County of Bingham v. County of Bonneville

125 P.2d 315, 63 Idaho 669, 1942 Ida. LEXIS 67
CourtIdaho Supreme Court
DecidedApril 22, 1942
DocketNo. 6971.
StatusPublished

This text of 125 P.2d 315 (County of Bingham v. County of Bonneville) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Idaho Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
County of Bingham v. County of Bonneville, 125 P.2d 315, 63 Idaho 669, 1942 Ida. LEXIS 67 (Idaho 1942).

Opinions

*671 GIVENS, C.J.

— Respondent recovered in three respective causes of action: $714.50 for attendance of 31 pupils, residents of appellant county, in the school year 1936-7 at Independent School District No. 30 at Shelley in respondent county; $1,091.87 for 26 pupils in 1937-8; and $1,-396.56 for 67 pupils in 1938-9, under section 32-806 I. C. A., as amended by the 1933 Session Laws, Chapter 205, pages 408-9. 1 The complaint alleged the Shelley School *672 District never notified' respondent’s school superintendent of such attendance, hence no certificate thereof was submitted to appellant by the superintendent until 1940.

The sole basis of appellant’s resistance by general demurrer to the imposition of these charges, and this appeal, is that the complaint disclosing the certificate had not been given within the time specified in the statute (i. e., October first of each current year) did not state a cause of action.

Judgment was rendered upon the overruling of the demurrer and appellant’s failure to plead further.

*673 The statute contains no prohibition against recovery though the certificate be not sent within the prescribed time, nor is there any penalty attached for such dereliction, nor is time of the essence of the right to the statutory contribution. As to these causes of action the statute as to timely notice is therefore directory not mandatory. (In re Overland Co. v. Utter, 44 Ida. 885, 257 Pac. 480; Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. Lincoln Land Co., 50 Wyo. 229, 59 Pac. (2d) 763; Skelly Estate Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 9 Cal. (2d) 28, 69 Pac. (2d) 171; In re Lambert, 53 Wyo. 241, 80 Pac. (2d) 425; Hudgins v. Mooresville Consol. School Dist., 312 Mo. 1, 278 S. W. 769; Mead v. Jasper County, 322 Mo. 1191, 18 S. W. (2d) 464; City of Appleton v. Bachman, 197 Wis. 4, 220 N. W. 393; People v. Lieber, 357 Ill. 423, 192 N. E. 331; Vaughan v. John C. Winston Co., 83 Fed. (2d) 370; 4th Ed. Cooley on Taxation, sec. 510; 25 R. C. L., pages 766-7, sec. 14.)

Counties and school districts are continuing entities, arms of the government, hence the levy of taxes by appellant to reimburse through respondent the Shelley School District its proportionate cost for the education of these pupils, after the serial years in which the services were rendered, does not defeat respondent’s right of recovery.

“Nor do we consider the contention sound, that the apportionments are made and expended in a specific year, and that they are intended and used for the benefit of the youth who are attending that year’s schools and that to take the money out of an apportionment and taxes several years later, to reimburse a district, amounts to visiting upon another generation of students the loss suffered by students who have passed from the student class, and from which the previous body of students profited. A school district is a continuing corporation. (Corum v. Common School Dist. No. 21, 55 Ida. 725, 47 Pac. (2d) 889, 891.) It may be in perpetuity, devoted to the purpose of promoting and fostering general public education among the youth of the district, and is not unlike an eleemosynary trustee; indeed it has sometimes been so chronicled. (People v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129, 45 Pac. *674 270, 35 L. R. A. 269; Collier v. Lindley, 203 Cal. 641, 266 Pac. 526, 528.) The corporate entity is but a trustee for the local public. (Pearson v. State, 56 Ark. 148, 19 S. W. 499, 35 Am. St. 91.)” Independent School Districts v. Common School Districts, 56 Ida. 426, 55 Pac. (2d) 144.

There is no factual showing of loss or injury to appellant, hence we do not' consider any corresponding or responsive right of reduction of respondent’s claim if there had been such showing or a superintendent’s responsibility or liability.

Judgment affirmed. Costs to respondent.

Budge and Morgan, JJ., concur.
1

“Section 32-806. Apportionment by County Superintendents.— The county superintendent shall require from the county treasurer quarterly each year a report of the amount of money on hand to the credit of the school fund of his county, not already apportioned, and the county treasurer shall furnish such report when required. The county superintendent, upon receiving such report, shall proceed to apportion the public school moneys in the county school fund, both county and state, reported by the county treasurer to be in the county treasury, among the several school districts in the following manner, to-wit:

“He shall apportion to every school district in the county an amount sufficient, when added to the computed yields of the minimum district levies provided in Section 32-702, Idaho Code Annotated, as amended by this Act, and Section 32-704, Idaho Code Annotated, as amended by this Act, to provide one hundred and twenty dollars ($120.00) per month for each elementary classroom unit in which such district is entitled according to the provisions of Section 3 of this Act and one hundred and sixty dollars ($160.00) per month for each high school classroom unit to which such district is entitled according to the provisions of Section 3 of this Act, for each month or major portion thereof the school of such district was in session during the preceding year; provided, for new districts formed from unorganized territory, new districts formed by the consolidation of existing districts, new districts formed by the division of an organized district, and border districts operating under the provisions of Section 32-305, Idaho Code Annotated, the number of months for which such apportionments shall be made shall be computed as provided in subdivision (a), (b), (e), and (d), respectively, of Section 61-806, Idaho Code Annotated, as amended by this Act. Provided, however, in the event there should be insufficient funds in the county school fund to make the full apportionment to each district as in this section provided, all moneys to be apportioned by virtue of the provisions of this section shall be apportioned to the several districts in pro rata proportion, paying *672 such percentages of each apportionment as the money available in, the county school fund will permit.

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Related

Skelly Estate Co. v. City & County of San Francisco
69 P.2d 171 (California Supreme Court, 1937)
Collier v. Lindley
266 P. 526 (California Supreme Court, 1928)
Corum v. Common School District No. Twenty-One
47 P.2d 889 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1935)
In Re Overland Co. v. Utter
257 P. 480 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1927)
The People v. Lieber
192 N.E. 331 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1934)
Hudgins v. Mooresville Consolidated School District
278 S.W. 769 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1925)
Mead v. Jasper County
18 S.W.2d 464 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1929)
Horse Creek Conservation District v. Lincoln Land Co.
59 P.2d 763 (Wyoming Supreme Court, 1936)
Lambert v. Place
80 P.2d 425 (Wyoming Supreme Court, 1938)
People ex rel. Ellert v. Cogswell
45 P. 270 (California Supreme Court, 1896)
Pearson v. State
19 S.W. 499 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1892)
City of Appleton v. Outagamie County
220 N.W. 393 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1928)

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Bluebook (online)
125 P.2d 315, 63 Idaho 669, 1942 Ida. LEXIS 67, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/county-of-bingham-v-county-of-bonneville-idaho-1942.