Cox v. Rabaud's Syndics

2 Mart. 11
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedDecember 15, 1815
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 2 Mart. 11 (Cox v. Rabaud's Syndics) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cox v. Rabaud's Syndics, 2 Mart. 11 (La. 1815).

Opinion

Martin, J.

delivered the opinion of the court. On the 29th of June, 1811, Cox (the plaintiff below, now the appellant and appellee) and Bartlett, were partners in trade, under the firm of Bartlett & Cox; and Cox was also the attorney in fact of Bartlett. The firm owned two undivided thirds of a rope-walk; the remaining third was the property of Hellen & Wederstrand. [12]*12Bartlett & Cox sold one of their thirds to Rabaud for $14,151, payable $5,000 down, $5,000 in one, and $4,151 in two years.

East’n. District. Dec. 1815.

On the same day, the vendors and vendee came to an agreement, evidenced by a notarial act, by which the latter (in order to afford to the former the facility of obtaining the amount of the deferred instalments) bound himself to furnish, on request, his note or notes to the amount of $5,000, or any sum under, payable at 60 days, to the order of the vendors, to be discounted at the bank; and at the maturity of such note, or notes, to furnish another or others, of the same amount, to be discounted, in order to take up the first; and so on at the end of every 60th day, until the 29th of June, 1812, when the whole sum of $5,000 was to be paid. A like provision was made in respect to the last instalment.

Rabaud took charge of the rope-walk, carrying on its affairs, for the benefit of all parties, until his death, which happened on the 15th of May, 1813.

Bartlett & Cox and Hellen & Wederstrand, respectively opened accounts with Rabaud.

The first item to the debit of Rabaud, in his account with Bartlett & Cox, is a sum of $14,151, the purchase money aforesaid, and credit is given him for the first payment, viz. $4,000 in cash [13]*13and $1,000 in a note; and farther, for a note of $5,000, the amount of the second payment, anticipated according to agreement: and on the 29th of June, 1812, credit was given him for a note of $4,151.

Rabaud, from this time till his death, supplied Bartlett & Cox with his notes according to the agreement, and also with other notes and drafts of his and other persons to a considerable amount, and Bartlett & Cox supplied him with provisions, yarns, money and other articles, for the use of the rope-walk, to the amount of upwards of $40,000.

After the death of Rabaud, the business of the walk was conducted as before, by his widow until the first of January, 1814, when a balance of $6,873 85 was struck in favor of Bartlett & Cox.

The amount of the accommodation paper given by Rabaud was intermingled with the proceeds of other paper furnished by him, and the whole was indistinctly carried to his credit, and applied by Bartlett & Cox, in their account, to the discharge of the purchase money and of the supplies made to him in cash, provisions, yarns, &c. for the use of the rope-walk.

Rabaud’s widow renounced to the community.

The present suit was instituted for the [14]*14recovery of the aforesaid balance, with a privilege, lien or mortgage on Rabaud’s part of the ropewalk. Judgment was obtaind for the whole sum, but the privilege, lien or mortgage, was confined to that of 4,151 dollars.

From this judgment, both parties have appealed; the plaintiff contending that the whole is a privileged debt; the defendants, that no part of it is so.

The amount is not contested.

During the trial below, the plaintiff produced ten notes of Mde. Rabaud, given for the use of the estate, protested and remaining in his hands; eight of which bear date of the latter part of the month of May, 1813, and amount together to the sum of 5,350 dollars; one of the 9th of June for 1,000 dollars, and one of the 16th of June for 550 dollars; all at 60 days; the aggregate amount 6,850 dollars.

The defendants, on their part, showed that the renewing notes, according to the agreement and the routine of bank business, as far as related to the note for 4,151 dollars, should have different dates; and they produced and spread on the record copies of sundry notes discounted in bank, subscribed by Rabaud, of dates and amounts corresponding with those of the origin[15]*15al note. Some of these notes were endorsed by Bartlett & Cox. They also spread on the record copies of a number of checks of corresponding amounts and dates, with which they contended the accommodation paper was taken up.

On these facts, the only question for the solution of which this court is resorted to, is, whether the plaintiff’s claim be in the whole or part a privileged one, or any thing more than a simple debt.

If we examine only the account current, which makes part of the statement of facts, it is clear that the plaintiff can have no benefit from his mortgage; for, striking a balance on the first of July, 1813, when the firm received a large payment, they are debtors, after being paid for the rope-walk, of the sum of $2239 02. The period, taken for striking this balance, is only two days after the last portion of the price of the rope-walk became due.

But, besides the deed of sale and the account current, there is another instrument which it is proper to look into. This is the notarial act by which a facility is secured to the plaintiff—the demand of Rabaud’s notes for the two deferred instalments, in order to obtain money thereon by anticipation—and afterwards of other notes to [16]*16renew the former ones from 60 to 60 days, as they became payable.

The effect, on the mortgage, of the facility, which it appears from the account current was thus afforded, by two notes received by the plaintiff (the first of 5,000 dollars, the other for 4,151 dollars) must be ascertained.

The notes certainly did not extinguish the mortgage; for, if either the original notes, or any of those subsequently given for the renewal of them, was unpaid at maturity in the hands of the plaintiff, he might resort to his mortgage. But this transaction, although it did not extinguish the mortgage, did certainly affect it. For, even

if the plaintiff had on the day any of the instalments became payable, applied to a judge for an order of seizure, if the whole transaction was disclosed in the petition, he would have with holden his flat, if the notes were not tacked to the petition, until they were satisfactorily accounted for: and if, for want of this information, the order of seizure had been obtained, its execution would have been suspended on the facts being properly suggested by the vendee.

The plaintiff could not have offered the absence of the notes from the possession of the maker, as evidence of their being unpaid and consequently no obstacle to his demand. For it [17]*17would not suffice for him to shew that the maker had not paid; he must have gone farther (as the notes were negociable) and have shewn that he was still holder of them.

We are, therefore, of opinion, that the plaintiff cannot avail himself of his mortgage, unless he shew that he still holds the original notes, or either of them, or any other clearly proven to be given for the renewal of the original.

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Bluebook (online)
2 Mart. 11, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cox-v-rabauds-syndics-la-1815.