County of Dakota v. Worldwide Truck Parts & Metals

511 N.W.2d 769, 245 Neb. 196, 1994 Neb. LEXIS 37, 1994 WL 47056
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 18, 1994
DocketS-91-669
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 511 N.W.2d 769 (County of Dakota v. Worldwide Truck Parts & Metals) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
County of Dakota v. Worldwide Truck Parts & Metals, 511 N.W.2d 769, 245 Neb. 196, 1994 Neb. LEXIS 37, 1994 WL 47056 (Neb. 1994).

Opinion

Hastings, C. J.

Following an action in equity brought by Dakota County, Worldwide Truck Parts and Metals, Jack P. Lemmon, and Marilyn J. Lemmon appealed an order of the district court enjoining them from using the premises as being in violation of the county zoning regulations. Worldwide and the Lemmons appeal, alleging a variety of errors, including the allegation that the county had no jurisdiction under the zoning laws existing over the premises in question. We have reviewed the entire record, the briefs, and the arguments of counsel, which we must do, but because we determine this appeal on the basis of jurisdiction, there is no need to discuss the other errors. We reverse the order and dismiss the cause.

An action for an injunction sounds in equity. Village of Brady v. Melcher, 243 Neb. 728, 502 N.W.2d 458 (1993); Bauer v. Lancaster Cty. Sch. Dist. 001, 243 Neb. 655, 501 N.W.2d 707 (1993).

. In an appeal of an equity action, an appellate court tries factual questions de novo on the record and reaches a conclusion independent of the findings of the trial court, *198 provided, where credible evidence is in conflict on a material issue of fact, the appellate court considers and may give weight to the fact that the trial judge heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than another. K N Energy, Inc. v. Cities of Broken Bow et al., 244 Neb. 113, 505 N.W.2d 102 (1993); Bauer v. Lancaster Cty. Sch. Dist. 001, supra. However, with regard to questions of law, an appellate court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent from the trial court’s conclusion. Kopecky v. National Farms, Inc., 244 Neb. 846, 510 N.W.2d 41 (1994).

The Dakota County zoning resolutions at issue in this case became effective on March 13, 1978. The property in question was zoned R-10 (residential, with 10,000 square feet minimum lot size). For many years prior to the effective date of the resolutions, the property had been operated as a used parts and salvage business by Gilbert VandeMheen. On two or three occasions, a private contractor came to the property with a portable smelter for processing accumulated aluminum.

In 1979, the property was purchased from VandeMheen by Quad States, Inc., and operated by Worldwide, a division of Quad States. Prior to the purchase, Quad States’ president, Jack Lemmon, investigated the operation at that location and determined that the business included selling new or used trucks, selling used parts, and processing metals of all types. Lemmon testified that he did not check to determine whether there were any ordinances which would affect the use of the property. From 1979 to 1985, Worldwide did not engage in any smelting of metals. In 1985, Worldwide purchased a movable aluminum smelter and began smelting aluminum. Approximately 1 year later, a second smelter was purchased. Lemmon estimated that at maximum capacity, the operation could process 10,800 pounds a day. In 1987, Nebraska’s Department of Environmental Control advised Worldwide that a permit was necessary for the smelter and that it would have to be operated in a controlled structuré. Worldwide had a metal pole building constructed to house the smelting operation. In April 1988, a large amount of polyurethane caught fire and burned on the property. The Dakota County Attorney brought criminal charges against Lemmon for unauthorized open *199 burning and maintaining a nuisance. In March 1989, Lemmon pled no contest to the charges and entered into a nolo contendere plea agreement and order of abatement in which he agreed to take remedial steps to prevent future problems with stockpiled polyurethane. That agreement provided that “nothing, contained herein shall prohibit the future smelting of aluminum ... or incinerating of polyurethane foam provided the operations are conducted within the constraints of state and federal law, and any local ordinance or regulation.”

In May 1989, the state Department of Environmental Control filed charges concerning air pollution caused by the April 1988 fire and opacity violations occurring in September 1988 and January 1989. Worldwide entered into a consent decree and paid a $12,556 filie. In August 1989, the Dakota County Attorney filed this action, alleging that the use of the property was a nonconforming and nonpermitted use under Dakota County zoning ordinances and in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 14-406 (Reissue 1991). Worldwide answered and asserted as affirmative defenses that the county did not have authority to regulate the property in question because it was within 2 miles of the city limits of South Sioux City and that the county was barred under the doctrine of laches because of inexcusable delay in asserting its rights. At the conclusion of the trial, the district court found that the county was not estopped from enforcement of its zoning resolutions, that the zoning authority of South Sioux City was not mandatory, and that the use of the property was “an impermissible expansion of the non-conforming use.”

The district court found that Dakota County had jurisdiction over the Worldwide property, noting that

[t]he premises was zoned by the plaintiff in March, 1978 and has been so zoned since that time. While the City of South Sioux City may have had the statutory power to zone the premises, zoning was not mandatory and an agreement between the Plaintiff and the City as to that respective zoning is not prohibited. The Plaintiff has exercised a zoning jurisdiction over the premises, and the Defendant recognized that jurisdiction by applying for a building permit and later in seeking an application to *200 change the zoning, the application going to the Plaintiff.

The authority for a city of the first class, such as South Sioux City, to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction is found in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 16-901 (Reissue 1991), which states in pertinent part:

Any city of the first class may apply by ordinance any existing or future zoning regulations, property use regulations, building ordinances, electrical ordinances, plumbing ordinances, and ordinances authorized by section 16-240 to the unincorporated area two miles beyond and adjacent to its corporate boundaries with the same force and effect as if such outlying area were within the corporate limits of such city____

Although the zoning authority granted by § 16-901 is not mandatory, South Sioux City chose to exercise its authority under this statute, as evidenced by ordinance No. 528, passed and approved on September 19,1967. That ordinance states:

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Bluebook (online)
511 N.W.2d 769, 245 Neb. 196, 1994 Neb. LEXIS 37, 1994 WL 47056, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/county-of-dakota-v-worldwide-truck-parts-metals-neb-1994.