County of Monroe v. Town of Brighton

68 N.E.2d 417, 295 N.Y. 399
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedJuly 23, 1946
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 68 N.E.2d 417 (County of Monroe v. Town of Brighton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
County of Monroe v. Town of Brighton, 68 N.E.2d 417, 295 N.Y. 399 (N.Y. 1946).

Opinions

Conway, J.

In Town of Amherst v. County of Erie (260 N. Y. 361) we held that the county was obligated to reimburse a town for the amount of uncollected taxes as returned by the town collector. Such return disclosed the difference between the total amount levied for .town and special district purposes and the amount received by the town collector and paid over to the town supervisor. We said at p. 368: “ The defendant contends that the law does, not require the county to make up such deficit or permit it to do so. It is urged that the town has been extravagant and reckless; that all of the improvements and the organization of special districts for local improvement purposes was done by the town without the knowledge or consent of the county and without participation by the county in any way therein and it is contended that it would be unjust and *409 inequitable to compel the county to make up the deficit caused by the unwise action of the town.

“ If the expenditures made by the town and the liabilities incurred by it are for governmental purposes and were made in accordance with the terms of the statute, the fact that they were unwisely and recklessly incurred does not create a legal question. Solution of that problem presents a political question which must be solved by the voters of the town or, if checks are needed, they must be supplied by the Legislature.”

In 1933 and 1935 the Legislature adopted tax statutes affecting the county of Monroe and the towns situate therein. Generally, they provided that while the county was obligated to pay the difference between the total amount levied and the amount collected, such “ difference ” must thereafter be repaid by the town to the county less “ any and all collections made by such treasurer of such taxes including interest paid thereon ”. The statutes so enacted were Laws of 1933, chapter 833, and Laws of 1935, chapters 861 and 862.

The county has brought these three actions to recover under those statutes moneys advanced to the defendant towns, repayment of which is alleged to be due.

The learned Official Referee upheld the constitutionality of the statutes. He also answered specific questions propounded by the parties as to the effect of the statutes. Two. of the answers defined the word “ collections ” as including foreclosures by the county and cancellations of penalties and interest by resolution of the County Board of Supervisors. Another answer reached the same conclusion as to penalties collected by the county.

We are in accord with the views of the Official Referee, as modified by the Appellate Division, except as to the matter of penalties, to which reference will now be made.

The Official Referee found that the Board of Supervisors of the county by resolution had cancelled certain interest and penalties which had been added to unpaid taxes, and that the county had also collected certain penalties. No question is raised as to the board’s power to make the cancellations. The towns argue that such cancellation, like the. foreclosure of tax liens, deprived them of possible collection of those penalties, and that such penalties, whether collected or cancelled, should be credited to them. The county argues that the penalties are pot *410 for the benefit of the town, but for the benefit of the purchaser. Laws of 1884, chapter 107, section 6, provides for a 10% penalty “ for the benefit of * * * purchasers ”. The testimony of the Deputy County Treasurer describes the county practice in adding interest charges, penalties and fees to the amount of the unpaid tax. While the statutes provide for crediting the towns with collections of taxes “ including interest paid thereon ”, no mention is made of fees or penalties. The Official Referee wrote that “ penalties, in a broad sense, are nothing more than interest at an increased rate ” and that all items collected by the treasurer should be credited to the towns. He cited Getman v. Niferopulos (276 N. Y. 161), where it was said at p. 171: “ * * * where interest and penalties are allowable by statute, they constitute a part of the tax lien against the property originally charged if they are for the benefit of the unit imposing the tax.” Here it would be the county that was the unit. The county levies the tax (Town Law, § 116, formerly, § 148), collects it (since the town tax collector is the agent of the county), and adds charges (penalties, fees, and interest) to unpaid taxes which go to make up the tax lien. We think that as between the county and the town, the fees certainly belong to the county. The fees, are for advertising, for tax certificates, and for the tax sale. Since the burden of collecting taxes rests on the county, there is no reason to suppose that the Legislature intended the collection of disbursements which the county has presumably made in its attempt to collect the taxes, to be deemed a “ collection of * * * such taxes.” As affecting the penalties, the following are the applicable portions of the statutes relating to cancellation:

(L. 1933, ch. 468):

“ Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, if the board of supervisors of any county shall determine that it is for the best interests of such county, such board may, by resolution, authorize the county treasurer to reduce the rates of interest or of penalties now imposed by law, for failure to pay any real property tax * * *, which shall have been returned as unpaid by a town collector or city treasurer to such county treasurer and for the collection of which no sale of the property shall have been made. If the board of supervisors of any county shall determine that it is for the best interests of such county, such hoard shall have like power to authorize, by resolution, the county *411 treasurer to permit the redemption of any piece of property sold at a tax sale and bid in by such county on such terms as the board of supervisors may make and may remit in whole or in part any penalties and interest imposed by law to which the county or any other municipality shall be lawfully entitled upon' such redemption. Provided, however, that in cases where such interest and penalties, if collected by the county, belong to a municipality therein, no reduction or remission in whole or in part of such interest and penalties shall be made without the consent of the municipality affected * *

(L. 1934, ch. 917):

“ Notwithstanding any other general, special or local law, all penalties on any unpaid taxes and assessments heretofore levied on real property by any municipal corporation, as defined by section 2 of the general municipal law, and for the collection of which no sale of the property shall have been made, may be cancelled and revoked, provided such unpaid taxes and assessments are paid, together with interest thereon at a rate not to exceed six per centum per annum from the time such taxes become due and payable, upon resolution duly adopted by the governing body of any municipal corporation.

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204 Misc. 76 (New York Supreme Court, 1953)

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Bluebook (online)
68 N.E.2d 417, 295 N.Y. 399, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/county-of-monroe-v-town-of-brighton-ny-1946.