County of Cheatham v. Baker

64 S.W.2d 31, 16 Tenn. App. 1, 1932 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedDecember 10, 1932
StatusPublished

This text of 64 S.W.2d 31 (County of Cheatham v. Baker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
County of Cheatham v. Baker, 64 S.W.2d 31, 16 Tenn. App. 1, 1932 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1932).

Opinion

DeWITT, J.

Upon the final hearing of this cause the original and amended and supplemental bills were dismissed by the Chancellor and the injunction restraining the Commissioner of Highways and Public Works “from constructing State Highway Number 112, and *3 from using funds of the State Highway Department in the construction thereof,” was dissolved. The complainants the County of Cheat-ham and two of its citizens and taxpayers have appealed from this decree, and in their assignments of error they present three propositions :

1. That, “the road project proposed by the Commissioner and enjoined in this case, first known in this record as a removal and relocation of State Highway No. 12, and later described and called by the State No. 112, is not, does not follow, and is not a reconstruction or rebuilding of any ‘Main traveled road,’ the designation and construction of which is provided by law and especially Acts 1919, Chapter 149, Section 7. Its designation and construction is in violation of law, especially of said Act, is beyond the powers of his office and not done in the exercise of his reasonable discretion.
2. That, “in addition to acting in excess of his powers under the law, as set out in Proposition 1, the Commissioner, in attempting the designation and construction of said enjoined project, has not acted in the exercise of his reasonable discretion.
3. That, “The commissioner is in contempt of Court in that he has violated and disobeyed the commands of the injunction served on him, and is not entitled to relief of any sort, especially to a dissolution of the injunction and an order to the Master to report damages for the issuance of the injunction or to a determination of such damages, if any.”

The purposes of the original and amended and supplemental bills are carefully stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court, prepared by Mr. Justice Swiggart, reported in 161 Tennessee, 222 et seq., 30 S. W. (2d), 234, et seq. In that appeal from the action of the Chancellor in dismissing the amended and supplemental bill of the complainants on the demurrer of the defendant, the Commissioner of Highways and Public Works, the law' of the case was fully settled. It was determined that a decision of the Commissioner of Highways to erect or construct a particular highway, reached in the reasonable exercise of his discretion, is not subject to judicial review; but that the Commissioner should be required to answer the amended and supplemental bill to the end that it might be determined upon evidence whether he had acted in the reasonable exercise of the discretion vested in him. The Court was of the opinion that the averments of fact set forth in said bill and carefully summarized in its opinion, showed at least that the County of Cheatham was about to be deprived of substantial rights conferred upon it by statute, without a fair or adequate consideration by the Commissioner of Highways of the facts involved. The demurrer was therefore overruled and *4 the cause was remanded to the Chancery Court for further proceedings. These proceedings have been elaborately conducted. A vast amount of evidence has been adduced by the contending parties. The cause was given thorough consideration by the Chancellor, and he stated in his opinion that he had read every line of the evidence. His finding is that the Commissioner has acted in the reasonable exercise of the discretion vested in him. He decreed that the equities alleged in the original bill and in the amended and supplemental bill are fully met and denied by the answer, and are not sustained by the evidence.

The Commissioner of Highways and Public Works (hereinafter termed the Commissioner) possesses the powers conferred upon the State Department of Highways by chapter 149 of the Public Acts of 1919, among them being the following:

“Sec. 7. Be it further enacted, That the State Highway Commission is given the power to proceed to designate main traveled roads with a view of connecting all county seats, and also to designate other main traveled roads, which are deemed of sufficient importance to be included in the general highway plan of the State and receive for their construction and improvement financial aid under the provisions of this Act.
“Sec. 8. Be it further enacted, That all counties of the State desiring to participate in the expenditure of the funds of the State Highway Department, which shall comply with the requirements of the law and the rules and regulations of the State Highway Commission, shall have the right to participate in said fund and be aided in the construction or reconstruction of roads and bridges therein and the maintenance thereof, if in the discretion of the State Highway Commission the same is deemed advisable.
“Sec. 9. Be it further enacted, That whenever the said State Highway Commission finds it necessary or advisable it shall have the power to alter the course or grade or otherwise improve any road selected, adopted, or accepted for Federal or State aid and take over and improve as a State Highway.”

To the original bill an answer was filed by the then Commissioner, Harry S. Berry. A supplemental answer to the original bill was filed by his successor, Commissioner R. H. Baker. After the cause was remanded to the Chancery Court, an elaborate answer to the amended and supplemental bill was filed by Commissioner Baker. In all these pleadings the controversy was resolved into one primary issue upon the evidence — whether or not the Commissioner has acted in the reasonable exercise of discretion vested in him as to the location of highway No. 112 and the improvement and continued mainte *5 nance of highway No. 12 as proposed, by him, and in doing so had proper regard to the legislative purpose to connect all county seats with improved roads as a part of a general highway plan of the State.

The proposed route No. 112 extends northwestwardly from the Hyde’s Ferry Bridge, near the City of Nashville, to the Cheatham County line, thence in a general northwestwardly • direction through the extreme northern part of Cheatham County and then very directly to the city limit of Clarksville. The total distance is 41.5 miles. At Pleasant View', nine miles north of Ashland City, it would intersect Highway No. 49 which extends from the bridge over Cumberland River at Ashland City northward through Springfield to the Kentucky line. The distance between Ashland City and Nashville via Pleasant View by this proposed road would be about thirty-two miles. The distance by the existing Highway No. 12, the old Hyde’s Ferry Pike, from the Hyde’s Ferry Bridge to Ashland City is about seventeen miles, and the distance by No. 12 from Ashland City to Clarks-ville is 27.49 miles. The total distance from the Hyde’s Ferry Bridge to the city limit of Clarksville by No. 12 is 44.52 miles.

In his answer to the amended and supplemental bill, Commissioner Baker, among other things, averred:

“In view of all the facts which have developed before and since the opinion of the Supreme Court in this cause, respondent’s opinion and judgment is that the interest of the public would be best subserved and that the public needs and public welfare require not only the construction of Highway No.

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Related

Cheatham County v. Baker
30 S.W.2d 234 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1930)
Parks v. Margrave
7 S.W.2d 990 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1928)
Insurance Co. v. Craig
62 S.W. 155 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1901)
Department of Highways v. Stepp
150 Tenn. 682 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1924)

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Bluebook (online)
64 S.W.2d 31, 16 Tenn. App. 1, 1932 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/county-of-cheatham-v-baker-tennctapp-1932.