Coxon v. United States District Court

Opinion

1 2 3 6 7 BENJAMIN COXON, Case No. 22-cv-00867-DMR

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IFP 9 v. APPLICATION AND SCREENING COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, et § 1915(E) al., 11 Defendants. 12 Plaintiff filed an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Having 13 considered Plaintiff’s papers, the court grants the IFP application and finds that the complaint fails 14 to state a claim on which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Plaintiff must file 15 a first amended complaint that addresses the deficiencies identified in this screening order by 16 February 28, 2022. 17 I. DISCUSSION 18 A court may allow a plaintiff to prosecute an action in federal court without prepayment of 19 fees or security if the plaintiff submits an affidavit showing that he or she is unable to pay such 20 fees or provide such security. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Having evaluated Plaintiff’s financial 21 affidavit, the court finds that he has satisfied the economic eligibility requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 22 1915(a) and grants the application to proceed IFP. 23 A court is under a continuing duty, however, to dismiss a case filed without the payment of 24 the filing fee whenever it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state 25 a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 26 immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). If the court dismisses a case 27 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the plaintiff may still file the same complaint by paying the 1 filing fee. This is because the court’s section 1915(e)(2)(B) dismissal is not on the merits, but 2 rather an exercise of the court’s discretion under the IFP statute. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 3 25, 32 (1992). 4 To make the determination under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), courts assess whether there is 5 an arguable factual and legal basis for the asserted wrong, “however inartfully pleaded.” Franklin 6 v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). Courts have the authority to dismiss 7 complaints founded on “wholly fanciful” factual allegations for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 8 Id. at 1228. A court can also dismiss a complaint where it is based solely on conclusory 9 statements, naked assertions without any factual basis, or allegations that are not plausible on their 10 face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 11 93-94 (2007) (per curiam). Dismissal is proper where “no cognizable legal theory or an absence of 12 sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless 13 Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff 14 “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 15 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. 16 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than 17 those drafted by lawyers, see Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, a complaint, or portion thereof, should be 18 dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails to set forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief 19 that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007); see also Fed. 20 R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to 21 amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 22 amendment.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). 23 Plaintiff’s barebones complaint does not allege any cognizable claim for relief. Plaintiff 24 simply alleges that he was “harassed” on multiple occasions between 2011 and 2022 and petitions 25 the U.S. District Court to order that “people stop harassing the Petitioner.” Plaintiff does not offer 26 any facts about his alleged harassment, including the identity of his harassers or what they did. He 27 also does not indicate any legal authority that prohibits such harassment or on what basis the court 1 as the sole respondent in this action and not his claimed harassers. Because Plaintiff states naked 2 assertions without any plausible allegations or legal claims for relief, the court finds that complaint 3 fails to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915¢e). 4 || I. © CONCLUSION 5 For the reasons above, the court grants Plaintiff's IFP Application and finds that the 6 || complaint fails to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Plaintiff must file a first amended 7 complaint addressing the deficiencies identified in this order within two weeks—1.e., by February 8 28, 2022. If he does not file a timely first amended complaint, the court will recommend that his 9 || action be dismissed. The Case Management Conference set for May 11, 2022 is vacated and will 10 || be re-set at a later date. 11 The court refers Plaintiff to the section “Representing Yourself” on the Court’s website, 12 || located at https://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-litigants/, as well as the Court’s Legal Help Centers for 5 13 unrepresented parties. Parties may schedule an appointment by calling 415-782-8982 or emailing S 14 || fedpro@sfbar.org.

5 17 || Dated: February 14, 2022 18 _Qfim—_ onna M. Ryu 19 United States Magistrate Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28