County of Bingham v. County of Bonneville
Opinions
— Respondent recovered in three respective causes of action: $714.50 for attendance of 31 pupils, residents of appellant county, in the school year 1936-7 at Independent School District No. 30 at Shelley in respondent county; $1,091.87 for 26 pupils in 1937-8; and $1,-396.56 for 67 pupils in 1938-9, under section 32-806 I. C. A., as amended by the 1933 Session Laws, Chapter 205, pages 408-9. 1 The complaint alleged the Shelley School *672 District never notified' respondent’s school superintendent of such attendance, hence no certificate thereof was submitted to appellant by the superintendent until 1940.
The sole basis of appellant’s resistance by general demurrer to the imposition of these charges, and this appeal, is that the complaint disclosing the certificate had not been given within the time specified in the statute (i. e., October first of each current year) did not state a cause of action.
Judgment was rendered upon the overruling of the demurrer and appellant’s failure to plead further.
*673 The statute contains no prohibition against recovery though the certificate be not sent within the prescribed time, nor is there any penalty attached for such dereliction, nor is time of the essence of the right to the statutory contribution. As to these causes of action the statute as to timely notice is therefore directory not mandatory. (In re Overland Co. v. Utter, 44 Ida. 885, 257 Pac. 480; Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. Lincoln Land Co., 50 Wyo. 229, 59 Pac. (2d) 763; Skelly Estate Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 9 Cal. (2d) 28, 69 Pac. (2d) 171; In re Lambert, 53 Wyo. 241, 80 Pac. (2d) 425; Hudgins v. Mooresville Consol. School Dist., 312 Mo. 1, 278 S. W. 769; Mead v. Jasper County, 322 Mo. 1191, 18 S. W. (2d) 464; City of Appleton v. Bachman, 197 Wis. 4, 220 N. W. 393; People v. Lieber, 357 Ill. 423, 192 N. E. 331; Vaughan v. John C. Winston Co., 83 Fed. (2d) 370; 4th Ed. Cooley on Taxation, sec. 510; 25 R. C. L., pages 766-7, sec. 14.)
Counties and school districts are continuing entities, arms of the government, hence the levy of taxes by appellant to reimburse through respondent the Shelley School District its proportionate cost for the education of these pupils, after the serial years in which the services were rendered, does not defeat respondent’s right of recovery.
“Nor do we consider the contention sound, that the apportionments are made and expended in a specific year, and that they are intended and used for the benefit of the youth who are attending that year’s schools and that to take the money out of an apportionment and taxes several years later, to reimburse a district, amounts to visiting upon another generation of students the loss suffered by students who have passed from the student class, and from which the previous body of students profited. A school district is a continuing corporation. (Corum v. Common School Dist. No. 21, 55 Ida. 725, 47 Pac. (2d) 889, 891.) It may be in perpetuity, devoted to the purpose of promoting and fostering general public education among the youth of the district, and is not unlike an eleemosynary trustee; indeed it has sometimes been so chronicled. (People v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129, 45 Pac. *674 270, 35 L. R. A. 269; Collier v. Lindley, 203 Cal. 641, 266 Pac. 526, 528.) The corporate entity is but a trustee for the local public. (Pearson v. State, 56 Ark. 148, 19 S. W. 499, 35 Am. St. 91.)” Independent School Districts v. Common School Districts, 56 Ida. 426, 55 Pac. (2d) 144.
There is no factual showing of loss or injury to appellant, hence we do not' consider any corresponding or responsive right of reduction of respondent’s claim if there had been such showing or a superintendent’s responsibility or liability.
Judgment affirmed. Costs to respondent.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
125 P.2d 315 (County of Bingham v. County of Bonneville) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.