County of Morris v. Skokowski

432 A.2d 31, 86 N.J. 419, 1981 N.J. LEXIS 1645
Supreme Court of New Jersey·Decided June 17, 1981·Published·Cited by 10 cases

Opinion

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

SULLIVAN, J.

This is an appeal, on direct certification granted, from the decision of the State’s Director of the Division of Local Government Services (Director) refusing to approve the proposed 1981 budget of Morris County. Under the Local Budget Law, N.J. S.A. 40A:4-1 et seq., which is applicable to all counties and municipalities of the State, no budget may be adopted by a local governing body unless the Director shall have previously certified his approval thereof. N.J.S.A. 40A:4-10.

On January 14, 1981, the Board of Chosen Freeholders of Morris County introduced its 1981 budget and transmitted copies of it to the Director as required by N.J.S.A. 40A:4-5. Pursuant to his responsibilities to review proposed budgets, N.J.S.A. 40A:4-76 to 81, the Director examined the Morris County budget and determined that certain amounts included under “Miscellaneous Revenues” could not reasonably be expected to be realized and should not be anticipated as revenues. These amounts consisted of tax revenues to be collected by the State under the Financial Business Tax Law, N.J.S.A. 54:10B-1 et seq., and the Corporation Business Tax Law (Banking corpora *422 tions), N.J.S.A. 54:10A-33 et seq., which revenues Morris County had expected would be apportioned among the State and the several counties in accordance with statutory provisions for distribution. N.J.S.A. 54:10B-24 and N.J.S.A. 54-.10A-33. 1 Based on his determination that the amounts could not reasonably be expected to be realized, the Director refused to approve the proposed Morris County budget. 2

The County appealed to the Local Finance Board of the Division of Local Government, N.J.S.A. 52:27BB-10(4), which conducted a hearing, taking testimony regarding the propriety of including these anticipated revenues in the budget and considering the basis for the Director’s determination. Following the hearing on February 24, 1981, the decision of the Director was affirmed.

The basic issue involves the construction of the Local Budget Law insofar as it allows a governing body to include in its budget “such amounts as may reasonably be expected to be realized in cash during the fiscal year from known and regular sources, or from sources reasonably capable of anticipation.” N.J.S.A. 40A:4-25. Also involved is the scope of the Director’s review under N.J.S.A. 40A:4-77 which requires that he determine “upon the basis of information and data available whether: a. all estimates of revenue are reasonable, accurate and correctly stated.”

The Local Budget Law regulates the budget-making process for all counties and municipalities in the State. It establishes the procedure to be followed in adopting local budgets, N.J.S.A. 40A:4-4 to 10, as well as the form and content thereof, N.J.S.A. 40A:4-21 to 45. All budgets must be prepared on a cash basis *423 unless otherwise permitted by law. N.J.S.A. 40A:4-3. This insures that local governments will pay for the expenses they incur with cash actually collected or received during the fiscal year. The purpose of the Law is to require local governments to follow sound business principles in their budgetary practices. Its aim is to insure that anticipated revenues equal expenditures, State v. Boncelet, 107 N.J.Super. 444, 450-451 (App.Div. 1969), and to prohibit deficit financing. Mount Laurel Township v. Local Finance Board, 166 N.J.Super. 254, 257 (App.Div.1978), aff’d, 79 N.J. 397 (1979).

The real dispute is over the evaluation of certain undisputed facts. While the Financial Business Tax Law and the Corporation Business Tax Law contain provisions for the distribution among the counties of part of the taxes collected by the State under these laws, the provisions are not self-executing and do not constitute legislative appropriations in and of themselves. Unless the Legislature each year includes in its general appropriation law a provision for such distribution, the full amount of taxes collected remains with the State to be used for general state purposes. See City of Camden v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 133, 145-146 (1980).

The record shows that in 1980 the Legislature included in its general appropriation law a provision for the allocation to the counties of a portion of such taxes in accordance with the statutory provisions for distribution, and that the several counties received the amounts allocated to them. It is also undisputed that in preparing its 1981 budget Morris County, in anticipating revenues from these sources, used approximately the same amounts as had been received in 1980.

At the hearing before the Local Finance Board, the Director stated that he had refused to approve the 1981 Morris County budget in order to avoid a deficit therein. He said that he “had been advised by the State Treasurer, with the concurrence of the Governor,” that there would be no payments made in 1981 to the counties from the Financial Business Tax and *424 Corporation Business Tax. 3 He concluded, therefore, that he could not reasonably expect such monies would be realized by the counties in 1981. The Director acknowledged that the Legislature recently had passed a concurrent resolution favoring the continued distribution of these tax monies to the counties but pointed out that the Joint Appropriations Committee had yet to take action on this matter. He also noted the Governor’s power to line item veto these appropriations if the Legislature should include them in the State budget. In view of the uncertainty as to the availability of these monies, the Director determined that they should not be included in the 1981 budget. He expressed the concern that, if these items were included and the funds not made available thereafter, the county would suffer a shortfall resulting in substantial harm to its fiscal integrity. We agree with the action taken by the Director and, therefore, affirm.

The Director’s decision carries with it a presumption of reasonableness and validity. One challenging it bears the burden of demonstrating that the decision was arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious. New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 75 N.J. 544, 561 (1978). Moreover, in reviewing the administrative decision, the standard of judicial review is whether there is sufficient support in the record for the decision. Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 598-599 (1965). Also, recognition must be given to the expertise of the Director and the Board in local government budgetary affairs. Cf. City of Atlantic City v. Laezza, 80 N.J. 255, 265 (1979).

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County of Morris v. Skokowski, 432 A.2d 31, 86 N.J. 419, 1981 N.J. LEXIS 1645 (N.J. 1981).

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