County of Morton v. Forester

168 N.W. 787, 40 N.D. 281, 1918 N.D. LEXIS 87
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 31, 1918
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 168 N.W. 787 (County of Morton v. Forester) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
County of Morton v. Forester, 168 N.W. 787, 40 N.D. 281, 1918 N.D. LEXIS 87 (N.D. 1918).

Opinions

Christianson, J.

This is an action to enjoin the maintenance of an obstruction to a public highway. The appeal is from an order sustaining a demurrer to the answer. The highway involved runs from Mandan in a southwesterly direction through the county of Morton. The highway runs across both organized and unorganized townships in Morton county. The premises involved in this action are situated in Fair Valley township, which is an organized civil township. Immediately east of Fair Valley township the highway runs across certain unorganized territory, and immediately south of said Fair Valley township it enters the organized township of Flasher.

The answer of the defendant alleges that Fair Valley township is .a duly organized civil township, having a duly elected and qualified board of supervisors; and that such board of supervisors, upon the petition of more than ten legal voters of said township owning and occupying real estate within 1 mile of said highway within said township, after notice and proceedings had as provided by the laws of this state in such cases made and provided, entered an order discontinuing and vacating such highway in Fair Valley township. The answer alleges the proceedings had with respect to such discontinuance with particularity, and it is conceded that the statutory provisions relative to vacation of highways by a board of township supervisors were fully complied with.

The parties are agreed that the only question presented for determination on this appeal is whether the board of supervisors of Fair Valley township had authority to vacate the highway in question. If they had such authority, then the highway no longer exists, and the defendant has not erected, nor does he maintain, an obstruction in a [283]*283highway. On the other hand, if the board of supervisors had no such authority, then the highway has never been vacated; it still exists and the defendant has erected and is maintaining an obstruction therein.

Our statutes provide:

“In the opening, vacating or changing of a highway outside of the limits of incorporated cities, villages or towns, all proceedings relating thereto to acquire right of way and to all other matters connected therewith shall be under the charge and in the name:
“1. Of the board of county commissioners, if the county is without a civil township organization, or if the road is in terrritory not organized into a civil township.
“2. Of the board of township supervisors of organized townships.
“3. Of the board of county commissioners of each county in case the road is between or in two or more counties.
“4. Of the board of township supervisors of each organized civil township in which any part of the road is situated if the road is situated between two civil townships or in more than one civil township.
“5. Of the board' of township supervisors of each organized township and of the board of county commissioners in case the road is situated partly in an organized township and partly in an unorganized township.
“6. Of the board of county commissioners in any case arising under subdivision 4 where the board of township supervisors of the respective civil townships cannot agree or will not take action on petition so to do.” Comp. Laws 1913, § 1921.

And, that “the board having jurisdiction as provided by the provisions of the preceding section may alter or discontinue any road or lay out any new road upon the petition of not less than six legal voters, who own real estate, or who occupy real estate under the Homestead Laws of the Hnited States, or under contract from the state of North Dakota, in the vicinity of the road to be altered, discontinued, or laid out. . . . Comp. Laws 1913, § 1923.

It is the contention of the respondent that the highway involved in this proceeding is situated partly in the organized township of Lair Valley and partly in an unorganized township, and that consequently the board of supervisors of Lair Valley township have no authority [284]*284to vacate that portion of the highway situated within Fair Valley township, but that such authority could only be exercised by the board of township supervisors and the board of county commissioners acting jointly under the provisions of subdivision 5, § 1921,.supra. This contention is predicated solely upon the proposition that the highway as traveled does, in fact, run across both Fair Valley township and the unorganized township lying immediately east of it. There is no contention that the highway in question was laid out by the joint action of the boards of supervisors of organized townships through which it passes, and the board of county commissioners.

In the absence of constitutional restriction, public highways are under full control of the legislature and may be created or vacated in .such manner and through such instrumentalities as the legislature may designate. 37 Cyc. 175. Public highways can only be vacated through the instrumentality and in the mode prescribed by law. 37 Cyc. 176. Ordinarily, the power of vacation is conferred upon the appropriate officers of local governmental subdivisions. And where the statute confers general authority upon a board to vacate public highways, the power extends to all public highways, regardless how they originated. 37 Cyc. 176, 177; State, Snedeker, Prosecutor, v. Snedeker, 30 N. J. L. 80.

It will be noted that § 1921, supra, confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the board of county commissioners to open, vacate, or alter highways situated in unorganized territory in the county. And it confers similar authority upon the board of township supervisors with respect to highways situated in an organized township. It will also be noted that highways within the limits of incorporated cities and villages are expressly exempted from the jurisdiction of such board. In this connection, it may be further noted that § 3599, subd. 7, Comp. Laws 1913, confers powder upon the city council to lay out, establish, open, alter, and improve streets and alleys in cities, and § 3889 and § 3861, subd. 9, Comp. Laws 1913, confer similar powder upon the boards of trustees of villages with respect to streets and alleys situated within a village. The policy of the legislature, as evinced by these different statutes, was to delegate and intrust the power to open, vacate, and change highways within the different organized villages, cities, and townships, to their governing bodies, and to restrict the power of the-[285]*285county commissioners to highways lying within territory not organized into local governmental subdivisions. The wisdom of this policy may be questioned, but that is a matter for the legislature, and not for the courts. And legislation recently enacted in this state evidences a change in the policy, and an intent on the part of the legislature to exercise through the State Highway Commission a more direct state control over the public highways of the state. See Laws 1917, chap. 181.

It will be noted that § 1921, supra, contemplates that the same conditions will confer jurisdiction to vacate a highway which, in the first instance, would confer jurisdiction to establish it.

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Related

Hulett v. Snook
221 N.W. 879 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 1928)
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181 N.W. 885 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 1921)

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Bluebook (online)
168 N.W. 787, 40 N.D. 281, 1918 N.D. LEXIS 87, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/county-of-morton-v-forester-nd-1918.