Cox v. Caldwell.

197 So. 167, 1940 La. App. LEXIS 162
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 3, 1940
DocketNo. 6111.
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 197 So. 167 (Cox v. Caldwell.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cox v. Caldwell., 197 So. 167, 1940 La. App. LEXIS 162 (La. Ct. App. 1940).

Opinion

TALIAFERRO, Judge.

On April 2, 1937, Mrs. Kate T. Campbell and her husband, W. B. Campbell, specially mortgaged to Mrs. Gladys Caldwell, to secure payment of a declared indebtedness of six hundred seventy ($670) dollars, evidenced by their note, the south one-half (S %) of a small lot of land measuring two hundred twenty-one (221) feet north and south by one hundred seventy-eight (178) feet east and west in the northeast one-quarter (NEJ4) of the northwest one-quarter (NW Vi), Sec. thirty-one (31), Twp. fifteen north (15 N.), range three west (3 W) in Jackson Parish. Hereinafter this property will be referred to as the lot: The mortgage note was pledged to the Jackson Parish Bank of Jonesboro by Mrs. Caldwell, as collateral security to her open notes. The separate and parapher-nal character of this' mortgage note, as an asset of Mrs. Caldwell, or whether it belongs to the community of acquets and gains between her and her husband are the embattled questions herein.

On January 20, 1931, judgment for ninety-six and S7/ioo ($96.57) dollars and interest was rendered by the district court of Jackson Parish against D. E. Caldwell, husband of Mrs. Gladys Caldwell, in favor of Jonesboro Hardware & Furniture Company, Inc., which was thereafter assigned to J. E. Cox, plaintiff herein. Cox caused execution to issue on the judgment and sued out garnishment process. The said bank and Mrs. Campbell were cited and served as garnishees. The customary formal, interrogatories were propounded to each. Seizure of the mortgage note was made in the manner and form usual in such a case.

The bank admits holding the mortgage note in pledge to Mrs. Caldwell’s open notes on which there is (or was) a balance due of fifty-one ($51) dollars; that four hundred sixty ($460) dollars had been paid on the mortgage note. It disclaimed knowledge as to whether the mortgage note is the separate and paraphernal property of Mrs. Caldwell or an asset of the community of acquets and gains existing between her and her husband.

Mrs. Campbell likewise denies knowledge of the ownership of said mortgage note and admits that she owes thereon approximately two hundred ($200.00) dollars, the exact balance being a matter of record in said bank; and avers that she is able and willing to pay said balance (after the bank is paid the amount due it) to the person or persons adjudged to be entitled to the same, provided said judgment, if decreed an encumbrance on said lot, is canceled from the records.

Plaintiff moved to traverse the answers of the garnishees on the ground that the same, although unintentionally so, were false and evasive. The community character of the mortgage note was affirmatively alleged and its liability for payment of the judgment against Caldwell asserted. The various transfers and instruments of record, affecting said lot, to and from Mrs. Caldwell, employed as a basis for said conclusions, are specifically enumerated and described. We omit further discussion of said instruments and transfers for the immediate present as they will be hereinafter discussed in detail and their effect upon the parties’ contentions, respectively, determined.

Mrs. Gladys Caldwell filed intervention and third opposition wherein she set up ownership of the mortgage note of six hundred seventy ($670) dollars, subject to the pledge to the bank and payments thereon made. She alleged that said mortgage note was her separate and paraphernal property which was received by her from sale of certain real estate in Jackson Parish, not described. She also denies that the note is an asset of the community of acquets and gains between her and her husband, and, therefore, avers that it may not be subjected to the payment of his or the community’s obligations. She prayed that her ownership of the mortgage note be recognized; that the seizure thereof be set aside and that the garnishment proceedings *169 be dismissed. In the alternative, should it be held that “the property was not purchased as alleged herein, that the same be held to be a donation from her father, R. L. Hardy, and as such, the proceeds from the sale of the property, together with the note, be decreed and hereby exempted from seizure on the judgment out of which this suit arose.”

Plaintiff, the sheriff, the bank and Mrs. Campbell were made parties to the intervention and third opposition.

Plaintiff excepted in limine to the petition of intervention as disclosing neither a cause nor a right of action, and then answered. The exception was not passed on specifically. It is urged here, but as the case is with plaintiff on the merits, we omit passing on it. The answer is a categorical denial of all of the allegations advanced by intervenor to support her alleged separate ownership of the mortgage note, and, in addition, to negative said asserted ownership, and to sustain the position that the note is a community asset, plaintiff sets up and pleads the transfers and instruments alleged upon in the rule to traverse.

Neither the bank, Mrs. Campbell nor the sheriff answered the intervention.

The answers of the bank and of Mrs. Campbell to the rule to traverse are in substance the same as given by them to the interrogatories propounded to them as garnishees.

Mrs. Caldwell’s answer to the rule to traverse is a general denial, coupled with a reiteration of her contention that the mortgage note belongs to her individually as a result and effect of the same transfers and instruments plaintiff claims establish the community character thereof.

The rule to traverse and the intervention were tried together. Plaintiff’s demands were rejected and his suit dismissed. The mortgage note was decreed to be the separate and paraphernal property of Mrs. Caldwell and the garnishees were relieved from further answering. Plaintiff prosecutes appeal.

The transfers and other instruments of record upon which plaintiff and Mrs. Caldwell depend, in whole or part, to succeed herein, are as follows:

1.On May 28, 1925, Mrs. Caldwell and her father, R. L. Hardy, executed a notarial act of exchange whereby she released and transferred unto him her entire interest in her deceased mother’s estate in consideration of the -transfer to her of the above described lot.

2. On January 29, 1930, Mrs. Caldwell' sold said lot to her father for six hundred ($600) dollars cash.

3. On February 17, 1930, R. L. Hardy reconveyed, by act under private signature, the property to Mrs. Caldwell for the expressed consideration of two hundred ($200) dollars cash ajtd: “* * * further consideration of the love and affection that I have for my daughter, Mrs. Gladys (Hardy) Caldwell, wishing to provide a 'homestead for her and her children, the' same not ever to be mortgaged in any way that would deprive her and her heirs to forever claim as homestead for themselves.”

This instrument was not filed for registry until May 16, 1935.

4. On February 8, 1937, R. L. Hardy executed unto Mrs. Caldwell an instrument, confirmatory in character, wherein reference is made to the reconveyance to Mrs.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Succession of Pittman
282 So. 2d 799 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1973)
Britt v. Tisby
164 So. 2d 395 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1964)
Bailey v. Alice C. Plantation & Refinery Inc.
152 So. 2d 336 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1963)
Higginbotham v. Anders
69 So. 2d 107 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1953)
Succession of Tullier
53 So. 2d 455 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1951)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
197 So. 167, 1940 La. App. LEXIS 162, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cox-v-caldwell-lactapp-1940.