Affirmed as Modified and Opinion Filed February 7, 2018
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-17-00021-CR
CRAIG AARON MILLER, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 296-80261-2015
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Francis, Stoddart, and Whitehill Opinion by Justice Francis Craig Aaron Miller appeals his conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
After a jury trial, appellant was found guilty and sentenced to two years confinement suspended
for five years and a $2,500 fine. In his first issue, appellant asserts the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the conviction. The State joins appellant in his second issue that the
judgment should be modified to correct the name of the presiding judge. We modify the trial
court’s judgment and affirm the judgment as modified.
On October 20, 2014, Chandler Roach, the complainant, was driving on FM 1378 when he
noticed a pickup truck, driven by appellant, driving erratically behind him. Appellant
unsuccessfully attempted to pass Roach twice on the right-hand side, but was prevented by other
cars on the road. On the third attempt, appellant’s truck clipped the rear, right side of Roach’s truck. Appellant then accelerated through a red light. Roach stopped at the red light and lost sight
of the appellant until he approached the next light where he found appellant standing in the middle
of the road with his arms outstretched. In an effort to avoid appellant and get away from the
situation, Roach turned at the intersection. Appellant got back in his truck, caught up to Roach,
and made a quick maneuver towards the side of Roach’s truck. Roach braked and appellant’s truck
clipped the right front side of Roach’s truck causing appellant to lose control, hit the center median,
and flip. Roach drove to the next light, called the police, and returned to the scene of the accident.
Two other drivers on the road witnessed the events and testified at trial. Timothy Dart told
the jury appellant came up fast behind him and tailgated him. Appellant “almost pushed the car
that was next to us behind me out of the way,” requiring the other driver to hit the brakes quickly.
As appellant passed Dart, a passenger in appellant’s truck made obscene gestures while hanging
out the window. Appellant changed lanes causing another vehicle to slam on their brakes to avoid
a collision. Dart saw appellant clip the back bumper of Roach’s truck.
Kevin Grimes witnessed the second collision between appellant’s truck and Roach’s.
Grimes said he heard revving engines and thought Roach and appellant were racing. He saw
appellant’s truck pass Roach’s and then immediately turn left to cut Roach’s truck off. As
appellant’s truck pulled in front of Roach, it hit the median and flipped into oncoming traffic.
Appellant admitted at trial he was intoxicated at the time of the accident and was in a rush
to get back to work. He thought Roach slowed down on purpose during their initial interaction,
causing him to clip the back of Roach’s bumper. Appellant drove ahead of Roach and pulled over
to examine the damage to his truck. He then stood in the roadway in front of Roach’s oncoming
vehicle with his arms outstretched in a “why-did-you-do-that kind of gesture.” When Roach turned
at the intersection, appellant said he “wasn’t in the right state of mind to let him just take off.”
Appellant told the jury that just before the crash, he was driving next to Roach and made another
–2– gesture. “Roach came into my lane and clipped the bed of my truck” and “that’s what sent me in
front of him.” Appellant admitted to driving recklessly and to being mad but denied that he was
trying to threaten Roach.
After hearing the evidence, the jury found appellant guilty of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon. Appellant contends the evidence was legally insufficient to support the verdict.
Specifically, he contends the evidence is insufficient to establish he intentionally or knowingly
threatened the complainant.
When reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal
conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether
a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 894 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011). We do not resolve conflicts of fact, weigh evidence, or evaluate the credibility
of the witnesses as this is the function of the trier of fact. See Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735,
740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of
the appellant as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is enough to
warrant conviction. See Kennemur v. State, 280 S.W.3d 305, 313 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008,
pet. ref’d). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence and can be sufficient alone
to establish an accused’s guilt. Id.
The indictment alleged appellant intentionally and knowingly threatened Roach with
imminent bodily injury while using or exhibiting a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon. A person
acts intentionally with respect to the nature or result of his conduct when it is his conscious
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 6.03(a)
(West 2017). A person acts knowingly as to the nature or circumstances surrounding his conduct
when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist and he acts knowingly
–3– as to the result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the
result. Id. § 6.03(b). A defendant’s intent or knowledge is a question of fact to be determined
from a totality of the circumstances including the defendant’s acts, words, and conduct. See
Dobbins v. State, 228 S.W.3d 761–2, 764 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. dism’d).
Here, Roach and two other witnesses testified appellant was driving erratically and made
contact with Roach’s truck on two occasions. After clipping Roach’s truck the first time, appellant
ran a red light and then got out of his truck, blocking Roach’s path as he approached. Appellant
admitted he was angry when Roach turned onto another street instead of stopping. Appellant then
chased after Roach and maneuvered his truck in front of Roach’s with such force that he hit the
median and lost control of his vehicle. The jury could reasonably infer from this conduct that
appellant’s actions were knowing or intentional. See Nguyen v. State, 506 S.W.3d 69, 76 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. ref’d) (evidence sufficient to support conviction for aggravated
assault with vehicle where intent could be inferred from prior aggressive driving).
Appellant also contends the evidence is insufficient because Roach gave conflicting
testimony about how he perceived appellant’s conduct. He suggests the evidence must show
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Affirmed as Modified and Opinion Filed February 7, 2018
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-17-00021-CR
CRAIG AARON MILLER, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 296-80261-2015
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Francis, Stoddart, and Whitehill Opinion by Justice Francis Craig Aaron Miller appeals his conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
After a jury trial, appellant was found guilty and sentenced to two years confinement suspended
for five years and a $2,500 fine. In his first issue, appellant asserts the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the conviction. The State joins appellant in his second issue that the
judgment should be modified to correct the name of the presiding judge. We modify the trial
court’s judgment and affirm the judgment as modified.
On October 20, 2014, Chandler Roach, the complainant, was driving on FM 1378 when he
noticed a pickup truck, driven by appellant, driving erratically behind him. Appellant
unsuccessfully attempted to pass Roach twice on the right-hand side, but was prevented by other
cars on the road. On the third attempt, appellant’s truck clipped the rear, right side of Roach’s truck. Appellant then accelerated through a red light. Roach stopped at the red light and lost sight
of the appellant until he approached the next light where he found appellant standing in the middle
of the road with his arms outstretched. In an effort to avoid appellant and get away from the
situation, Roach turned at the intersection. Appellant got back in his truck, caught up to Roach,
and made a quick maneuver towards the side of Roach’s truck. Roach braked and appellant’s truck
clipped the right front side of Roach’s truck causing appellant to lose control, hit the center median,
and flip. Roach drove to the next light, called the police, and returned to the scene of the accident.
Two other drivers on the road witnessed the events and testified at trial. Timothy Dart told
the jury appellant came up fast behind him and tailgated him. Appellant “almost pushed the car
that was next to us behind me out of the way,” requiring the other driver to hit the brakes quickly.
As appellant passed Dart, a passenger in appellant’s truck made obscene gestures while hanging
out the window. Appellant changed lanes causing another vehicle to slam on their brakes to avoid
a collision. Dart saw appellant clip the back bumper of Roach’s truck.
Kevin Grimes witnessed the second collision between appellant’s truck and Roach’s.
Grimes said he heard revving engines and thought Roach and appellant were racing. He saw
appellant’s truck pass Roach’s and then immediately turn left to cut Roach’s truck off. As
appellant’s truck pulled in front of Roach, it hit the median and flipped into oncoming traffic.
Appellant admitted at trial he was intoxicated at the time of the accident and was in a rush
to get back to work. He thought Roach slowed down on purpose during their initial interaction,
causing him to clip the back of Roach’s bumper. Appellant drove ahead of Roach and pulled over
to examine the damage to his truck. He then stood in the roadway in front of Roach’s oncoming
vehicle with his arms outstretched in a “why-did-you-do-that kind of gesture.” When Roach turned
at the intersection, appellant said he “wasn’t in the right state of mind to let him just take off.”
Appellant told the jury that just before the crash, he was driving next to Roach and made another
–2– gesture. “Roach came into my lane and clipped the bed of my truck” and “that’s what sent me in
front of him.” Appellant admitted to driving recklessly and to being mad but denied that he was
trying to threaten Roach.
After hearing the evidence, the jury found appellant guilty of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon. Appellant contends the evidence was legally insufficient to support the verdict.
Specifically, he contends the evidence is insufficient to establish he intentionally or knowingly
threatened the complainant.
When reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal
conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether
a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 894 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011). We do not resolve conflicts of fact, weigh evidence, or evaluate the credibility
of the witnesses as this is the function of the trier of fact. See Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735,
740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of
the appellant as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is enough to
warrant conviction. See Kennemur v. State, 280 S.W.3d 305, 313 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008,
pet. ref’d). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence and can be sufficient alone
to establish an accused’s guilt. Id.
The indictment alleged appellant intentionally and knowingly threatened Roach with
imminent bodily injury while using or exhibiting a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon. A person
acts intentionally with respect to the nature or result of his conduct when it is his conscious
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 6.03(a)
(West 2017). A person acts knowingly as to the nature or circumstances surrounding his conduct
when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist and he acts knowingly
–3– as to the result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the
result. Id. § 6.03(b). A defendant’s intent or knowledge is a question of fact to be determined
from a totality of the circumstances including the defendant’s acts, words, and conduct. See
Dobbins v. State, 228 S.W.3d 761–2, 764 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. dism’d).
Here, Roach and two other witnesses testified appellant was driving erratically and made
contact with Roach’s truck on two occasions. After clipping Roach’s truck the first time, appellant
ran a red light and then got out of his truck, blocking Roach’s path as he approached. Appellant
admitted he was angry when Roach turned onto another street instead of stopping. Appellant then
chased after Roach and maneuvered his truck in front of Roach’s with such force that he hit the
median and lost control of his vehicle. The jury could reasonably infer from this conduct that
appellant’s actions were knowing or intentional. See Nguyen v. State, 506 S.W.3d 69, 76 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. ref’d) (evidence sufficient to support conviction for aggravated
assault with vehicle where intent could be inferred from prior aggressive driving).
Appellant also contends the evidence is insufficient because Roach gave conflicting
testimony about how he perceived appellant’s conduct. He suggests the evidence must show
Roach was fearful appellant would injure him for there to be sufficient evidence of an intentional
or knowing threat. He contends a complainant must actually perceive the threat to prove the
element of “threatens” in an assault case. The court of criminal appeals has considered this
question in an aggravated assault by threat case and determined the evidence is sufficient if it
supports an inference that the victim did in fact perceive the threat. Olivas v. State, 203 S.W.3d
341, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
During trial, Roach told the jury he would describe appellant’s actions as threatening, but
he “wouldn’t take a threat to it.” Roach told the jury he did not stop when appellant got out of his
car because he didn’t want to fight with appellant and was trying to distance himself from the
–4– situation. Roach described the events as scary and said he believed appellant intended his actions
to be threatening. This evidence shows Roach perceived appellant’s actions as a threat. Even if
Roach’s testimony that he did not feel personally threatened could be seen as contradicting his
testimony about appellant’s threatening behavior, the jury weighed the evidence and interpreted
Roach’s testimony to mean that he perceived a threat. See Boston v. State, 410 S.W.3d 321, 327
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (evidence sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated robbery by
threat where a rational jury could have inferred that the victim was threatened, that the victim
perceived the threat, and that the victim was placed in fear as a result of the perceived threat); see
also Strange v. State, 446 S.W.3d 567, 574–75 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.). After
reviewing the record, we conclude the State introduced sufficient evidence to support the
conviction. We overrule appellant’s first point of error.
In appellant’s second issue, the State joins appellant in his request to modify the name of
the judge. The record shows Judge Keith Dean presided over the proceedings. The judgment,
however, identifies Judge John Roach, Jr. We modify the trial court’s judgment to show the
presiding judge is Keith Dean and affirm the judgment as modified. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b);
Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526,
529–30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd).
/Molly Francis/ MOLLY FRANCIS JUSTICE
Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 170021F.U05
–5– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
CRAIG AARON MILLER, Appellant On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas No. 05-17-00021-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. 296-80261-2015. Opinion delivered by Justice Francis. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Stoddart and Whitehill participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows: The name of the presiding judge is MODIFIED to read “Hon. Keith Dean.”
As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered February 7, 2018.
–6–