Cowhig

Court of Claims

Cowhig

652 F.2d 69, 226 Ct. Cl. 715, 1981 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 119

CourtUnited States Court of Claims

DecidedFebruary 27, 1981

DocketNo. 427-80C

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 652 F.2d 69 (Cowhig) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Cowhig, 652 F.2d 69, 226 Ct. Cl. 715, 1981 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 119 (cc 1981).

Pincite

Opinion

This action is before the court on defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiffs claim is barred by the statute of limitations, or in the alternative for summary judgment on the ground that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Plaintiff has not responded to this motion.

Plaintiff, Edward D. Cowhig, is a Roman Catholic priest. He was discharged from the Army Chaplain Corps on January 22, 1962, following his voluntary resignation. He now seeks to have that discharge declared null and void and requests that this court remand the action to the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records and direct the board to expunge his records. Plaintiff also seeks money damages in an unspecified amount.

All claims brought against the United States must be commenced within six years after the right of action first accrues or they are barred. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1976). A claim for active duty pay accrues upon the discharge of the member from the service. Kirby v. United States, 201 Ct.Cl. 527, 531 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 919 (1974). Since this action was not brought until 18 % years after discharge and the right of action accrued, it is barred by the statute of limitations. We need not address other defenses raised by the government or the merits of the cause of action.

[716]*716it is therefore ordered, that defendant’s motion to dismiss be and the same is granted, plaintiffs petition is dismissed.

Plaintiffs motion to revoke the order of dismissal, etc. was denied April 3,1981.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

This action is before the court on defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiffs claim is barred by the statute of limitations, or in the alternative for summary judgment on the ground that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Plaintiff has not responded to this motion.

Plaintiff, Edward D. Cowhig, is a Roman Catholic priest. He was discharged from the Army Chaplain Corps on January 22, 1962, following his voluntary resignation. He now seeks to have that discharge declared null and void and requests that this court remand the action to the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records and direct the board to expunge his records. Plaintiff also seeks money damages in an unspecified amount.

All claims brought against the United States must be commenced within six years after the right of action first accrues or they are barred. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1976). A claim for active duty pay accrues upon the discharge of the member from the service. Kirby v. United States, 201 Ct.Cl. 527, 531 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 919 (1974). Since this action was not brought until 18 % years after discharge and the right of action accrued, it is barred by the statute of limitations. We need not address other defenses raised by the government or the merits of the cause of action.

[716]*716it is therefore ordered, that defendant’s motion to dismiss be and the same is granted, plaintiffs petition is dismissed.

Plaintiffs motion to revoke the order of dismissal, etc. was denied April 3,1981.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

652 F.2d 69, 226 Ct. Cl. 715, 1981 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 119, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cowhig-cc-1981.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack