Covington Ex Rel. Estate of Garnes v. MCIC, Inc.

627 F. App'x 268

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: January 5, 2016
• Docket: 14-2055
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

The estate of Otis Games, along with his eight surviving children, appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants MCIC Inc. (“MCIC”), General Electric Corporation (“GE”), Wallace and Gale Asbestos Settlement Trust (“Wallace and Gale”), SB Decking Inc. (“SB Decking”), and Wayne Manufacturing Company (“Wayne”). Finding no reversible error, we affirm,

Otis Games died of lung cancer in 2005 at the age of 88. In 2008, the appellants filed this wrongful death suit in Maryland state court against 63 companies, alleging that Games’ lung cancer was caused in part by exposure to asbestos-containing products sold or installed by those companies. The case was removed to federal court.' Over time, the appellants voluntarily dismissed or consented to summary judgment for 58 defendants, leaving only the five appellees. The district court granted summary judgment for each of the five appellees.

Federal Civil Procedure Rule 56(a) provides that the district court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” On a motion for summary judgment, we view “all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of America, 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir.2012). We review a summary judgment order de novo. Lee Graham Shopping Ctr., LLC v. Estate of Kirsch, 777 F.3d 678, 681 (4th Cir.2015).

The district court held that the appellants failed to provide evidence of exposure to any products manufactured or installed by MCIC, Wallace and Gale, SB Decking, or GE sufficient to meet the “frequency, regularity, and proximity” test for substantial-factor causation in Maryland negligence cases alleging asbestos exposure. See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 210, 604 A.2d 445 (1992); Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1162 (4th Cir.1986). Because the appellants could not meet that test, their claims failed as a matter of law.

The district court further held that the plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute as to whether Wayne is subject to personal jurisdiction. The court found that Wayne, a Virginia corporation, did not have sufficient “minimum contacts” with Maryland to permit an exercise of personal jurisdiction consistent with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Consulting Engineers Corp. v. Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273, 277 (4th Cir.2009) (A defendant must have “sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state such that ‘the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”)(quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)).

Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, and having had the benefit of oral argument, we affirm the judgment based on the reasoning of the district court. *

AFFIRMED.

* The appellants also argue that the district court abused its discretion by denying their Rule 60(b)(1) motion to file an opposition to GE’s motion for summary judgment out-of-time. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant plaintiffs a third extension of time. See Home Port Rentals, Inc. v. Ruben, 957 F.2d 126, 132 (4th Cir.1992)(explaining that plaintiffs must show that they were not at fault in order to show excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1)).