandonment, but rather it disputes whether these facts amount to a safety risk which would justify abandonment. The parties here had an adequate opportunity to present their views and FERC had an adequate record upon which to base its decision.
FERC’s approval of William Gas’ request for abandonment Next, the Association asserts that FERC’s decision to allow Williams Gas to abandon Craig Field was not based on substantial evidence. In reviewing FERC’s decision we do not review its factual conclusions if they are supported
by substantial evidence. Cascade , 955 F.2d at 1421-22 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b)). Our task is only to determine whether FERC’s action was “‘arbitrary, capricious, . . . or otherwise not in accordance with law.’” Id. at 1422. We must uphold FERC’s determination if it is “based on consideration of the relevant facts and articulates a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Id.
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