Cox v. School Bd. of Osceola County
This text of 669 So. 2d 353 (Cox v. School Bd. of Osceola County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Manis G. COX, Appellant,
v.
SCHOOL BOARD OF OSCEOLA COUNTY, Appellee.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
*354 John Paul Parks, John F. Wendel and Charles P. Chritton, of Wendel, Chritton & Parks, Chartered, Lakeland, for Appellant.
Usher L. Brown and Mary Van Leuven, of Brown & Williams, P.A., Kissimmee, for Appellee.
GRIFFIN, Judge.
Appellant, Manis Cox ["Cox"], appeals the final order of the School Board of Osceola County ["School Board"] denying him reinstatement to his position as a lead painter. We affirm.
Manis Cox worked for the School Board on an annual contract basis for eleven years as a painter. His employment during the 1993-94 school year expired on June 30, 1994. In March, 1994, the District's director of maintenance handed Cox a letter, a copy of which was to go into his personnel file, asserting that the director had reasonable suspicions Cox had violated Board policies by engaging in drug use. The letter offered Cox three options: enroll in an assistance program, take a drug screening test or resign. Cox denied the charge and chose to take the drug test, whereupon the director withdrew that option and suggested that Cox begin the counselling program. Cox continued to deny any drug use and refused to enroll in the program. After Cox's annual contract expired on June 30, 1994, Cox was not nominated by the superintendent for reappointment for the following year.
Cox filed a grievance with the School Board, asserting that his right to privacy under the Florida Constitution had been violated. The grievance requested that the letter from the maintenance director be removed from his employee file and that he be reinstated. The School Board conducted a hearing, on the third day of which the superintendent essentially conceded a lack of reasonable suspicion that Cox had engaged in drug use and agreed to remove the letter from Cox's employee file. The Board also issued an order concluding that the School Board's policy had not been appropriately implemented with respect to Cox, adding that no finding was made that Cox used illegal drugs. The Board ordered that all documents relating to Cox's grievance be kept in a file separate from Cox's standard employee file.
The School Board then conducted a hearing on whether it had the authority to reinstate Cox as a painter. After considering Cox's memorandum of law and the advice of its attorney, the Board concluded that under sections 230.23(5)(a) and 230.33(7)(a), Florida Statutes (1993),[1] the Board lacked authority *355 to reinstate Cox as a painter because the superintendent had refused to nominate him. The Board accordingly rendered the appealed order refusing reinstatement.
Cox claims that the superintendent's decision not to renominate him for a position with the District was tainted by an unconstitutional purpose, namely retaliation for his reaction to the director's unwarranted attempt to intrude upon his fundamental right to privacy. Cox contends that the superintendent should not be allowed to exercise his power in an unconstitutional manner to decline renominating an employee and that the law should be extended to allow (and, thus, presumably require) the School Board to remedy such conduct by the superintendent by hiring the unnominated employee. Although the School Board appeared sympathetic to Cox,[2] it concluded that it did not have the statutory authority to grant such relief.
District school boards are constitutional entities that are instructed to "operate, control, and supervise all free public schools in their respective districts and may exercise any power except as expressly prohibited by the State Constitution or general law." § 230.03(2), Fla.Stat. (1993). The legislature has specifically outlined the procedure by which school district employees are appointed to their positions: the superintendent of the school district is to submit written nominations of persons to fill employee positions, and the school board is to act upon those recommendations by appointing the nominees or rejecting them for good cause. §§ 230.23(5)(a), .33(7)(a). Section 230.23(5)(a) further provides the limited exceptions: "If the third nomination by the superintendent for any position is rejected for good cause, if the superintendent fails to submit a nomination for initial employment within a reasonable time as prescribed by the school board, or if the superintendent fails to submit a nomination for reemployment within the time prescribed by law, the school board may proceed on its own motion to fill such position."
Cox offers that a superintendent's decision not to renominate a current employee amounts to a recommendation against reappointment, and that the School Board is obliged to act upon this negative recommendation by conducting the same "good cause" examination it would undertake with ordinary, affirmative recommendations. Cox relies for this proposition principally on the First District Court of Appeal's decision in Columbia County Bd. of Public Instruction v. Public Employees Relations Comm'n, 353 So.2d 127 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert. den., 357 So.2d 185 (Fla.1978). In Columbia County, a school superintendent recommended to the school board that a nontenured mechanic not be rehired and that his job be eliminated. The board accepted the recommendation. The Public Employees Relations Commission [PERC] found that the superintendent's recommendation was improperly motivated by *356 disapproval of the employee's union activities and ordered him reinstated. On appeal by the board, the First District noted:
Sec. 230.23(5)(b), Fla.Stat. (1975) requires school boards to accept the recommendations of the superintendent concerning employment of noninstructional personnel unless the school board has good cause to reject a recommendation. In this case the Board had notice of cause to rejector at least to investigate the motive behindthe recommendation that Adams not be rehired, because prior to the Board meeting at which that recommendation was approved Adams' employee organization filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging superintendent Phillips told Adams he would be fired if he continued his union organizational activities.
Id. at 130 n. 5 (emphasis in original). The nonrenewed employee was reinstated to his position.
Columbia County differs from the present case in several respects: first, no union contract or unfair labor practice is involved here and there is no PERC order of reinstatement. Moreover, the statute that was controlling in Columbia County read:
[T]he school board must consider the recommendations or nominations of the superintendent submitted as prescribed by law and may not reject such recommendations or nominations except for good cause, and when such rejection is made a second and if necessary a third recommendation or nomination shall be requested and if made within a reasonable time as prescribed by the school board shall be considered or acted upon as prescribed by law; provided, that if the superintendent shall fail to submit his recommendations as prescribed by law or within a reasonable time as prescribed by the school board, the board shall have the right to nominate or to appoint on its own motion.
§ 230.23(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1975) (emphasis added). Under that statute, the school board accepted or rejected recommendations or nominations, while the statute now directs the board to accept or reject employees nominated.
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669 So. 2d 353, 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 2466, 1996 WL 111765, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cox-v-school-bd-of-osceola-county-fladistctapp-1996.