CR Bard v. Medical Components

District Court, D. Utah·Decided November 13, 2024·No. 2:17-cv-00754·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH CENTRAL DIVISION

C.R. BARD, INC.; BARD PERIPHERAL MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER VASCULAR, INC.; and BARD ACCESS DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO SYSTEMS, INC., COMPEL EXPERT REPORT DRAFT (DOC. NO. 1061), AND Plaintiffs, GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DATA SUPPORTING EXPERT v. REPORT (DOC. NO. 1064)

MEDICAL COMPONENTS, INC., Case No. 2:17-cv-00754

Defendant. District Judge Howard C. Nielson, Jr.

Magistrate Judge Daphne A. Oberg

Plaintiffs (collectively, “Bard”) have filed two motions relating to one of Defendant Medical Components’ (“MedComp”) expert reports. Bard filed a motion to compel production of a draft version of the report, seeking to evaluate whether MedComp’s counsel impermissibly prepared portions of the report.1 Bard also filed a motion to compel production of the data supporting the report, alleging MedComp failed to produce the formulas its expert used in her damages calculations.2 After holding a hearing on these motions, the court took them under advisement.3 As explained below, Bard’s motion to compel a draft version of the report is denied, because Bard provides an insufficient basis to call into question the integrity of the expert report. However,

1 (See Pls.’ Short Form Mot. to Compel Expert Rep. Draft (“Mot. to Compel Draft Rep.”) 1, Doc. No. 1061.) 2 (See Pls.’ Short Form Mot to Compel Data Supporting Damages Expert Rep. (“Mot. to Compel Data”), Doc. No. 1064.) 3 (See Min. Entry, Doc. No. 1099.) Bard’s motion to compel data supporting the report is granted, because Bard is entitled to the facts and data MedComp’s expert relied on in forming her opinion. ANALYSIS I. Bard’s motion to compel a draft version of the report is denied.

MedComp served the expert report at issue on August 6, 2024, and the report’s signature page indicates the expert signed it that same day.4 On August 4—two days before MedComp’s expert signed her report—the expert sustained a severe medical injury, which affected her ability to complete “mentally taxing or stressful events.”5 Because MedComp’s expert signed her report two days after her injury, Bard seeks production of the “operative version” of the report from before the expert’s injury, to assess “whether portions of [her] report were prepared while she was impaired.”6 While Bard acknowledges draft expert reports are typically protected work product, it contends draft reports are discoverable “when counsel is substantively involved in drafting an expert report, as appears to be the case here.”7

MedComp responds that production of the draft is unnecessary because, at the time of the expert’s injury, her report was already “substantially complete, subject to [] checking her citations for correctness, [] resolving formatting issues, and [] inserting a

4 (See Mot. to Compel Draft Rep. 1, Doc. No. 1061.) 5 (See id.; see also Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. to Compel Expert Rep. Draft (“Opp’n to Mot. to Compel Draft Rep.”) 1, Doc. No. 1079 (same).) 6 (Mot. to Compel Draft Rep. 1–2, Doc. No. 1061.) 7 (Id. at 2 (citing Gerke v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 289 F.R.D. 316, 330 (D. Or. 2013)).) Table of Contents.”8 MedComp also states the expert reviewed her report “[i]n the days and weeks following the August 6 submission of [her report] and found no substantive issues.”9 MedComp further claims that at the time of her injury, the expert “was not then aware that the extent of her injuries would require a lengthy recovery time.”10 Finally,

MedComp claims “Bard’s concern regarding [the expert’s] mental capacity on August 6 can be easily resolved through her submission of an Amended Report.”11 Under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an expert report must be “prepared and signed by the [expert] witness.”12 Draft versions of expert reports are protected by the work product doctrine.13 However, some courts have permitted discovery of draft expert reports when there is evidence an attorney drafted portions of the report or otherwise “commandeered the expert’s function.”14 Other

8 (Opp’n to Mot. to Compel Draft Rep. 1, Doc. No. 1079.) 9 (Id.) 10 (Id. (explaining MedComp did not learn until September 3 that the expert’s physician advised her to avoid “mentally taxing or stressful events,” and “MedComp’s counsel informed Bard’s counsel of this development [on] September 4”).) 11 (Id. at 2.) This amended report is the subject of MedComp’s motion for leave to serve amended report. (See Def.’s Short Form Mot. for Leave to Serve Am. Expert Rep., Doc. No. 1083.) 12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). 13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B). 14 See, e.g., Gerke, 289 F.R.D. at 328 (permitting discovery of draft expert report in light of deposition testimony and substantive inconsistencies in the report suggesting counsel authored portions of the report). courts disagree, holding Rule 26 precludes discovery of draft expert reports even if there is evidence an attorney participated in drafting the report.15 Even assuming evidence of an attorney’s participation in drafting an expert report could nullify work product protection of draft reports, Bard is not entitled to the draft it

seeks. Bard has simply not provided evidence of attorney participation. In Gerke v. Travelers Casualty Insurance Co. of America16 (the case Bard relies on), the District of Oregon permitted discovery of a draft expert report because the expert’s deposition testimony suggested counsel authored portions of the report and the report contained opinions about a truck the expert had never inspected.17 But Bard does not identify anything in MedComp’s expert’s report suggesting attorney participation in drafting the report. Indeed, when asked at the hearing whether anything in the report suggested MedComp’s counsel drafted any of it, Bard’s counsel answered “we don’t know.” Bard bases its entire argument on the fact that MedComp’s expert signed her report two days

15 See, e.g., U.S. CFTC v. Newell, 301 F.R.D. 348, 351–52 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (“respectfully disagree[ing]” with Gerke, and explaining if evidence of attorney participation could forfeit work product protection, courts would have to analyze “the degree of counsel involvement (both quantity and quality),” which “would necessarily require production of all of the drafts of the report for comparison, as well as production of all, or virtually all, communications between expert and counsel”); see also Carpenter v. Deming Surgical Assocs., No. 14-64, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201152, at *7–16 (D.N.M. Apr. 20, 2015) (unpublished) (holding communications between expert and counsel regarding a draft expert report are protected work product, despite the expert’s testimony that counsel suggested several specific edits, and finding Gerke’s reading of Rule 26 “not support[ed]” by the “Advisory Committee comments and the plain language of Rule 26(b)(4)”). 16 289 F.R.D. 316 (D. Or. 2013). 17 See id. at 328–29. after her injury.18 But without more, this does not show MedComp drafted the report or commandeered the expert’s function. Where Bard has not provided evidence of counsel participation in drafting the report, Bard’s motion is denied.19 II. Bard’s motion to compel data supporting the report is granted.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

CR Bard v. Medical Components, (D. Utah 2024).

CR Bard v. Medical Components (CR Bard v. Medical Components) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

United States v. Zolin
491 U.S. 554 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Hilt v. SFC Inc.
170 F.R.D. 182 (D. Kansas, 1997)