Cox Cable Tucson, Inc. v. David Ladd

795 F.2d 1479, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 586, 60 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1642, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 28504
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedAugust 1, 1986
Docket85-2427
StatusPublished

This text of 795 F.2d 1479 (Cox Cable Tucson, Inc. v. David Ladd) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cox Cable Tucson, Inc. v. David Ladd, 795 F.2d 1479, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 586, 60 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1642, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 28504 (9th Cir. 1986).

Opinion

795 F.2d 1479

230 U.S.P.Q. 586, 1986 Copr.L.Dec. P 25,974

COX CABLE TUCSON, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
David LADD, in his official capacity as Register of
Copyrights, the Copyright Office, and United
States of America, Defendants-Appellees,
and
Major League Baseball, Motion Picture Association of
America, National Collegiate Athletic Association, National
Basketball Association & North American Soccer League, and
National Hockey League, Intervenors-Appellees.

No. 85-2427.

United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 13, 1986.
Decided Aug. 1, 1986.

Brent N. Rushforth, R. Bruce Beckner, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellant.

Thomas J. Byrnes, Dept. of Justice, Arthur Scheiner, Dennis Lane, Washington, D.C., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.

Before ALARCON and WIGGINS, Circuit Judges, and STEPHENS,* District Judge.

OPINION

ALARCON, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-appellant Cox Cable Tucson, Inc. (hereinafter Cox), the owner and licensed operator of a cable television system servicing Tucson, Arizona, sued defendants-appellees David Ladd (Register of Copyrights), the Copyright Office, and the United States of America (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Copyright Office) in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona on July 13, 1984. Cox sought a declaration that a regulation issued June 29, 1984 by the Copyright Office, 37 C.F.R. Sec. 201.17(h)(9) (hereinafter the Regulation), is void as contrary to law. The Regulation concerns copyright royalty payments paid by cable television systems for distant broadcast television signals substituted for grandfathered distant signals. Cox hoped to avoid a higher royalty payment for three of its five signals by having the Regulation struck down.

On February 11, 1985, Cox filed a motion for summary judgment. The Copyright Office opposed Cox's motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On May 13, 1985, defendants-intervenors-appellees the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, the National Collegiate Athletic Association, and the National Hockey League (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Program Suppliers) intervened in the action, opposed Cox's motion, and filed their own joint summary judgment motion. The Program Suppliers argued, inter alia, that Cox lacked standing to challenge the Regulation because it had not shown it was within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the Regulation. On July 11, 1985, the district court rejected the Program Suppliers' argument and found that Cox Cable had standing to pursue its action. The district court then denied Cox's summary judgment motion and granted the motion of the Copyright Office upholding the validity of the Regulation. Cox appeals.

We conclude that Cox lacks standing to challenge the Regulation. The challenged regulation concerns grandfathered signals. Cox has never provided the evidence necessary to establish that its signals were properly authorized or grandfathered. Because Cox has failed to show that it is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated" by the Regulation, Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54, 90 S.Ct. 827, 829-30, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970), we reverse the summary judgment and remand to the district court with directions to dismiss the action for lack of standing.

I. FACTS

A. Historical Background of the Regulation

The cable television industry has grown rapidly since the first commercial systems were established in 1950. See generally United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 88 S.Ct. 1994, 20 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1968). A major use of cable technology "has been the retransmission of broadcast signals to areas beyond the reach of conventional 'over the air' facilities." National Cable Television Association, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 724 F.2d 176, 179 (D.C.Cir.1983) (hereinafter NCTA ). This retransmission is known as distant signal retransmission. The Copyright Act of 1909, as construed by the Supreme Court, contained no provision for cable operators' copyright liability for distant signal retransmission. Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 94 S.Ct. 1129, 39 L.Ed.2d 415 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 88 S.Ct. 2084, 20 L.Ed.2d 1176 (1968).

Prior to 1966, the Federal Communications Commission (hereinafter FCC) did not regulate cable systems. In response to the continued growth of the cable industry, the FCC in 1966 adopted rules and regulations that permitted the carriage of distant signals only if such carriage was shown to be in the public interest. First Report & Order in Docket Nos. 14895 & 15233, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965); 47 C.F.R. Sec. 74.1107(a) (1966). The 1966 rules contained a grandfathering provision which permitted the continued carriage of distant signals that had been carried prior to the effective date of the rules (March 5, 1966). 47 C.F.R. Sec. 74.1105(d), 74.1107(d) (1966).

In 1972, the FCC amended its regulations in several significant respects and promulgated distant signal and syndicated program exclusivity rules. Cable Television Report & Order in Docket Nos. 18397, 18397-A, 18373, 18416, 18892 & 18894, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972). The distant signal rules restricted the number of distant broadcast signals a cable system was permitted to carry; the limit varied according to the size and signal density of the market within which the cable system operated.1 Id. at 177-78; NCTA, 724 F.2d at 180. Like the 1966 rules, the 1972 rules contained a grandfathering provision which permitted the continued carriage of distant signals that had been carried prior to March 31, 1972. 47 C.F.R. Sec. 76.65 (1972).2

In 1976, Congress decided to create a form of copyright liability for cable operators and established a cable compulsory license scheme. 17 U.S.C. Sec. 111(d) (1976). The compulsory license scheme permitted licensed cable operators to carry whatever television programming the FCC rules permitted without negotiating with the copyright owner and without incurring liability for copyright infringement. In exchange for this privilege, however, Congress required cable operators to pay royalties for carriage of distant broadcast stations' non-network programming. 17 U.S.C. Secs.

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795 F.2d 1479, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 586, 60 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1642, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 28504, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cox-cable-tucson-inc-v-david-ladd-ca9-1986.