C.R. England, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Transp.

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: September 17, 2025
• Docket: 24-1100
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA 24-1100

Filed 17 September 2025

North Carolina Industrial Commission, No. TA-26019

C.R. ENGLAND, INC., Plaintiff,

v.

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from decision and order entered for the Full Commission

by Chairman Philip A. Baddour, III in the North Carolina Industrial Commission.

Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 August 2025.

Young Moore & Henderson, P.A., by Angela F. Craddock and David M. Duke, for plaintiff-appellee.

Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General David D. Larson, Jr., for defendant-appellant.

ARROWOOD, Judge.

North Carolina Department of Transportation (“NCDOT”) appeals from a

decision and order by the Full Commission of the North Carolina Industrial

Commission awarding C.R. England (“plaintiff”) recovery of contribution. For the

following reasons, we reverse the decision and order.

I. Factual Background

On 13 February 2014, North Carolina was under a declared state of emergency

due to Winter Storm Pax. That evening, Cardell Gayfield (“Mr. Gayfield”) was C.R. ENGLAND, INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP.

Opinion of the Court

operating a “Freightliner” bobtail tractor with no trailer on I-40W near the Wake

County/Johnston County line. Mr. Gayfield was employed by plaintiff as a driver,

and the Freightliner was registered to and owned by plaintiff. At that time, both

lanes of I-40 east of the Wake County/Johnston County line were cleared from snow

and ice. However, west of the Wake County/Johnston County line, only the left lane

and shoulder had been cleared, leaving the right lane covered in snow and ice. As

Mr. Gayfield crossed into Johnston County, he encountered the snow and ice, and his

tractor lost traction. The tractor spun and landed perpendicular to the road.

After Mr. Gayfield’s tractor lost traction, Nathaniel Williams similarly

encountered the snow and ice and lost control of his vehicle. Meanwhile, Larry

Kepley, who was driving in the left lane of I-40, saw the tractor and pulled over to

provide assistance. Both Mr. Williams and Mr. Kepley were standing outside near

the scene of the accident when they were struck and killed by another driver.

The estates of Mr. Williams and Mr. Kepley each brought a claim against

plaintiff for wrongful death on 8 February 2015 and 13 February 2015, respectively.

On 14 December 2015, plaintiff settled with Mr. Williams’ estate for $1,050,000. On

8 June 2016, plaintiff settled with Mr. Kepley’s estate for $600,000. Meanwhile, the

statute of limitations for wrongful death claims arising from the accident on

13 February 2014 expired on 13 February 2016. See N.C.G.S. § 1-53(4) (limiting

wrongful death claims to two years after the date of death). Plaintiff then filed a

Claim for Damages Under Tort Claims Act with the North Carolina Industrial

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Commission on 30 November 2016, seeking contribution from NCDOT. Plaintiff

alleged that “various named and unnamed employees of [NCDOT]” were negligent in

the design and execution of lane adjustments on I-40W, by failing to warn

approaching traffic of the dangerous conditions, and in the training, supervision, and

execution of snow removal. Plaintiff claimed that NCDOT’s negligence contributed

to the traffic accident on 13 February and that the plaintiff was therefore entitled to

recovery of contribution for the settlements with Mr. Williams’ and Mr. Kepley’s

estates.

NCDOT filed a motion to dismiss on 3 January and 5 January 2017, claiming

that plaintiff did not properly preserve its contribution claim through its settlement

agreements. The motion was denied on 28 March 2017, and NCDOT appealed the

denial to the Full Commission. On 19 April 2018, the Full Commission dismissed

NCDOT’s appeal as interlocutory and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

After a full evidentiary hearing on the merits, Chief Deputy Commissioner Howell

issued a 7 July 2023 order finding that plaintiff had not established NCDOT’s

negligence and was thus not entitled to contribution. Plaintiff appealed to the Full

Commission.

The Full Commission reversed on 23 July 2024. As a preliminary matter, the

Full Commission determined that NCDOT did not properly preserve for review the

issue of whether plaintiff’s settlements preserved its contribution claim. The Full

Commission also found that NCDOT was negligent in “fail[ing] to exercise reasonable

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care to implement reasonable training and dry run protocols for snowplow drivers

necessary for adequate maintenance of the roadways during a winter storm event.”

Lastly, because the negligent training occurred prior to the declared state of

emergency on 11 February, the Full Commission determined that Emergency

Management Act (“EMA”) immunity did not apply.

To support its finding of negligence, the Full Commission noted that while

NCDOT’s Safe Operating Procedures required operators inspecting snowplow routes

to “note or mark” hazards, it did not require them to make documentation of or

otherwise memorialize those hazards. The Full Commission found this procedure

unreasonable as the snowplow routes are long, hard to visualize during a storm, and

may not be cleared by the same operator who originally inspected the route,

increasing the possibility that hazards will be overlooked or forgotten.

NCDOT filed notice of appeal to this Court on 20 August 2024.

II. Discussion

NCDOT raises three issues on appeal: 1) whether plaintiff’s contribution claim

is barred by EMA immunity; 2) whether the Full Commission had jurisdiction to

decide whether plaintiff took the proper steps to preserve its contribution claim

against NCDOT; and 3) whether plaintiff took the proper steps to preserve its

contribution claim against NCDOT. For the following reasons, we reverse the

Commission’s order.

A. Standard of Review

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Appeals from the Industrial Commission “shall be for errors of law only under

the same terms and conditions as govern appeals in ordinary actions, and the findings

of fact of the Commission shall be conclusive if there is any competent evidence to

support them.” N.C.G.S. § 143-293 (2025). Therefore, the Court’s inquiry on appeal

is “limited to two questions: (1) whether competent evidence exists to support the

Commission’s findings of fact, and (2) whether the Commission’s findings of fact

justify its conclusions of law and decision.” Dawson v. N.C. Dep’t. of Env’t and Nat.

Res., 204 N.C. App. 524, 527 (2010). Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Shera

v. N.C. State Univ. Veterinary Teaching Hosp., 219 N.C. App. 117, 120 (2012).

B. Emergency Management Act Immunity

Plaintiff contends that EMA immunity applies only to negligence committed

“while carrying out emergency response functions during an actual or imminent

emergency.” Meanwhile, NCDOT argues that EMA immunity extends to activities

related to emergency management outside the actual occurrence or imminence of an

emergency. This issue is one of statutory interpretation and of first impression before

this Court.

“[T]he intent of the legislature controls the interpretation of a statute.” C

Investments 2, LLC v. Auger, 383 N.C. 1, 8 (2022) (quoting State v. Fletcher, 370 N.C.

313, 327–28 (2017)). The Court shall “first look to the plain language [of a statute],

as the actual words of the legislature are the clearest manifestation of its intent.”

Cohane v. Home Missioners of America, 387 N.C. 1, 7–8 (2025) (quoting Fearrington

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v. City of Greenville, 386 N.C. 38, 52 (2024)). “[W]ords and phrases are interpreted

in their statutory context, and traditional rules of grammar apply. Where the

statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, courts must construe it using its plain

meaning.” Id. (citations omitted).

The EMA operates in conjunction with sovereign immunity and the Tort

Claims Act (“TCA”). Generally, the doctrine of sovereign immunity grants the State

immunity from suit absent a waiver. Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 104 (1997). The

TCA provides such a waiver of immunity for negligence claims against the State and

any of its departments. Id.; N.C.G.S. § 143-291(a) (2025). However, the EMA

effectively retracts the TCA’s waiver and reinstates immunity from negligence claims

against the State where the State is engaged in emergency management. N.C.G.S.

§ 166A-19.60(a) (2025); Williams v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schs. Bd. of Educ., 292

N.C. App. 542, 546 (2024). The EMA provides that “[n]either the State nor any

political subdivision thereof . . . shall be liable for the death of or injury to persons, or

for damage to property as a result of any [emergency-management] activity.”

Williams, 292 N.C. App. at 546 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 166A-19.60(a)). In turn,

emergency management is defined as “measures . . . to minimize the adverse effect of

any type emergency, which includes the never-ending preparedness cycle of planning,

prevention, mitigation, warning, movement, shelter, emergency assistance, and

recovery.” N.C.G.S. § 166A-19.3(8) (2025).

For example, in Williams, this Court extended EMA immunity where a school

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bus collided with another vehicle and caused property damage while delivering food

to students during the COVID-19 pandemic. Williams, 292 N.C. App. at 546–47.

There, at the time of the collision, the bus was on its route delivering food to students.

Id. at 547. The Court reasoned that because the bus was being used for an emergency

management purpose—minimizing the adverse effects of the COVID-19 emergency

“by providing food to students who might otherwise go hungry”—at the time of the

accident, EMA immunity applied. Id.

The plain language of the EMA contemplates pre-emergency preparations and

provides immunity. N.C.G.S. § 166A-19.3(8) states that emergency management is a

“never-ending preparedness cycle” which includes “planning.” N.C.G.S. § 166A-

19.3(8) (emphasis added). The broad definition of emergency management requires

that EMA immunity encompass all stages of preparing for emergencies, including

training personnel to respond to emergencies. Limiting EMA immunity only to

actions made during an active or imminent emergency would impose an end to the

cycle of emergency management, contrary to the statute. Thus, whether EMA

immunity applies is not simply a question of timing but rather of relation to

emergency “planning, prevention, mitigation, warning, movement, shelter,

emergency assistance, and recovery.” See N.C.G.S. § 166A-19.3(8).

The negligence alleged in this case occurred in preparation of an emergency

and falls under the EMA. NCDOT’s training and adoption of snowplow operating

procedures is done in preparation for winter weather events. Indeed, the act of

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clearing roads of snow and ice is meant to “minimize the adverse effects” of a winter

storm by making the roads safer to use. Accordingly, the training of snowplow

operators is “an important function of safety” and a crucial step in planning for

emergencies. As such, though these preparations took place before the occurrence of

winter storm Pax, they are part of the emergency preparedness cycle and protected

by EMA immunity. Therefore, we find that plaintiff’s contribution claim against

NCDOT is barred by EMA immunity.

C. Preservation of Contribution Claim

NCDOT also argues that the Full Commission had jurisdiction to consider

whether plaintiff had properly preserved its contribution claim. Moreover, NCDOT

contends that plaintiff did not preserve its contribution claim because the wrongful

death settlements did not extinguish NCDOT’s liability for the deaths of Mr. Williams

and Mr. Kepley. However, because we find that plaintiff’s contribution claim is

barred by EMA immunity, we do not reach these issues.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Full Commission’s decision and order

granting recovery of contribution to C.R. England and remand to the Commission for

entrance of an Order dismissing plaintiff’s claims for contribution.

REVERSED.

Judges COLLINS and FREEMAN concur.

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