Gordon, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
In 1962 David Lee Cradle, age seventeen, was brought before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of the City of Norfolk for a hearing on two charges of armed robbery. Cradle was not represented by counsel at the hearing, nor was he told that counsel would be appointed if he could not afford to retain counsel. After the hearing the juvenile court certified Cradle to the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk for trial as an adult on both charges. Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-176 (Repl. vol. 1960).
The grand jury returned an indictment against Cradle on each charge of armed robbery. The corporation court then appointed counsel to represent Cradle at his trial and, after hearing evidence, convicted Cradle on guilty pleas to the indictments and sentenced him to two consecutive terms of eight years each.
Cradle challenged the corporation court’s conviction order by a habeas corpus petition filed in that court in 1965. He appeals from the court’s order of January 11, 1966 denying the writ after a plenary hearing.
[1] On May 15, 1967, after oral argument of this appeal, the Supreme Court handed down Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.ed.2d 527 (1967), holding that detention by juvenile court order of a person who was not afforded the right to counsel in the juvenile court proceedings contravenes due process.1 The most [245]*245serious question now before us is whether Gault controls the decision of this case.
Gerald Gault, age fifteen, was picked up at his home on June 8, 1964, on the basis of a complaint that he had made lewd remarks to a woman by telephone. The sheriff who picked him up left no notice for the parents, who were away at work, but that night they learned Gerald was in custody and a hearing would be held in the juvenile court on June 9. On the day of the hearing a police officer filed a petition with the juvenile court, reciting only that Gerald was under eighteen years of age, in need of the protection of the court, and a delinquent minor.
Neither Gerald nor his parents were advised of his right to counsel, retained or court-appointed, and Gerald was not represented by counsel at the hearing. The court heard the evidence, comprised only of hearsay testimony about Gerald’s lewd remarks over the telephone and of Gerald’s admissions in his answers to questions put by the court. The court found Gerald was a “delinquent child” and ordered him committed to the State Detention Home during his minority, a period of about six years. (Had Gerald been an adult the maximum punishment that could have been imposed under Arizona law for malting the lewd remarks was $50 or two months imprisonment.)
No appeal being available under Arizona law, Gerald’s parents brought state habeas corpus proceedings. The state courts denied habeas corpus, but the Supreme Court reversed. It held the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment violated because: (1) neither Gerald nor his parents were given “timely notice, in advance of the hearing, of the specific issues ... [to be determined at the hearing]” (id. at 34, 87 S.Ct. at 1447, 18 L.ed.2d at 550); (2) neither Gerald nor his parents were “notified of the child’s right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or if they . . . [were] unable to afford counsel, that counsel. .. [would] be appointed to represent the child” (id. at 41, 87 S.Ct. at 1451, 18 L.ed.2d at 554); (3) Gerald was denied the right of confrontation and cross-examination, in that evidence of the alleged lewd remarks was not given by the woman to whom they were supposedly made, but by hearsay testimony of a police officer who had talked to the woman; and (4) the juvenile court elicited a confession from Gerald at the hearing without any [246]*246warning “that he was not obliged to speak and would not be penalized for remaining silent.” Id. at 44, 87 S.Ct. at 1452, 18 L.ed.2d at 555.
A
The holding in the Gault case does not control our decision of this case because of the significant difference between a confinement order and a certification order. A confinement order imposes a sentence of confinement in an institution (“however euphemistic the title, a ‘receiving home’ or an ‘industrial school’ for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time”. Application of Gault, id. at 27, 87 S.Ct. at 1443, 18 L.ed.2d at 546). A certification order transfers the case to another court for original determination whether the accused child shall be confined.
The Supreme Court held Gault’s confinement under order of the Arizona juvenile court constitutionally invalid because the order denied Gault his liberty without due process. Cradle is not confined under a juvenile court order. The Virginia juvenile court made no finding of Cradle’s innocence or guilt, only a finding that he should stand trial on the merits in another court. It therefore certified Cradle for trial as an adult in the court having jurisdiction to try the charges against him, the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk.
The intent of the Gault opinion, as we read it, is to forbid confinement under juvenile court order without due process. At first glance the Court may appear to have relied upon its recent decision in Kent v. United States, supra n.l, a certification case that upheld the right to assistance of counsel in juvenile court proceedings. But the Court had declined to decide the Kent case on constitutional grounds, saying: “The Juvenile Court Act and the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit2 provide an adequate basis for decision of this case, and we go no further.” Id. at 556, 86 S.Ct. at 1055, 16 L.ed.2d at 94. So we take the references to Kent in Gault as intended to describe the development of statutory law respecting right to counsel in juvenile court proceedings; not as intended to extend the Kent decision beyond what [247]*247it originally stood for. And we believe the Gault opinion as a whole reflects the Court’s intention to deal only with the case before it; to leave open the question whether the same constitutional rules should be made applicable to certification cases.
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of the City of Norfolk found that the evidence adduced at the hearing showed probable cause to believe Cradle had committed felonies. After receipt of the probation officer’s report concerning Cradle’s physical, mental and social condition and personality, the juvenile court determined that he should be tried as an adult—that is, he should stand trial on the merits in another court, if indicted by a grand jury. We find no denial of federal due process in the court’s making those determinations without first appointing counsel to represent Cradle.
B
[2] Even if the Gault opinion should be interpreted as making no distinction between confinement orders and certification orders, we believe the new constitutional standards laid down in Gault should be given only prospective effect.3 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.ed.2d 1199 (1967); Johnson v.
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Gordon, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
In 1962 David Lee Cradle, age seventeen, was brought before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of the City of Norfolk for a hearing on two charges of armed robbery. Cradle was not represented by counsel at the hearing, nor was he told that counsel would be appointed if he could not afford to retain counsel. After the hearing the juvenile court certified Cradle to the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk for trial as an adult on both charges. Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-176 (Repl. vol. 1960).
The grand jury returned an indictment against Cradle on each charge of armed robbery. The corporation court then appointed counsel to represent Cradle at his trial and, after hearing evidence, convicted Cradle on guilty pleas to the indictments and sentenced him to two consecutive terms of eight years each.
Cradle challenged the corporation court’s conviction order by a habeas corpus petition filed in that court in 1965. He appeals from the court’s order of January 11, 1966 denying the writ after a plenary hearing.
[1] On May 15, 1967, after oral argument of this appeal, the Supreme Court handed down Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.ed.2d 527 (1967), holding that detention by juvenile court order of a person who was not afforded the right to counsel in the juvenile court proceedings contravenes due process.1 The most [245]*245serious question now before us is whether Gault controls the decision of this case.
Gerald Gault, age fifteen, was picked up at his home on June 8, 1964, on the basis of a complaint that he had made lewd remarks to a woman by telephone. The sheriff who picked him up left no notice for the parents, who were away at work, but that night they learned Gerald was in custody and a hearing would be held in the juvenile court on June 9. On the day of the hearing a police officer filed a petition with the juvenile court, reciting only that Gerald was under eighteen years of age, in need of the protection of the court, and a delinquent minor.
Neither Gerald nor his parents were advised of his right to counsel, retained or court-appointed, and Gerald was not represented by counsel at the hearing. The court heard the evidence, comprised only of hearsay testimony about Gerald’s lewd remarks over the telephone and of Gerald’s admissions in his answers to questions put by the court. The court found Gerald was a “delinquent child” and ordered him committed to the State Detention Home during his minority, a period of about six years. (Had Gerald been an adult the maximum punishment that could have been imposed under Arizona law for malting the lewd remarks was $50 or two months imprisonment.)
No appeal being available under Arizona law, Gerald’s parents brought state habeas corpus proceedings. The state courts denied habeas corpus, but the Supreme Court reversed. It held the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment violated because: (1) neither Gerald nor his parents were given “timely notice, in advance of the hearing, of the specific issues ... [to be determined at the hearing]” (id. at 34, 87 S.Ct. at 1447, 18 L.ed.2d at 550); (2) neither Gerald nor his parents were “notified of the child’s right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or if they . . . [were] unable to afford counsel, that counsel. .. [would] be appointed to represent the child” (id. at 41, 87 S.Ct. at 1451, 18 L.ed.2d at 554); (3) Gerald was denied the right of confrontation and cross-examination, in that evidence of the alleged lewd remarks was not given by the woman to whom they were supposedly made, but by hearsay testimony of a police officer who had talked to the woman; and (4) the juvenile court elicited a confession from Gerald at the hearing without any [246]*246warning “that he was not obliged to speak and would not be penalized for remaining silent.” Id. at 44, 87 S.Ct. at 1452, 18 L.ed.2d at 555.
A
The holding in the Gault case does not control our decision of this case because of the significant difference between a confinement order and a certification order. A confinement order imposes a sentence of confinement in an institution (“however euphemistic the title, a ‘receiving home’ or an ‘industrial school’ for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time”. Application of Gault, id. at 27, 87 S.Ct. at 1443, 18 L.ed.2d at 546). A certification order transfers the case to another court for original determination whether the accused child shall be confined.
The Supreme Court held Gault’s confinement under order of the Arizona juvenile court constitutionally invalid because the order denied Gault his liberty without due process. Cradle is not confined under a juvenile court order. The Virginia juvenile court made no finding of Cradle’s innocence or guilt, only a finding that he should stand trial on the merits in another court. It therefore certified Cradle for trial as an adult in the court having jurisdiction to try the charges against him, the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk.
The intent of the Gault opinion, as we read it, is to forbid confinement under juvenile court order without due process. At first glance the Court may appear to have relied upon its recent decision in Kent v. United States, supra n.l, a certification case that upheld the right to assistance of counsel in juvenile court proceedings. But the Court had declined to decide the Kent case on constitutional grounds, saying: “The Juvenile Court Act and the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit2 provide an adequate basis for decision of this case, and we go no further.” Id. at 556, 86 S.Ct. at 1055, 16 L.ed.2d at 94. So we take the references to Kent in Gault as intended to describe the development of statutory law respecting right to counsel in juvenile court proceedings; not as intended to extend the Kent decision beyond what [247]*247it originally stood for. And we believe the Gault opinion as a whole reflects the Court’s intention to deal only with the case before it; to leave open the question whether the same constitutional rules should be made applicable to certification cases.
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of the City of Norfolk found that the evidence adduced at the hearing showed probable cause to believe Cradle had committed felonies. After receipt of the probation officer’s report concerning Cradle’s physical, mental and social condition and personality, the juvenile court determined that he should be tried as an adult—that is, he should stand trial on the merits in another court, if indicted by a grand jury. We find no denial of federal due process in the court’s making those determinations without first appointing counsel to represent Cradle.
B
[2] Even if the Gault opinion should be interpreted as making no distinction between confinement orders and certification orders, we believe the new constitutional standards laid down in Gault should be given only prospective effect.3 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.ed.2d 1199 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.ed.2d 882 (1966); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 86 S.Ct. 459, 15 L.ed.2d 453 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.ed.2d 601 (1965).
The Court in Stovall v. Denno, supra, as a summary of the rules of Johnson, Tehan and Linkletter, set forth the following criteria for determining whether a decision should be retroactive or given only prospective effect: “(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” Id. at 297, 87 S.Ct. at 1970, 18 L.ed.2d at 1203. Application of these criteria to the new standards set forth in Gault demonstrates that the standards should be given only prospective effect.
In Stovall the Court held that the new standards laid down in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.ed.2d 1149 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct.1951, 18 L.ed.2d 1178 (1967)—that the Sixth Amendment requires exclusion [248]*248of identification evidence tainted by exhibiting the accused to identifying witnesses before trial in the absence of his counsel—should be given only prospective effect. The purpose to be served by the Wade and Gilbert rules, as described in the Stovall opinion, was:
“‘The presence of counsel will significantly promote fairness at the confrontation and a full hearing at trial on the issue of identification. We have, therefore, concluded that the confrontation is a “critical stage,’ and that counsel is required at all confrontations.” 388 U.S. at 298, 87 S.Ct. at 1971, 18 L.ed.2d at 1204 (1967).
The Gault rules also have the purpose of promoting full and fair hearings.
In concluding that the intended purpose of the Wade and Gilbert rules would be better served by giving them only prospective application, the Court said in Stovall:
“It must be recognized,, however, that, unlike cases in which counsel is absent at trial or on appeal, it may confidently be assumed that confrontations for identification can be and often have been conducted in the absence of counsel with scrupulous fairness and without prejudice to the accused at trial.” Id. at 298-299, 87 S.Ct. at 1971, 18 L.ed.2d at 1204.
Juvenile court proceedings that result in confinement may be deemed the equivalent of trials. Nonetheless we believe that in the vast majority of juvenile cases conducted in the absence of counsel, proceedings have been scrupulously fair and without prejudice to the accused. We base this belief in large measure upon our conviction that juvenile court judges have conscientiously endeavored to carry out state policy of making the welfare of the child the paramount consideration.
Turning to the second criterion, we find that Virginia, like all other states of the union, had assumed for many years before the Gault decision that juvenile laws reflecting the “parens patriae” concept of juvenile justice were constitutionally adequate. Under this concept the juvenile court judge acts for the state “in loco parentis for the purpose of protecting the property interests and the person of the child.” Application of Gault, 387 U.S. at 16, 87 S.Ct. at 1438, 18 L.ed.2d at 540 (1967). The generally accepted premises for the [249]*249treatment of juveniles, formulated by early reformers of the ancient practice of treating adult and child alike in criminal trials, were described by the Supreme Court in the Gault opinion:
“The child—essentially good, as they saw it—was to be made ‘to feel that he is the object of [the State’s] care and solicitude,’ not that he was under arrest or on trial. The rules of criminal procedure were therefore altogether inapplicable. The apparent rigidities, technicalities, and harshness which they observed in both substantive and procedural criminal law were therefore to be discarded. The idea of crime and punishment was to be abandoned. The child was to be ‘treated’ and ‘rehabilitated’ and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be ‘clinical’ rather than punitive.” Id. at 15-16, 87 S.Ct. at 1437, 18 L.ed.2d at 539.
The Gault decision requires a change in this concept of juvenile proceedings as non-criminal, a change from procedures (however inadequate to meet constitutional tests as now understood) that were founded on honest concern for the welfare of the child. For example, Gault changes the juvenile’s statutory right to be represented by a probation officer or counsel as guardian ad litem if the parent or guardian is not present (Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-173 (Supp. 1966)) to a Sixth Amendment right to counsel.4 In view of the justifiable reliance on the old system by the states and their law enforcement authorities, we believe public interest dictates that the change be prospective only.
Applying the last criterion, we conclude that retroactive application of the Gault standards would have a seriously adverse effect on [250]*250the administration of justice. The Court’s statements in Stovall v. Denno, supra, are pertinent here:
“In Tehan v. Shott, supra, we thought it persuasive against retroactive application of the no-comment rule of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, that such application would have a serious impact on the six States that allowed comment on an accused’s failure to take the stand. We said, ‘To require all of those States now to void the conviction of every person who did not testify at his trial would have an impact on the administration of their criminal law so devastating as to need no elaboration.’ 382 U.S., at 419. That impact is insignificant compared to the impact to be expected from retroactivity of the Wade and Gilbert rules. At the very least, the processing of current criminal calendars would be disrupted while hearings were conducted to determine taint, if any, in identification evidence,, and whether in any event the admission of the evidence was harmless error. Doubtless, too, inquiry would be handicapped by the unavailability of witnesses and dim memories. We conclude, therefore, that the Wade and Gilbert rules should not be made retroactive.” 388 U.S. at 300, 87 S.Ct. at 1971, 18 L.ed.2d at 1205 (1967).
Retroactivity of the Gault rules would have an equally devastating impact on the administration of criminal law. Every state would be required to void the conviction of every juvenile who was not advised of his right to be represented in juvenile court proceedings by retained counsel or, if unable to afford counsel, by court-appointed counsel. Already crowded court calendars would be further burdened by habeas corpus proceedings and, where habeas corpus is successful, by retrials. Inquiry would be handicapped by the unavailability of witnesses, by dim memories, and by the inadequacy or unavailability of juvenile court records.5
II
[3] We now consider whether the due process clause of Section [251]*2518 of the Constitution of Virginia, reading “He [the accused] shall not be deprived of life or liberty, except by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers”, requires that juveniles be advised of their right to counsel,, retained or court-appointed, in juvenile court proceedings. We have held that this clause impliedly guarantees the right to counsel in felony trials. See, e.g., Watkins v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 518, 6 S.E.2d 670 (1940). But for reasons to be given we hold that it does not provide such a right in juvenile court proceedings.
As evidenced by the juvenile court statutes in effect since 1910, Virginia adhered to the “parens patriae” concept of justice for juveniles, a concept discussed in section I of this opinion. Juvenile court proceedings were not regarded as criminal trials. They were regarded either as custodial proceedings to determine the need for treatment and rehabilitation of the juvenile or as investigatory proceedings to determine whether a juvenile should be tried in another court for an aggravated offense. See Mickens v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 273, 16 S.E.2d 641 (1941).
In 1910 the General Assembly enacted a statute providing for the appointment of a probation officer to represent the juvenile’s interests in juvenile court proceedings. Va. Acts of Assembly 1910, ch. 289, at 434, 435. In 1922 the statute was changed to provide for the appointment of a probation officer or an attorney at law as guardian ad litem for the juvenile, if a parent or guardian did not attend the juvenile court hearing. Va. Acts of Assembly 1922, ch. 481, at 822. The Virginia statute in effect when Cradle was tried also permitted the appointment of a probation officer instead of an attorney as guardian ad litem, if a parent or guardian did not attend the hearing. Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-173 (Supp. 1966).
Section 8 of the Constitution of Virginia was amended and reenacted as part of the general constitutional revision in 1928 and has not been changed since 1928. Before 1928 the General Assembly did not interpret the due process clause of section 8 as requiring assistance of counsel in juvenile court proceedings. As already pointed out the General Assembly enacted a statute in 1910 permitting representation of juveniles by a probation officer; and it enacted a statute in 1922, which was still in effect in 1928, permitting representation of juveniles by a parent or guardian or, if neither was present at the hearing, by a probation officer as guardian ad litem.
In 1928 the General Assembly proposed no change in the existing [252]*252language of the due process clause of section 8, and no such change appeared in the constitutional amendment as adopted. After 1928 the General Assembly continued the statutory permission for representation of juveniles by a parent or guardian or by a probation officer.
No intent to require representation by counsel in juvenile court proceedings should therefore be inferred from the due process clause of section 8. See Roanoke v. Michael’s Bakery Corp., 180 Va. 132, 21 S.E.2d 788 (1942). The General Assembly’s practical construction of section 8, by continuing the statutory permission for the representation of juveniles by a parent or guardian or by a probation officer, confirms the absence of any such intent. See id.
Ill
We will dispose of the three remaining assignments of error in this section.
[4] On the night of Cradle’s arrest he made written confessions that he had committed the robberies with which he was charged. Counsel contends that these confessions were coerced by the police in violation of Cradle’s “rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution”.
The trial court in this proceeding (the “habeas court”) found that before the confessions were made “he [Cradle] was informed of his rights, in that he, the Petitioner, did not have to make any statement, and that if he did make a statement that it could be used for or against him in Court, and further that if he made such statement, that he could have anyone present he wanted”. The habeas court also found that the police used no threat, physical force or promise to prompt the confessions. The evidence, though conflicting, supports these findings.
We hold that the confessions meet the test of voluntariness in effect before Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.ed.2d 694 (1966). The Miranda rules are not applicable because Cradle was tried before June 13, 1966. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.ed.2d 882 (1966). Even if the new rule laid down in Gault respecting admissions by juveniles would make Cradle’s confessions constitutionally involuntary, we find the Gault [253]*253rule inapplicable for the reasons set forth in section IB of this opinion.6
[5] Next, counsel contends that the notification requirement of Code § 16.1-172 was not complied with in Cradle’s case.7 The record shows that Cradle, the illegitimate son of a deceased mother and an unknown father, lived with his grandmother. Counsel contends that the grandmother acted in place of Cradle’s parents within the meaning of Code § 16.1-172 and that this section was not complied with because she was not given notice of the hearing before the juvenile court. She did not attend the hearing and, as stated (n.7, supra), the court appointed a probation officer as guardian ad litem.
Accepting counsel’s contention that the grandmother was acting in the place of Cradle’s parents, we hold that she was given the notice required under Code § 16.1-172. The habeas court found that when Cradle was arrested, a police officer told the grandmother “he was charged with committing Robbery and would be charged with the offense and brought to trial”, and he “told her to be in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court at 10:00 o’clock the next morning.” The evidence supports that finding.
The notice given to Cradle and his grandmother apparently would not comply with the new rule laid down in Gault; but for the reasons set forth in section I of this opinion, we find the Gault rule inapplicable to Cradle’s case.
[6] Lastly, counsel contends that Cradle was denied effective assistance of counsel at his trial in the Corporation Court of the City [254]*254of Norfolk on the indictments for armed robbery. The habeas court held that Cradle “had effective and competent counsel”. It found that:
(1) Counsel was appointed one month before the trial.
(2) Counsel conferred with his client before the date of the trial, the first occasion being three days after he was appointed.
(3) Counsel “explained the seriousness of the offenses and possibilities of punishment”.
(4) Cradle advised counsel of his signed confessions, told him that no threat or promise was made by the police in order to obtain the confessions, and told him nothing “that would lead the attorney to have any doubts or to question the voluntariness of the confession [s]”.
(5) Counsel advised Cradle “concerning his rights to plead ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’, . . . [and] of his right to a trial by Judge or jury”.
(6) There was no indication Cradle was insane. He was of low intelligence and had suffered from a nervous disorder,, but told counsel the day before the trial “he had no nervous problem at this time”.
(7) Cradle entered pleas of guilty at his trial.
Because the evidence supports these findings we reject the contention that Cradle had ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial on the indictments.
Affirmed.