Cowell v. Patterson
Opinion
We infer that the judge who acted upon the petitioner’s application refused to allow him to introduce testimony upon the ground that he waived the preliminary examination. Without stopping to inquire whether it was properly shown to the judge that such examination was waived, we have to say that, if waived, we think it should not preclude the petitioner from a hearing upon testimony in the proceeding upon habeas corpus. It is true that section 3482 provides for tendering an issue as to the sufficiency of the testimony to justify the action of the committing magistrate. Now, if the petitioner admitted, by his waiver, that the testimony, if taken, would be sufficient, it might seem that he should not afterward be heard to aver to the contrary. But the same section provides that [517] other testimony may be produced. So the real question to be tried is as to whether the petitioner ought to be held, in view of all the testimony that may be produced; and it is clear that the petitioner should he discharged, in view of such testimony, if it appeared that he ought not to he held, even if the testimony taken simply before the magistrate showed otherwise. The presumption against him arising from a waiver ought not to be stronger than in such a case. We think, therefore, that the judge erred in refusing to hear testimony.
Reversed.
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49 Iowa 514 (Cowell v. Patterson) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.