Craftsmen Homes v. Hollywood Door
This text of 583 So. 2d 879 (Craftsmen Homes v. Hollywood Door) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
CRAFTSMEN HOMES, INC., U.S. Life Title Insurance Company of Dallas, and Neil Alford
v.
HOLLYWOOD DOOR COMPANY, INC. and Lakeside Insulators, Inc.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
*880 Joseph Russo, Jefferson, for defendant-appellant Hollywood Door Co., Inc.
Charles F. Gay, Jr., New Orleans, La., for defendant-appellant Neil Alford.
Denise D. Lindsey, Slidell, for plaintiff-appellee Craftsmen Homes, Inc.
Neville M. Landry, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellee U.S. Life Title Ins. Co.
Before LOTTINGER, SHORTESS and CARTER, JJ.
LOTTINGER, Judge.
This is an appeal by Hollywood Door Company, Inc. (Hollywood), one[1] of the defendants in this declaratory judgment action, from the trial court's judgment granting the declaratory relief requested by the plaintiffs, Craftsmen Homes, Inc. (Craftsmen), U.S. Life Title Insurance Company[2], and Neil Alford. Hollywood claims to have a judicial mortgage on a piece of property owned by Craftsmen, pursuant to a judgment against Reine Homes, Inc. (Reine).[3] This judgment was recorded at a time when Reine was the owner of public record, but not the owner in fact of the property.
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether a judicial mortgage attaches to, or creates an encumbrance on, a certain piece of real property due to the fact that the judgment debtor is listed in the public records as the owner of that property at the time that the judgment was recorded, notwithstanding that the judgment debtor is not the true owner of the property.
I.
The real property which Hollywood claims to have a judicial mortgage on is described as lot 88, Quail Ridge Subdivision, Phase VI, Slidell, La. (lot 88). Prior to August 20, 1982, lot 88 was owned by Clover Construction Company, Inc. (Clover). On that date, Clover entered into a cash sale, whereby lot 88, along with several other lots in the same subdivision, was sold to Reine. This cash sale was recorded in the conveyance records of St. Tammany Parish on August 24, 1982.
When Reine was ready to develop lot 88 it discovered that the roadway fronting it was incomplete. Since Reine could not further develop the property without a completed roadway, Clover agreed to let Reine exchange lot 88 for lot 30 of the same subdivision, which was also owned by Clover, and which abutted a completed roadway. *881 An act of exchange was entered into by Reine and Clover on October 18, 1982, transferring lot 88 back to Clover and lot 30 to Reine in exchange. This act of exchange was recorded in the conveyance records of St. Tammany Parish on October 26, 1982.
Subsequent to this exchange, it was discovered that the plat numbers used to describe the subdivision in the original cash sale were wrong.[4] To remedy this error in the plat numbers used in the cash sale, Clover executed a quit claim deed with the correct plat numbers on February 10, 1983, deeding its interest in all of the property sold in the original cash sale, including lot 88, to Reine. This quit claim deed was recorded in the conveyance records of St. Tammany Parish on February 14, 1983.
Lot 88 was included in the quit claim deed because the attorney who prepared it, Neil Alford, was unaware of the exchange by Reine of lot 88 for lot 30 subsequent to the cash sale.[5] Clover and Reine only intended to correct the plat numbers in the original cash sale when they executed the quit claim deed, it was not their intention to transfer lot 88 back to Reine. In order to give effect to the intention of the parties, lot 30 should have been included in the quit claim deed instead of lot 88. Nevertheless, this was not done and after the recordation of the quit claim deed, it appeared in the public records that Clover had deeded lot 88 back to Reine.
The judgment at issue, in favor of Hollywood and against Reine, was recorded in the public records of St. Tammany Parish on April 18, 1984. It is Hollywood's contention that the recordation of this judgment at a time when Reine was the owner of record of lot 88 operates as a judicial mortgage on lot 88. Hollywood relies on the public records doctrine as support for this proposition.
An act of correction was executed by Clover and Reine on February 8, 1985, whereby lot 88 was removed from the description of property in the quit claim deed as being erroneously included therein. Lot 88 was then sold by Clover to Craftsmen on February 27, 1985. The act of correction to the quit claim deed and the cash sale of lot 88 from Clover to Craftsmen were both recorded in the conveyance records of St. Tammany Parish on March 4, 1985.
This declaratory judgment action was then brought by Craftsmen, U.S. Life, and Neil Alford to obtain relief from Hollywood's claim to a judicial mortgage on lot 88. The trial court found the facts to be as stated above and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring that lot 88 was owned by Clover when the judgment against Reine was recorded, and therefore it did not attach to, encumber, or create a judicial mortgage on lot 88. Hollywood appeals, asserting that the trial court erred as a matter of law in so holding.
II.
Hollywood does not assert that the trial court's factual findings[6] are erroneous, only that it erred as a matter of law in holding that the judgment against Reine does not act as a judicial mortgage on lot 88 since it was recorded at a time when Reine was the owner of record. Therefore, the only issue before us is whether the judicial mortgage created by the recordation of the judgment in favor of Hollywood and against Reine, attached to or encumbered lot 88, given the facts as outlined above.
*882 The law relative to judicial mortgages is set out in La.Civ.Code arts. 3321-3328. La. Civ.Code art. 3328 provides that "[t]he judicial mortgage may be enforced against all the immovables which the debtor actually owns or may subsequently acquire." According to this article, a judicial mortgage only attaches to immovable property which the judgment debtor "actually owns or may subsequently acquire."
Since the trial court found that Reine did not actually own lot 88 at the time the judgment at issue was recorded, and has not subsequently acquired it, a reading of La.Civ.Code art. 3328 would seem to indicate that the judicial mortgage created by the recordation of Hollywood's judgment did not attach to or encumber lot 88 in any way.
However, the public records doctrine, as embodied in La.Civ.Code art. 1839, La.R.S. 9:2721, La.R.S. 9:2756 and the jurisprudence interpreting these provisions, requires a different result. La.Civ.Code art. 1839 provides in part[7] that "[a] transfer of immovable property must be made by authentic act or by act under private signature.... An instrument involving immovable property shall have effect against third persons only from the time it is filed for registry in the parish where the property is located."
La.R.S. 9:2721 provides:
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
583 So. 2d 879, 1991 WL 119713, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/craftsmen-homes-v-hollywood-door-lactapp-1991.