Cowen v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co.

214 F. 806, 1914 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1845
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedJune 13, 1914
DocketNo. 454
StatusPublished

This text of 214 F. 806 (Cowen v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cowen v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 214 F. 806, 1914 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1845 (D. Mass. 1914).

Opinion

DODGE, Circuit Judge.

This bill is brought by the present owner of United States patents 642,813 and 642,814, issued February 6, 1900, to Robert Cowen. The first patent is for an apparatus for cleaning rubber; the second for a process of cleaning rubber. The plaintiff is Cowen’-s widow and holds the patent by assignment from his administrator. She alleges infringement by the defendant of both patents. The defendant denies the validity of both.

It appeared from the plaintiff’s uncontradicted evidence that before and at the time of his application, and from then until his death in 1902, Cowen was in the defendant’s employ as its superintendent; that during the same period a process and apparatus for straining rubber, and said to have been patented by him, were introduced and used in •the defendant’s factory; and that the same process and apparatus for carrying it into effect have ever since been so used by it, without license or permission from Cowen or his representatives, or the payment of any royalty to him or them, so far as shown. Nor does any transfer of Cowen’s rights in the inventions claimed, nor any contract regarding the patents between him and the defendant, appear to have been made. The defendant does not contend that it acquired any rights [807]*807in his alleged inventions merely by virtue of the fact that he was in its employ as above.

The following statements are made in both patents:

“As is well known, rubber, whether it be the raw material or shoddy, etc., which it is desired to work over again is usually more or less filled with foreign substances, such as bark, dirt, pieces of wood, stones, etc., in the case of the raw rubber, and nails, pieces of buckles, straps, cloth, and various other foreign substances in the case of shoddy, etc. Heretofore the rubber has been cleansed of ’these foreign materials in various ways, the details' of which it is not necessary to set forth herein further than to say that sometimes the rubber mass has been ground and dried and subjected to a blower which would separate the parts by gravity, and the metallic parts have been removed by being passed in front of magnets, while also the fibrous foreign matter has been removed by being eaten away by sulphuric acid. All the methods mentioned have, however, more or less objectionable features and are also tedious and expensive, and accordingly I have invented the hereindescribed apparatus, which accomplishes the desired object quickly and thoroughly and does it in a simple manner and at slight expense.
“Stated in general terms, my invention consists in means for reducing the rubber (whether in the form of raw or shoddy rubber or otherwise) to a plastic or partially-fiuid condition and then straining it, thereby separating the foreign substances (nails, strings, bits of leather, bark, etc.) mechanically without in any wise deteriorating or damaging the rubber.”

The plaintiff’s uncontradicted evidence at the hearing was that prior to the filing of Cowen’s application on April 1, 1899, the method used in the defendant’s and in other rubber factories for removing foreign matter from the rubber was to reduce it, whether old rubber, scrap, or shoddy, to small pieces; to treat it in that condition with acid, thereby destroying any wood, bark, or fiber contained in it; and then to pass it in a series of rifles with water running through it, through or'over magnets which detained any brass, steel, or iron particles. It was then devulcanized by heating until soft enough to work. This testimony supplemented the above statements quoted from the patents, without materially varying from them, except perhaps in one particular. According to the testimony, the patented process takes longer than the methods previously followed, but is superior, in removing a)l foreign matter, whether metallic or not, more thoroughly and completely.

[1] It will be convenient to consider the process patent first (No. 644814). The general terms in which the alleged invention is described have been quoted above. The patent has three claims: The first for reducing rubber to a plastic condition, then straining it under pressure; the second for reducing it to a plastic condition by heating and then straining it under pressure; the third for first macerating it, then reducing it to a plastic condition by heating, and then straining it under pressure..

By “plastic,” it would seem from the quotation above made, is also to be understood “partially fluid.” Later the patentee states that in carrying out his invention he first makes the rubber “plastic or sufficiently fluid to flow under pressure.” And still later, in describing his machine (which he does in both patents), it is stated that, when it reaches the strainers after being heated, the rubber is “plastic like dough, just enough not to be inconveniently sticky.”

[808]*808The patentee, as has appeared, does not limit himself to any particular method of reducing the rubber to the plastic condition. Nor does he limit himself even to rubber; on the contrary, he expressly says that he intends to “include thereby any similar or analogous substance requiring substantially similar cleaning.” And he does this because, as he states:

“I regard it as broadly new to clarify rubber by forcing it in a plastic condition, as described, through mechanical strainers, and accordingly I do not intend to limit my invention to any details otherwise than as expressed in the claims.”

That there was nothing broadly new in removing foreign matter from a fluid or plastic substance by straining, I take to be of common knowledge. That there was anything broadly new in doing the same thing by forcing the fluid or plastic substance to be cleaned through mechanical strainers would be in any case hard to believe; but that there was not seems to me sufficiently shown by United States patents 4,676 to Miller & -Roller, July 31, 1846; 73,921 to Norton, January 28, 1868; and 138,824 to Thompson, May 13, 1873 — upon which the defendant relies. Bach of the three covers a machine for forcing clay in a plastic state through a strainer, and in each the object or one of the objects to be attained was to remove foreign matter from the clay. If it'was old thus to clean other plastic substances, I do not see how it can be said that there was invention in using the same method to clean rubber or substances similar or analogous thereto. Nothing new in principle or function is involved, and no object or result which can properly be called new is attained. Cowen does not and could not claim to have discovered either that rubber could be made fluid or plastic enough to be strained, nor- how to make it so, whether by heat or otherwise; any more than he could claim to have discovered how to macerate it. For the purposes of his process patent, I must regard the rubber, or the similar or analogous substances referred to in it, merely as substances capable of being made fluid or plastic enough to be strained. No difficulty in straining, peculiar to them, is shown. Notwithstanding the presumption from the grant of this patent, I must hold it void as disclosing no patentable invention.

[2] It follows that the remaining patent, No. 642,813, covering Co'wen’s apparatus, does not describe a machine effecting any broadly new result, but is to be considered merely as a machine for mechanically straining rubber or other substances which are or can be made sufficiently plastic.

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214 F. 806, 1914 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1845, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cowen-v-boston-woven-hose-rubber-co-mad-1914.