County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth

534 A.2d 760, 517 Pa. 65, 1987 Pa. LEXIS 843

Opinions

OPINION OF THE COURT

FLAHERTY, Justice *.

The question raised by this appeal is whether the various counties of Pennsylvania are required by statute to fund the common pleas court system, and if they are, whether such a funding scheme is constitutional.

On March 16, 1985 Allegheny County filed an Application for Declaratory Judgment in Commonwealth Court addressed to that court’s original jurisdiction, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 761(a). The County sought a declaration that it was not obligated by statute to fund the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County and an order directing the Commonwealth to fund all aspects of the unified court system of Pennsylvania. Simultaneously, the County also requested this Court to assume extraordinary jurisdiction over the matter. We denied the request for extraordinary jurisdiction and the case proceeded in Commonwealth Court.

In its Application the County alleged that for the fiscal year 1984 it expended $22,327,415 for personnel, facilities, and services necessary for the operation of the county court system and that it employed over 800 persons who were necessary for the court’s functioning. It further alleged that because the number and compensation of employees necessary for the functioning of the court are controlled by county officials other than judges of the Court of Common Pleas, there are continuing disputes between the County and the Court of Common Pleas concerning the funding of these employees. Similarly, according to the County’s application, there are recurrent disputes over the level of funding necessary for supporting facilities and services, which the County acknowledges it is required by statute to provide. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 3721(a).

In response to the County’s Application for Declaratory Judgment, the Commonwealth filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, alleging, inter alia, that the County failed to set forth a cause of action upon which relief may be granted; that the relief sought contravenes the separation of powers doctrine; that the constitutional challenges are without foundation; and that Commonwealth Court was without power to direct the Executive Branch to fund the courts. Commonwealth Court sustained the demurrer on the grounds that the Application presented no justiciable controversy and the court was without power to fashion the remedy requested by the county.

Citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), Commonwealth Court reasoned that the issues raised in this case are non-justiciable because there is “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate governmental branch and impossibility of an appropriate judicial remedy.” 93 Pa.Comwlth Ct. 112, 114, 500 A.2d 1267 (1985). In other words, in the view of Commonwealth Court, the matter was not capable of resolution by the courts since it had been constitutionally assigned as being within the sole province of another branch of government. In support of this view, the court made reference to this Court’s decision in Shapp v. Sloan, 480 Pa. 449, 469, 391 A.2d 595 (1978) in which we held that the General Assembly “has been given the constitutional power to determine what [governmental] programs will be adopted ... and how they will be financed.”

We disagree that the issues raised in this case are non-justiciable. The United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr defined “non-justiciability” as follows:

In the instance of non-justiciability, consideration of the cause is not wholly and immediately foreclosed; rather, the Court’s inquiry necessarily proceeds to the point of deciding whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded.

369 U.S. at 198, 82 S.Ct. at 700, 7 L.Ed.2d at 674. Since this is a declaratory judgment action, the court’s inquiry concerns the ascertainment of the rights of the parties and whether protection for the asserted right can be judicially molded. See The Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7531-7541.

In Shapp v. Sloan, 480 Pa. 449, 391 A.2d 595 (1978), this Court recognized the authority of the General Assembly to control the state’s finances, but the Court also recognized that the General Assembly’s control of fiscal matters might, in particular circumstances not present in that case, be limited by the constitution. Shapp v. Sloan, therefore, is no authority for the proposition that control of the state’s finances has been incontrovertibly and in all instances assigned to the authority of the General Assembly. Moreover, in Beckert v. Warren, 497 Pa. 137, 145, 439 A.2d 638 (1981), we reaffirmed the holding of Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 57, 66 A.2d 577, 579 (1949), that although control of state finances rests with the legislature, that control is subject to constitutional limitations.

Essentially, this is a case in which Commonwealth Court was called upon to determine, by way of familiar principles of constitutional and statutory construction whether the General Assembly has imposed any obligations on the County to fund Pennsylvania’s court system, and if it has, whether these obligations are constitutional. Since, as we have seen, the financing of state institutions has not been incontrovertibly and in all cases relegated to the direction and control of the General Assembly, and since the rights of the parties were able to be determined by construction of the relevant statutes and constitutional provisions, it was error for Commonwealth Court to hold that the case is non-justiciable and to enter judgment upon preliminary objections.

Ordinarily, we would remand for trial a case erroneously decided upon preliminary objections, but in this case Commonwealth Court also addressed the merits and resolved them against the County. Since the record is complete and we are required only to address legal, not factual questions, we will treat the case as having been decided upon the merits below.

The first issue raised by the County is whether there is a statutory requirement that the County fund the courts within its judicial district. Although the County concedes that it is required by the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 3721, to furnish certain accommodations, goods and services for the functioning of the courts within its judicial district, it argues that there is no statutory requirement that it employ personnel for use in the court system.

The Judicial Code requires that County officials provide adequate staff for the courts:

Whenever necessary, it shall be the duty of county officers to appoint or detail such county staff as shall enable the judges of the courts embracing the county to properly transact the business before their respective courts.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2302. Further, the County is required to establish and maintain a judicial and related account. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 3541. Out of this account the County must pay:

(1) Salaries, fees and expenses of:

(i) Appointive judicial officers.

(ii) Other system and related personnel which by statute are required to be paid by the political subdivision.

(2) Salaries, fees and expenses of jurors, witnesses and all other persons paid under authority of law by the political subdivision for the maintenance of judicial and related functions.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 3544. The Code also provides:

Except as otherwise provided by statute, each county shall continue to furnish to the court of common pleas and community court embracing the county, to the minor judiciary established for the county and to all personnel of the system, including central staff entitled thereto, located within the county, all necessary accommodations, goods and services which by law have heretofore been furnished by the county.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 3722. Finally, we note that the Second Class County Code mandates that a salary board shall fix the compensation of certain court employees:

The board, subject to limitations imposed by law, shall fix the compensation of all appointed county officers, and the number and compensation of all deputies, assistants, clerks and other persons whose compensation is paid out of the county treasury, and of all court criers, tipstaves and other court employes, and of all officers, clerks, stenographers and employes appointed by the judges of any court and who are paid from the county treasury.

16 P.S. § 4823. See also The County Code, 16 P.S. § 1623, where similar obligations are imposed upon counties of the third through eighth classes. In sum, it is apparent that the General Assembly intended to create a legislative scheme in which funding of the various judicial districts was primarily a responsibility of the counties, and that these responsibilities include the funding of salaries, services and accommodations for the judicial system.¹ We conclude, therefore, that the County’s statutory claim is without merit.

Next the County claims that the current system of requiring the counties to fund the respective court systems within their judicial districts is unconstitutional in that it does not create a unified court system, as is mandated by Article 5, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. That provision states:

The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial system consisting of the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court, courts of common pleas, community courts, municipal and traffic courts in the City of Philadelphia, such other courts as may be provided by law and justices of the peace. All courts and justices of the peace and their jurisdiction shall be in this unified judicial system.

(Emphasis added). Whether the county’s claim has merit will depend, in large part, upon the meaning of “unified.”

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “unify,” in pertinent part, as follows:

to cause to be one: make into a coherent group or whole: give unity to: HARMONIZE

The County's claim, in essence, is that the current method of funding is inimical to a "unified judicial system," and indeed, is fraught with dissention and conflict which produces fragmentation. In support of this claim, the County points out that because it determines the number of employees who are necessary to the functioning of the Court of Common Pleas, 16 P.S. § 4820 and 4823, and their compensation, 16 P.S. § 4820 and 4823, and acts as their employer for collective bargaining purposes, See Ellenbogen v. County of Allegheny, 479 Pa. 429, 388 A.2d 730 (1978), these mandated activities often embroil county authorities in disputes with the various judicial districts. Such disputes include disagreement over the scope of bargaining power of the County Commissioners, County of Allegheny v. Allegheny Court Association of Professional Employees, 22 Pa. D. & C. 3d 166 (1981), aff'd 67 Pa.Comwlth.Ct. 277, 446 A.2d 1370 (1982); alloc. denied, Oct. 18, 1982; whether the Board has legislative power to reject labor arbitration awards, County of Allegheny v. Allegheny Court Association of Professional Employees, 99 Pa.Comwlth. 530, 513 A.2d 1101, and whether the County's mandatory retirement system should be implemented with respect to court employees, Kaplan v. Foerster, et al., Alleg. Co. Court of Common Pleas,

Moreover, in addition to matters related to collective bargaining and pension funds, there is a history of strife between the various judicial districts and the counties regarding funding. To cite only three examples, in the leading case of Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949), the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County entered a mandamus Order against the county to pay salary increases for court stenographers. In Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193 (1971), the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia sued to require the Mayor and City Council of Philadelphia to appropriate additional funds requested by the court for expenses related to court administration for the fiscal year 1971. And in Beckert v. Warren, 497 Pa. 137, 439 A.2d 638 (1981) the judges of the Court of Common Pleas sued to enjoin the County Commissioners from adopting a budget for the year 1981 which did not fund the court's requests and which did not fund certain new positions.

It goes without saying that when relations between the judicial branch and the county governments deteriorate to the point where litigation is required to settle disagreements as to funding, the relationship is neither harmonious nor unified, but rather, fragmented. The Commonwealth argues that however this may be, the framers of the 1968 Constitution did not address the question of funding, and intended, therefore, that the courts should continue to be funded as they had in the past.

While it is true that the 1968 Constitution of Pennsylvania does not specify the manner in which courts are to be funded, the constitution does require that the judicial system shall be unified. It is inconceivable that unity, in any meaningful sense of that word, can be attributed to a court system characterized by management and fiscal disagreements which periodically culminate in litigation in which the various counties and the courts within them are set off against each other as antagonists.

Although the dissent argues that the county court system is currently funded by an exercise of the taxing power delegated to the counties by the state, and that there is, therefore, no absence of unity in the system, this argument is illusory. While it may be true that the county derives its taxing power from the state, it is also true, nevertheless, that these “state” funds are being administered by local authorities in a manner that causes continual friction and dissention.

Our interpretation of the concept “unified judicial system” depends, as does virtually all constitutional construction, not only upon a literal meaning of words, but also upon an awareness of the legal and constitutional implications of those words. In addition to the concerns already discussed, two additional matters should be mentioned.

First, the employment of staff. The purpose of a unified judicial system is to provide evenhanded, unbiased and competent administration of justice. The expectation is that cases will be processed as well in one county as another. In order to meet this expectation, however, judicial resources and staffing must be proportionately similar in all judicial districts. There must be uniform hiring practices and standards, and judges must be free to hire competent staff, not merely those referred by local political figures. If the staffing of court-related positions is treated as an opportunity to repay political debts rather than as an opportunity to serve the public by hiring qualified people who are able to make the system work efficaciously, the system will be neither evenhanded nor competent.

A second matter is the public’s perception of the judicial system. The citizens of this Commonwealth have a right not only to expect neutrality and fairness in the adjudication of legal cases, but also, they have a right to be absolutely certain this neutrality and fairness will actually be applied in every case. But if court funding is permitted to continue in the hands of local political authorities it is likely to produce nothing but suspicion or perception of bias and favoritism. As the framers of our constitution recognized, a unified system of jurisprudence cannot tolerate such uncertainties. All courts must be free and independent from the occasion of political influence and no court should even be perceived to be biased in favor of local political authorities who pay the bills.

For the foregoing reasons we hold that the statutory scheme for county funding of the judicial system is in conflict with the intent clearly expressed in the constitution that the judicial system be unified. The order of Commonwealth Court is vacated and judgment is entered for the County.

However, because this order entails that present statutory funding for the judicial system is now void as offending the constitutional mandate for a unified system, we stay our judgment to afford the General Assembly an opportunity to enact appropriate funding legislation² consistent with this holding. Until this is done, the prior system of county funding shall remain in place.³

HUTCHINSON, J., did not participate in the decision of this case. NIX, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion which McDermott, j., joined.

Footnotes

*

This case was reassigned to this writer on February 25, 1987.

1

. Accord, Beckert v. Warren, 497 Pa. 137, 439 A.2d 638 (1981), where this Court held that the Judicial Code and the County Code together require not only that counties fund reasonably necessary court personnel, but also that they- fund new positions which were found to be reasonably necessary.

2

. The authority of this Court to direct payment of funds necessary for the funding of the judicial system does not intrude upon the legislative power of appropriation, but is merely an exercise of this Court's inherent power to preserve itself as a coordinate branch of government. See Leahey v. Farrell, supra; Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, supra.

3

. Our approach to the problem of maintaining a constitutionally flawed system until another system can be implemented is borrowed from the United States Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 2880, 73 L.Ed.2d 598, 626 (1982). In that case the Court held that although the legislative grant of authority to bankruptcy judges was unconstitutional, the holding was to be applied prospectively only and was stayed in order to afford Congress an opportunity to address the problem created by its statute.